Whose security?

Integration and integrity in EU policies for security and development

An assessment prepared for the Association of World Council of Churches-related development agencies in Europe

*"Development has to be the first line of defence for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. Combating **poverty** will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen states' capacity to combat terrorism, organised crime and proliferation. Development makes everyone more secure. There is an agreed international framework for how to achieve these goals, set out in the Millennium Declaration and the Monterrey Consensus, but implementation lags." (United Nations: A more secure world: our shared responsibilities, report of the Secretary-General's high-level panel on threats, challenges and change, 2004)*

Clive Robinson **June 2005**

Preface

Over the past two years or so, European Union institutions have issued a number of policy documents and statements signaling a paradigm shift in the approach to the issue of security and development. These documents raise concerns about the specific role of development and humanitarian aid policies in the broader context of EU external policies. There are signs that long-term poverty reduction is losing ground as the primary objective, while security and stability are gaining importance.

Aprodev recognises the obvious and close links which exist between peace, security and development. Development co-operation policies (and related budgets) should not be autonomous but their integrity should be safeguarded. Promoting the security of (northern) donor countries cannot take precedence over the primary goal of development co-operation, which is to improve the livelihoods of poor people with the ultimate objective of eradicating poverty. If development and humanitarian aid policies are made subject to security imperatives, we will return to the Cold War logic when geo-political motives dominated development policies. Indeed, the question should be asked 'whose security' are we talking about?

In order to assess the changing EU external relations policy framework from a development perspective, Aprodev asked Clive Robinson to identify the main issues at stake and to formulate policy recommendations for Aprodev and its member organisations. As his report was finalised prior to the decisions of the Council meeting in June about the future of the Constitutional Treaty, no account could be taken of the possible implications of these decisions on the external policies of the EU.

We are very grateful to Clive Robinson for producing this discussion paper. For Aprodev, this is 'work in progress' and further input from other perspectives will be sought, especially from civil society organisations in other parts of the world. We hope that publishing this paper will stimulate further reflection and action concerning the specific role of development co-operation in the broader context of EU external policies.

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Contents

		Page
Executive summary		**1**
1	**Introduction**	**3**
2	**Purpose of the paper**	**3**
Security and development: where we are now		
3	**The policy interface**	**4**
4	**Human security, human development and human rights**	**6**
5	**Gender, childhood and security**	**8**
The EU policy framework		
6	**European security strategy**	**10**
7	**A human security doctrine for Europe**	**13**
8	**Development policy statement**	**16**
EU policy instruments		
9	**Conditionality in aid agreements**	**16**
10	**Financial perspectives 2007-2013**	**17**
11	**Development cooperation and economic cooperation instrument**	**19**
12	**Stability instrument**	**20**
13	**What counts as ODA: the DAC criteria**	**21**
14	**Conflict prevention**	**22**
15	**Recommendations**	**24**
16	**Conclusions**	**25**
Annex 1	**Bibliography**	**27**

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Executive summary

The end of the Cold War refocused the European Union's (EU) attention both on its 'near neighbourhood' and on the needs of the world's poorest people. With the trend towards inclusion of 'first-world' security criteria in development policies, APRODEV, CIDSE and Caritas Europa organised an internal workshop in November 2004. As follow-up, this paper was commissioned by APRODEV to identify priority issues for lobby and advocacy concerning EU policies for development and security. It was based on desk research and interviews with staff of APRODEV agencies.

There are signs that donors want to change the conditions of aid to respond to the threat of 'global terrorism', but poor people suffer disproportionately from insecurity and development policy needs to be clear about whose security is the priority. The absence of global justice is a fundamental challenge. Military interventions can never bring peace; they can only make the guns fall silent. There is an emerging norm of a collective 'responsibility to protect' and UN peace missions integrate humanitarian, political and military elements. The UN and humanitarian aid NGOs have developed codes of conduct for the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action but these principles are not applied to development programmes and budgets.

The doctrine of human security has been developed to embrace the full range of deprivation, not just violent threats. It is larger than traditional state-based security and complements the expansionist idea of human development by focusing on 'downside risks'; as it also carries ethical and political force, it can be seen as a class of human rights. Faith-based agencies add to these approaches the preferential option for the poor and the search for a more just and peaceful world. A greater number of deaths occur from suicide and homicide than from war. Women are most vulnerable to domestic violence and rape has also now become an instrument of war and terror. Women's participation in political decision-making, including peacebuilding and security, needs to be promoted.

Changes are taking place in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as shown by the proposal under the draft constitution to appoint an EU Foreign Minister, who would combine the Commission's external relations functions with the CFSP. The European Security Strategy, as a response to the unilateralist character of US strategy, takes a more comprehensive, multilateralist approach, recognising that threats cannot be tackled by purely military means: 'with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad'. Development assistance is seen as one of the instruments at the EU's disposal, as are rapidly deployable battle groups and a civilian capacity of police, legal and civilian staff. These proposals are supported by a 'human security doctrine for Europe', outlining seven principles according to which 'human security response forces', paid from the CFSP budget, would operate. Some in APRODEV have seen this doctrine as narrowing the scope for reform of wider EU policies affecting human security. The Madrid declaration, made in response to the bombings, makes further proposals for the use of policy dialogue and aid instruments to counter terror. The EU's development policy statement of 2000 is being revised with a view to including the complementarity of security and development. APRODEV believes that development and human rights should be seen as end goals and not simply as instruments to the achievement of other aims of EU external relations policy.

The EU's wish to include clauses in aid agreements against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to fight terrorism has been tested with their addition to the Cotonou Agreement, with a view in the development community that aid programmes should be linked to performance against poverty reduction and not to performance against global security goals. The Commission aims to rationalise the profusion of aid budgets with a proposal reducing them from 90 to just six new legal instruments. The parameters of some of the instruments proposed would make it more difficult to monitor the EU's spending on poverty reduction. In the draft Financial Perspectives for 2007-2013, the largest instrument, meant to deliver the Union's contribution to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), is set to take a lower share of spending, relative to more security-focused instruments. A diversion of aid from poverty reduction towards 'neighbourhood and security' objectives is being proposed. The share allocated to the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument (DCECI) should increase at least ***proportionately*** with the overall increase in the external relations envelope.

As drafted, the DCECI fails to reflect the Commission's stated principle that policy should precede instruments. It is encroached by including activities also covered by the Stability instrument, including economic cooperation with no poverty criteria and receiving a diminishing share of aid funds. The EU needs an instrument dedicated to the pursuit of poverty eradication in developing countries. The proposed Stability instrument, smaller in size than DCECI, was planned to support DAC-ineligible peacekeeping operations of third countries as well as several DAC-eligible purposes. APRODEV agencies feel that short-term military stabilisation may be necessary, perhaps with a stronger mandate from the UN or the AU, but that it should be financed by the CFSP, separately from development expenditure. A ring-fenced Stability instrument might produce greater clarity in protecting development expenditure through the DCECI. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recently classified six new areas of aid as overseas development assistance (ODA). It already excludes the supply or financing of military equipment or services. In view of the close relationship between ODA eligibility and EU instruments, APRODEV members may be vigilant that there should be 'no further erosion' and explore the 'roll-back' of eligibility in the case of some existing items.

Although EU institutions and NGOs have made substantial efforts to promote conflict prevention, church agencies have not systematically brought together all the grassroots experiences they have had, nor have they had a forum or process to discuss the dynamics underlying violence. Women can be key change agents in conflict prevention through social networks across conflict lines.

The report ends with recommendations for policy changes and further work (8 to the EU, 5 to the EU and other donors, 9 to APRODEV and other ecumenical actors). While subscribing to coherence, APRODEV agencies believe that there should be a division of labour and mandates. Integrity (of tasks, of budgets) is a value that APRODEV agencies would apply to the EU's work for poverty reduction. EU citizens are entitled to a clear picture of how much the Union is spending on poor people and the MDGs. The distinct contribution of development assistance is to tackle the longer-term, underlying causes of global insecurity linked to poverty and inequality.

1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War around 1990 signalled three trends which were to affect the evolution of the European Union's development assistance policy. While aid has always been given from a mixture of motives, the delinking of aid from strategic Cold War considerations allowed donors during the 1990s to refocus attention on the needs of the world's poorest people. This movement culminated in the adoption in 2000 of the Millennium Development Goals, heroic not only in their ambition but also in the failure of the international community to live up to their requirements since. The second trend, specific to the Union, was the refocus of its aid on its 'near neighbourhood' of countries. As a result, between 1990 and 2000 EC aid to low-income countries fell from 76% to less than 40% and EC aid to poor countries declined by 12% in absolute terms over the decade. The third trend, common like the first to all OECD donors, is the growing inclusion of 'first-world' security criteria in development policies and instruments. For developed countries, insecurity no longer arises from border incursions by foreign armies; it is perceived to arise from trafficking (in people, drugs and guns), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorists, recruited from the injustices done in Palestine and Iraq or from the disorder of failed states.

To begin an assessment of these trends, especially the third, at EU level the three Brussels-based networks of faith-based development and humanitarian aid organisations, APRODEV, CIDSE and Caritas Europa, organised an internal workshop in November 2004. Papers presented at the workshop identified a number of problems worrying development specialists and supporters in the churches:

- aid agreements including conditionality on recipient countries' cooperation in counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of WMD
- development programmes being remoulded as a pre-planned strategic component of post-intervention reconstruction, with pressure on states that did not intervene militarily to share the burden of long-term clean-up
- under 'mission and mandate creep', military forces delivering humanitarian aid, blurring the boundaries and making civilian aid workers more of a military target
- use of the language of human security to promulgate the case for joint military/ civilian peacekeeping missions
- reclassification of official aid by the DAC to include some military expenditures
- continuing re-allocation of resources away from poor people to areas perceived as the most immediate threats to Europe.

The workshop discussed these problems in terms of both short-term lobby and advocacy positions and longer-term reflection on the issues. A dossier of the outputs of the workshop is available on the Aprodev website and this discussion paper has been commissioned as a first attempt to take forward the analysis.

2 Purpose of the paper

The objective of the consultancy is ***to identify priority issues for lobby and advocacy positions of Aprodev concerning EU policies regarding development and security.*** The purpose is three-fold:

1 to make proposals for Aprodev lobby and advocacy positions vis-à-vis the European Union regarding the future importance and relevance of the relationships between 'development', 'security' and 'conflict prevention/ transformation' in the debates on the Common Foreign and Security Policy;

2 to relate these issues to the analyses and recommendations as reflected in the APRODEV/CIDSE/Caritas Europa discussion paper (4 November 2004) and the report of the workshop (issues for mid-term reflection, immediate issues)[1];
3 to assess which issues need to be further elaborated and which topics need to be further discussed in order to find common ground.

The ten-day consultancy was commissioned in April 2005, based on desk research and semi-structured interviews with a small number of staff in selected APRODEV (and related) agencies. As the work had to keep in view the EU decision-making calendar, time did not allow interviews to be conducted with southern partners. Feedback at the time of the APRODEV annual meeting in June 2005 has now been integrated. The paper is in three main sections: a review of the wider debates around security and development, an examination of developments in EU policies and a look at the changing nature of EU instruments. It concludes by identifying recommendations, areas for further work and general conclusions.

Security and development: where we are now

3 The policy interface

Poor people suffer disproportionately from insecurity. Casualties from international terrorism between 1998 and 2004 were nearly 28,000 in Africa and Asia, compared with 5,000 in North America and Western Europe[2]. Yet terrorism accounts for only a tiny share of violence-related deaths (as illustrated on page 8). War (in developing countries) and interpersonal violence account for much more. The international community needs to be clear about 'whose insecurity?' is the priority. As there has been a growth in failing states over recent years, it has become common to say that security is a pre-condition of development. There are signs that the donor community wants to change the shape and conditions of aid in order to respond to the threat of 'global terrorism'. What northern security strategies have not done is to question their own co-responsibility for the economic, social, political and environmental decline which has produced failed states, internal/regional conflicts, international crime and terrorism. As the UN high-level panel says, "Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being."[3] The Development Assistance Committee of OECD, whose definitions govern what is and is not classed as aid, published in 2003 *A development cooperation lens on terrorism prevention* which noted, "Development cooperation does have an important role to play in helping to deprive terrorists of popular support… and donors can reduce support for terrorism by working towards preventing the conditions that give rise to violent conflict in general and that convince disaffected groups to embrace terrorism in particular… this may have implications for priorities including budget allocations and levels and definitions of ODA eligibility criteria."

APRODEV agencies detect a similar trend among politicians to link security and development in ways that make it hard to distinguish the logics and activities of the two sectors. There has been an inflationary use of the term 'humanitarian' to describe military interventions, with the language, the aid and the budgets of development

[1] APRODEV, CIDSE and Caritas Europa: Security and development, dossier of an internal workshop
[2] DFID, 2005
[3] United Nations: A more secure world: our shared responsibilities, report of the Secretary-General's high-level panel on threats, challenges and change, 2004

appropriated for political purposes. The Directors of the three German church-based development agencies, in a 2003 statement[4], considered, "the justification that threats must be averted as problematic, politically as well as ethically. The absence of global justice is a fundamental challenge to us, because it has for a long time been violating the lives of billions of people day-by-day, and not because it has for a short time also been linked to the horrifying terrorist use of force. It is not fear that makes us act, but the conviction that another world is necessary and possible."

The record of 'humanitarian' interventions has been to stop extreme violence in some cases, produce new conflicts in others but not to resolve substantially the underlying causes. One form of intervention, much discussed since events in Rwanda and the Balkans, is the 'emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect': sovereign states have a duty to protect their own citizens. When they fail to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states, ultimately through enforcement action. Action is to be taken to avoid, "Large-scale loss of life (actual or apprehended), with genocidal intent or not, that is the product of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, act of terror or rape."[5] This is a classic response to symptoms rather than causes. There needs to be an honest examination of what was and is the role of the international community in the spread of war and insurgency which calls for the need to protect. Moreover, the protection of citizens of other countries through such a doctrine is different from an extended right of self-defence of one's own citizens, as some northern security strategies have claimed.

A stronger mandate for peace enforcement actions sanctioned by the UN Security Council in situations like Darfur and DRC has some support among APRODEV agencies, provided that it is recognised for what it is: military or police action and not misleadingly described as 'humanitarian'. The prevailing view among the agencies is that military interventions can never bring lasting peace; they can at best make the guns fall silent. By virtue of its Charter and the experience of its Security Council, the UN has held peacemaking and development in creative tension since its inception. The Secretary-General's report for the General Assembly session on the Millennium Development Goals in September 2005 contains proposals on 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear'. For the latter he notes that, "No part of the UN system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace," and he proposes a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office. In practice, many UN peace missions involve humanitarian, political and military elements: humanitarian aid is often seen as a 'tool in the toolbox' of conflict management. There is a, "need to ensure that the long-term perspectives of transition and development are embedded from the outset of a mission."[6]

[4] Misereor, Brot für die Welt and EED, 2003

[5] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), p VIII, 2001. This Commission, echoing former 'just war' theologies, proposes six criteria which must be satisfied to justify international intervention: just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects of success, right authority.

[6] Eide, Espen Barth, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen von Hippel: Report on integrated missions: Practical perspectives and recommendations, independent study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005

This has not always been the case. The NATO concept of CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) has been interpreted as civil support measures to military operations, to gain acceptance, support and intelligence from the local population. The example was given of the German army training teachers in Kosovo with the objective of force protection. However, the experience of the UN and humanitarian aid NGOs has led to the development of codes and guidelines governing the independence of humanitarian action. In 1994, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published the *Oslo Guidelines*, a non-binding document for UN agencies that describes civil-military cooperation in technical and natural disasters. It followed this with principles for *Civil-military relations in complex emergencies* in 2004[7]. Humanitarian aid NGOs regard themselves as bound by the Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief[8] and/or by the *Position paper on humanitarian-military relations in the provision of humanitarian assistance* of the Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response[9].

The Red Cross insists that, "Measures are humanitarian if they meet the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. Aid measures that do not are not humanitarian, regardless of any well-meaning intentions and their effectiveness." These principles are important for the security of beneficiaries as well as that of aid workers. Humanitarian aid must also be subject to civil coordination (eg by OCHA in the UN context). Explaining its proposed new aid instruments (see pages 18-21), the European Commission says, "Humanitarian aid remains outside this framework, in order to preserve the principle that humanitarian aid is delivered purely on the basis of human need and is not subject to political considerations."[10] Why is this principle not applied to development programmes and budgets? Presumably because humanitarian aid actors have encountered the problems of coordination in operational mode on the ground to a greater extent than development actors (many NGOs finance partners' development programmes rather than being operational themselves). The much wider scope of development assistance and the fact that it is so often delivered to governments make it difficult to free such assistance from political motivation.

4 Human security, human development and human rights

The extended concept known as human security emerged when UNDP published its Human Development Report on this theme in 1994. This advocated a greater emphasis on people's security than on territorial security. A Commission on Human Security appointed by the UN, which reported in 2003[11], defined human security as, "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment." A secure society has also been seen as the fulfilment of four fundamental conditions: an environment sustained for human life, physical survival needs met, human dignity respected, protection from avoidable harm. It needs a positive framing as the realisation of social justice and peace, not just freedom from threats. In his report to the general assembly this year, Kofi Annan says, "We must

[7] Inter-agency Standing Committee: Civil-military relations in complex emergencies, 2004
[8] International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1994 http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct
[9] Position paper on humanitarian-military relations in the provision of humanitarian assistance of the Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response, 2004 revision
[10] European Commission working document Fiche No 36: Stability instrument – interaction with the proposed policy-driven instruments and with the CFSP budget, October 2004
[11] Commission on Human Security: Human security now, 2003

respond to HIV/AIDS as robustly as we do to terrorism and to poverty as effectively as we do to proliferation."

How does the concept of human security relate to human development and human rights? The report *Human security now* (2003) draws on the experience of its co-editor Amartya Sen to explain. Human development shifted the focus of development attention away from economic growth to the quality and richness of human lives. Human development has a buoyant quality, as it is concerned with progress and augmentation. "It is out to conquer fresh territory on behalf of enhancing human lives and is too upbeat to focus on rearguard actions to secure what has to be safeguarded. Human security supplements the expansionist perspective of human development by paying attention to 'downside risks'. The insecurities that threaten human survival or safety, or imperil the dignity of men and women, or expose [us] to disease and pestilence, or subject vulnerable people to abrupt penury demand that special attention be paid to the dangers of sudden deprivation. Human security demands protection from these dangers and the empowerment of people so that they can cope with – and when possible overcome – these hazards."[12] Insecurity is a different – and much starker – problem than unequal expansion.

Human rights begin as ethical claims on behalf of every human being. Even where they are not legalised, the affirmation of human rights (and related activities of advocacy and monitoring of abuse) can be effective through the politicisation of ethical commitments. As human security likewise demands ethical force and political recognition, it can be seen as an important class of human rights. It may help to show the complementarity between the three concepts diagrammatically (see page 8). In earlier writing[13], Amartya Sen came close to the complementarity between human development and human security with his entitlement theory: entitlement protection against famine, entitlement promotion for freedom from hunger. It could be debated whether human security really adds value to these concepts but it is interesting that the subsequent discourse has taken the name of 'food ***security***'.

The strength of the human security perspective is that it keeps the full range of human deprivation in view. It is larger than state security: the primacy of human rights distinguishes human security from traditional state-based approaches. It is about the individual's ability to move in one's neighbourhood without fear and control one's own destiny. Some in APRODEV agencies find it helpful, especially those familiar with the oppressive nature of state security in some Latin American countries. Others do not find it so useful, either because the state has a monopoly of force and the citizen has no way of enforcing his/her security, or because the state's power has disintegrated, leaving millions of people in the south at the mercy of lawlessness.

The faith-based agencies see something beyond human security. As Geraldine McDonald points out in her workshop paper[14], the preferential option for the poor and powerless combined with the hope for a more just and peaceful world are the cornerstone of their approach. Church-based development cooperation cannot be subsumed to an idea of security focused on preserving and protecting the way of life of people in the north. Peace cannot be restored 'from above'. Achieving a fair

[12] Ibid, page 8
[13] Drèze, Jean and Amartya Sen: *Hunger and public action*, 1989
[14] APRODEV, CIDSE and Caritas Europa: Security and development, dossier of an internal workshop

balance of interests is political and must be done principally by the society affected. For peace to be sustainable, it must grow 'from below'.



5 Gender, childhood and security

Any concept of security (even the human security approach) is insufficient unless it differentiates between the type and scale of insecurity affecting men and women, young and old. Whose security is at stake, when and where? World Health Organisation's 2002 report *World report on violence and health* estimated that in 2000 1,659,000 people died as a result of violence:

815,000 (49.1%) from suicide
520,000 (31.3%) from homicide
310,000 (18.6%) from war-related violence

Even if these figures understate war casualties[15], they suggest that the various manifestations of violence range more widely than war (and interpersonal and self-directed violence are more likely to be under-reported than deaths in war). The different forms of violence affect men and women, young and old, differently. The great majority of deaths from violence (91.1%) occurred in low- to middle-income countries; fewer than 10% in high-income countries. Males account for 77% of all homicides and 60% of all suicides. Almost half the women who die owing to homicide are killed by their current or former partner, making the home the most dangerous place for women worldwide. The WHO report also notes that one third of girls experience their first sexual encounter in a forced or coercive way. The issues of bodily integrity that women identify as crucial to their intimate security (reproductive rights and violence in the family) lead to fear which limits women's access to resources and basic activities.

[15] The Secretary-General's report to the 2005 UN General Assembly notes that 3.8 million people have been killed in the Democratic Republic of Congo alone since 1997.

Violence against women and children is not only a human security issue in its own right, but a manifestation of other forms of domination and insecurity. The existing climate of impunity for violence in the family feeds the culture of impunity towards violence more generally. It reinforces the belief that violence wins, that domination succeeds, whether at home or in wars. In warfare women are seen as a symbol of the nation, which has to be defended. The traditional distinction between combatants and civilians has disappeared and civilians, particularly women and children, are increasingly the victims, often the specific targets, of non-statal wars.

Rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls, but also in some cases against men and boys, have become a weapon of war. The increased incidence of sexual and gender-based violence and failure to provide adequate protection need to be made a key international issue, as called for in 2000 in UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security[16]. The international community has yet to adopt adequate instruments to confront sexual and gender-based violence in war and should begin by consulting its victims and those working with them.

Even the deployment of UN and other peacekeepers, usually large numbers of unattached men with money to spare, may create new security concerns for women and children and increase the potential for exploitation, abuse, prostitution and connivance or participation in trafficking. There is a need to integrate gender perspectives into peacekeeping operations, increasing the numbers of women peacekeepers, and to implement adequate and gender-sensitive training and a clear sexual code of conduct for deployed personnel.[17]

Children suffer disproportionately from lack of security. Poverty, displacement, separation from family and lack of rights put children at risk of exploitation and abuse. In countries at war, children are at risk of being recruited as child soldiers. An estimated 300,000 children under the age of 18 serve as soldiers worldwide, in national militias, armed opposition groups and sometimes in government armies. The majority are boys but a growing number are girls[18]. The harm suffered by child soldiers is severe. There is the risk of being maimed or killed in combat, the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS and other STDs for girls forced into sexual slavery, but also the long-term emotional and social impact of witnessing and being involved in acts of violence from an early age.

Culture takes on added importance because the oppression of women is often explained or even legitimised in cultural terms. Intervention strategies adopted by external actors in crisis or post-war regions must take account of culture-specific factors affecting the social status of men, women and children. Socio-economic factors must also be addressed. The impact of unemployment on young males has been identified as, "the explosive combination of youth poverty, small arms proliferation and loss of identity… Male identity is constructed through violence,

[16] See Report of Secretary-General on women and peace and security, S/2004/814, 13 October 2004.
[17] A 'Gender resource package for peacekeeping operations' can be found at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/
[18] Save the Children: The State of the World's Mothers 2002: Mother and Children in War and Conflict, http://www.savethechildren.org/publications/sowm2002.pdf¸ Yvonne E. Keairns, February 2002: The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers, Summary, New York/Geneva: Quaker United Nations Office. See also P.W. Singer, 2005: Children at War, New York: Pantheon Books. .

providing those involved with a sense of superiority and autonomy. The lost position in the production process is replaced by participation in the production of violence within society." [19]

In order to promote security for men, women and children:

- violence against women, whether perpetrated at home or in public, must be addressed through legislative and policy reforms supported by public education.
- male domination of the security sector ('militarised masculinity') and male responsibility for condoning and extending violence against women must be acknowledged and actions put in place to address and overcome its root causes.
- women's equal participation with men in political decision-making, including in conflict prevention, peace-building and security, needs to be actively promoted. This entails putting women in positions of authority in peace talks, addressing gender perspectives in peace agreements, recruiting and promoting women in security institutions (including peacekeeping forces), consulting women's peace movements, and addressing violations of the human rights of women and children in conflict[20]. The international community must commit itself to more effective implementation of existing instruments to advance these goals, particularly UNSC resolution 1325, and develop new and more adequate instruments[21].
- the use of children as soldiers must be addressed through legislative reform.

The EU policy framework

6 European security strategy

In parallel with the changes in the nature of global security over the past fifteen years, the European Union has been enlarging and deepening its cooperation. Under the treaty establishing the new constitution, the external policies of the Union include three 'Community' areas (trade, development & economic cooperation, humanitarian aid) and two 'intergovernmental' areas: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)[22]. The draft constitution preserves a provision of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty whereby all external policies are to be consistent with one another. A major change would be the merger of the hitherto separate posts of Secretary General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP and External Relations Commissioner into the new post of Foreign Minister. Although constitutionally separate, the external responsibilities of the Commission (including development cooperation) would be brought under the control of the CFSP through the person of the Foreign Minister, who would chair the Foreign Affairs Council and also be Vice-President of the Commission, known as 'double-hatting'.

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[19] Verband Entwicklungspolitik Deutscher Nichtregierungs-Organisationen (VENRO): Poverty reduction and crisis prevention: how can poverty reduction be shaped conflict-sensitively?, 2003, citing work by Peter Lock.

[20] A 'good practice' example is women's influence on the drafting of the mandates for the police and the military in South Africa. Here, police and military units were given gender training and the number of women in the South African peacekeeping forces was increased in order to build confidence among the local population.

[21] See Elisabeth Rein and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, 2002: Women, War, Peace – The independent experts' assessment, New York: UNIFEM.

[22] In the intergovernmental areas, it is the member states, acting in the Council normally by unanimity, who have authority, not the Commission and Parliament.

Such a Foreign Minister position would inherit the dynamic evolution of EU external relations policy. The European Defence Agency, the European Security Strategy (ESS), a new relationship with NATO, a European planning headquarters and the first CSDP missions all emerged during 2003 and 2004. The current High Representative for the CFSP, Mr Javier Solana, sees these developments as integrated: he told the Council in June 2003, "European assistance programmes, military and civilian capabilities from member states and other instruments such as the European Development Fund… can have an impact on our security and that of third countries."

This integration is carried into the ESS agreed in December 2003[23]. Some in the EU welcome it as an holistic and comprehensive understanding of security and as a response to what is seen as the unilateralism of the US security strategy. "No single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own," it maintains. "None of these threats are purely military nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments." Could it be that, in the opening words of the Strategy ('Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free'), no doubt intended to reassure EU citizens by putting Europe's security into perspective, we see the seeds of the north's unwillingness to make an unreserved commitment to global justice, ultimately the only basis for sustainable global security? To some in APRODEV, the Strategy is based on the prerogative of northern/EU politics to define security threats and fails to recognise the need for fundamental policy change by the EU.

Key features of the European Security Strategy

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.

Causes of insecurity

Almost 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than 2 euros a day.
Since 1990, almost 4 million have died in wars.
45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition.

5 key threats to Europe

Terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime (= trafficking in drugs, women, illegal immigrants, weapons, the privatisation of force).

3 strategic objectives

1 Addressing the threats. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.
2 Building security in our neighbourhood. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the east of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe.
3 An international order based on effective multilateralism.

Need to

1 Be more active
2 Be more capable
3 Be more coherent: in a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command. "In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations."
4 Work with partners: the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable (as well as the UN).

[23] European Council: A secure Europe in a better world, European security strategy, 8 December 2003

Within three months of the adoption of the ESS, Western Europe sustained its worst terrorist attack, the Madrid bombings. This led to tougher language, the acceleration of measures already under way for improved EU coordination of domestic security and to a Council declaration on combating terrorism.[24] This contains references to the use of policy dialogue and aid instruments with third countries in pursuit of terror eg:

"Target actions under EU external relations towards priority third countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced.

"Include effective counter-terrorism clauses in all agreements with third countries.

"Make more efficient use of external assistance programmes to address factors which can contribute to the support for terrorism, including in particular support for good governance and the rule of law.

"The European Union will analyse and evaluate the commitment of countries to combat terrorism on an ongoing basis. This will be an influencing factor in EU relations with them."

Policy development is supported by the evolution of the EU's defence capabilities. Europe has 1.8 million persons under arms and spends 180 billion euros per year on defence. Under the CSDP, endorsed by the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Headline Goal 2010 provides for the formation of rapidly deployable battle groups by 2007: the capacity to put 50,000-60,000 troops in the field within 60 days and to sustain them for a year. The draft constitution speaks of the member states' providing the Union with civilian and military capabilities and there is a cell in the EU Military Staff for strategic planning of joint civil/military operations, with a commitment to provide up to 5,000 police officers, 'rule of law' staff, civilian administrators and civil protection officers. The General Affairs Council[25] has stressed the need for, "unity of purpose and coherence of instruments in EU crisis management activities."

The European Defence Agency (EDA), set up in 2004, is tasked with, "strengthening Europe's industrial potential [in] strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities," and promoting, "an internationally competitive European defence equipment market."[26] The European Parliament's rapporteur on the Security Strategy also sees it as, "helping to contribute to the creation of a European armaments market."[27] These objectives seem hard to reconcile with the pledge in a recent Commission communication on coherence[28] that, "The EU will strengthen the control of its arms exports, with the aim of avoiding that EU-manufactured weaponry be used against civilian populations or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries."[29]

Conflict prevention has long received attention from the Commission and the (former) Development Council. The November 2003 General Affairs Council agreed that the

[24] European Council: Declaration on combating terrorism (Madrid declaration), 2004
[25] GAER Council meeting of 17 November 2003
[26] Ibid
[27] EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, draft report on European Security strategy, December 2004
[28] European Commission: Policy coherence for development: Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals, 2005
[29] The European Peace Liaison Office (EPLO) has called for the creation by the EU of a European Peacebuilding Research and Civilian Capabilities Agency

EU should prioritise the analysis of the root causes of conflict and develop peacebuilding strategies linking relief, rehabilitation and development and paying due attention to governance. A recent member state document[30] observes, "The EU needs to revitalise the Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, which sets out an agenda for action by the EU and member states including improved early warning systems and comprehensive plans for countries where there is a significant danger of conflict. These plans should cover all EU policies that may exacerbate or reduce the risk of conflict, including those on trade and on the environment."

7 A human security doctrine for Europe

The human security concept outlined in paragraph 4 has been modified to justify EU security interventions through the report of the Barcelona study group on Europe's security capabilities[31]. In a paper written with Maries Glasius, the convener of the study group Professor Mary Kaldor argues that whether EU security policy is good or bad for development depends on the type of policy the EU adopts: a US-style defensive build-up or a contribution to global security[32]. Essentially their argument is that there are 'two EUs': a tension between 'Europe as a peace project' and 'Europe as a superpower in the making'. Current developments in the CFSP reflect the latter but the EU has the opportunity instead to be an 'international norms promoter', contributing to global security through multilateral/UN channels, according to principles governing the use of force and integration of civilian capabilities. "Whether the EU's security policy will further encroach and obstruct development policies, or whether the renewed interest in security will in fact strengthen development aims, depends fundamentally on the conception of security the EU chooses." However, even this 'multilateral' report suggests the development of criteria, "to open the way to (EU military) intervention without Security Council authorisation."

Seven principles for a human security doctrine for Europe
(from the Barcelona study group and Kaldor & Glasius)

1 Primacy of human rights: what distinguishes human security from state-based approaches
2 Legitimate political authority
3 Multilateralism: commitment to common rules and norms and to international institutions
4 A bottom-up approach: applying such concepts as 'partnership', 'local ownership', 'participation', 'role of women's groups' (familiar in development) to security. Readiness to import concepts and practices from civil society
5 Regional focus
6 Use of legal instruments: rule of law
7 Appropriate use of force

[30] Department for International Development: Fighting poverty to build a safer world: a strategy for security and development, March 2005
[31] European Union: A human security doctrine for Europe, the Barcelona report of the study group on Europe's security capabilities, September 2004
[32] Kaldor, Mary and Marlies Glasius: EU security architecture in relation to security and development, undated

Policy proposals for a human security doctrine for Europe
(from the Barcelona study group and Kaldor & Glasius)

1 Expanded EU political and legal presence on the ground, through the new External Action Service, EU monitoring missions, law shops and ombudspersons.

2 A human security response force of 15,000 personnel (one third civilian) as a standing contribution to UN operations. Under the EU Foreign Minister and with one third at a constant state of readiness (the others training and resting). These are professionals, to be supplemented by a human security volunteer force (mid-career and young people).

3 Promote development of a multilateral legal framework covering international human security missions.

Kaldor and Glasius conclude that, "The development community's best option is to embrace coherence, and try to influence the security agenda in the direction of human security." They add that spending on the civilian component should be increased and paid for out of the CFSP budget and that in the long run member states should allocate part of their defence budgets to the CFSP. The civilian component requires further clarification: if it is paid for by the CFSP, this has implications for command and control. Perhaps it is logical to place police, legal and some administrative and civil protection staff under CFSP command but this should not extend to aid workers, who should be under civilian management, in the terms described on page 6 and as recognised by the Red Cross and the UN. In these circumstances, the term 'human security response force' would have narrow connotations.

While many in APRODEV would be comfortable with the broader human security concept preached by the UN (see paragraph 4), reaction to the 'doctrine for Europe' proposals at the APRODEV/CIDSE/Caritas workshop was more critical, seeing them as reinforcing the EU's short-term interests and narrowing the scope for reforms to promote human security in diverse policy areas, such as trade, agriculture and external relations.[33] Examples were quoted of a range of threats to vulnerable individuals and communities where EU reforms could improve human security: eg the impact of EU trade policy on global food security, of EU manufacturing policy on the proliferation of small arms[34], of EU commercial policy on the provision of HIV/AIDS anti-retroviral drugs, of EU monetary policy on the economic security of the poorest communities. For the human security of all, the north has to be prepared to make major concessions and changes. This is the kind of EU policy coherence long advocated by APRODEV[35]. Interviewees were interested in the security of a global citizenship, not simply the security of EU citizens: "We are instruments of a greater security," as one remarked.

Similarities and differences between the various security 'doctrines' (US national security strategy, ESS, a human security doctrine for Europe and a faith-based approach to human security) are shown, albeit simplified, in the table opposite. Distinctions are not rigid: as suggested above, the EU approach includes both second and third columns and some in Aprodev agencies would find themselves in the third column as well as the fourth.

[33] See Geraldine McDonald in APRODEV, CIDSE and Caritas Europa: Security and development, dossier of an internal workshop, 4 November 2004

[34] Kaldor and Glasius comment that, "Too often, arms are still exported from Europe even whilst its foreign ministers and economic cooperation agencies are pursuing a security sector reform agenda."

[35] See John Madeley: Brussels' blind spot (2000), on the APRODEV website: www.aprodev.net

Four security doctrines

	US National security strategy	EU security strategy	Human security doctrine for Europe	Faith-based approach to human security
Focus	Our nation	European defence	Global defence of the individual	Poor people
Inspiration	9/11	Fall of Berlin wall, 9/11, 3/11	EU as a peace project	The Gospel
Aim	National security	Political influence	Global security	Global justice and reconciliation
Role in the world	Spreading freedom	A superpower in the making	EU as an international norms promoter	Preferential option for the poor
Security where?	Defending the US, the American people and our interest at home and abroad	Need to be a 'global actor', but especially in the neighbourhood	Global	Both south and north, and with the north needing to make concessions for justice
Scope of action	Unilateral, if necessary	Effective multilateralism, rule-based	Multilateral, support for UN	Multilateral
Approach to crisis	Pre-emptive, crisis precipitation	Preventive engagement, crisis anticipation	Crisis prevention and management	Emphasis on non-crisis insecurity, crisis avoidance based on structural change in global economy
Targets	Terrorism, threats to sovereignty	Terrorism, WMD	Insecurity, lack of development	Poverty, lack of global justice
Instrument	Coalition of the willing, led by US	Deployable and interoperable EU forces, battle groups	Human security response force, civil and military	Development and humanitarian aid
Approach to arms	Contain WMD proliferation	Contain WMD. EDA: harmonise procurement	Reduce European nuclear capabilities	Curtail international arms trade
Approach to development policy	Most favoured nations get aid	Security is the first condition for development	Development can gain from being embedded in a human security doctrine	Other policies should be made coherent with development

8 Development policy statement

One other part of the policy framework under review this year is the development policy statement. In November 2000 the Council and the Commission adopted a joint statement on EU development policy of which the central principle is, "Community development policy is grounded on the principle of sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social development… The main objective of Community development policy must be to reduce and, eventually, to eradicate poverty." Happily, this principle is enshrined in the draft Union constitution (Article III-316) and President Barroso has signalled in his strategic objectives for 2005-9 that the Millennium Development Goals must be the guiding objective of Union development policy. As progress towards these Goals is to be reviewed by the UN at its 2005 general assembly, they provide a good focus for development thinking this year.

The Commission has launched the process for review of the policy statement, publishing a consultation paper in January 2005 (consultation period already closed) and promising a new draft; the consultation paper says that security and development are complementary and will need to be treated in the new policy. APRODEV has taken the position that development can contribute to security through addressing the root causes of conflict, including poverty and inequality, but only if the specific objectives of development policy are respected.

Development and human rights should be seen as end goals and not simply as instruments to the achievement of other aims of EU external relations policy. The claim in the consultation paper that development policy has become, "the privileged instrument for managing globalisation," uses the language of instrumentalisation. To some observers, forced economic globalisation is a cause of worldwide insecurity. But the paper goes on to say, "The increase in political conditionality and the diversion of development resources for other, legitimate, security type concerns need to be avoided. These policy interactions should be undertaken with the aim of safeguarding ODA expenditures and focusing these expenditures on the huge task of reducing global poverty and achieving sustainable development." The Cotonou Agreement, the most comprehensive development cooperation agreement adopted by member states, is a powerful instrument to be used as a departure point for reviewing the policy statement. Its policy of co-management with ACP states and the fact that unspent funds are not lost on an annual basis have led one policy-maker to express a preference for the 'EDFisation' of the budget, rather than the other way round. What is needed is a dedicated channel for EU funding of its objective of poverty eradication in developing countries, which can serve as the instrument of the new policy statement.

EU policy instruments

9 Conditionality in aid agreements

As we saw on page 12, the Madrid Declaration linked aid and trade agreements with third countries to their willingness to cooperate on security. This policy was put to the test in February 2005 during the five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement with the 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. It was decided that the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would become an essential element of the Agreement; the EU undertook to provide ACP states with additional resources apart from the European Development Fund to carry this out. The fight against

terrorism did not prove contentious and a new article on cooperation is being added. This new insistence on 'security conditionality' did not evoke a strong reaction among APRODEV interviewees, but it has the potential to open the door to the use of development funds for security purposes and increases the need to monitor closely how funds are spent. If the question were posed another way ('Should aid to poor people be denied if their governments don't agree on counter-terrorism?'), APRODEV agencies would say no. CIDSE's approach is that conditionality is acceptable only where there has been a good participation of civil society in defining it. In a possible example of 'acceptable conditionality', one member state government has recently separated security considerations from the use of development budgets for poverty reduction.

What is 'acceptable conditionality'?

"To achieve security *and* development, development resources should be focused on achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It would be all too easy to unravel the international consensus for aid to be used in the fight against poverty, by allowing development budgets to be diverted to tackling high-profile threats such as terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. These threats affect rich and poor alike and urgently need to be addressed. But the distinct contribution of development assistance is to tackle the longer-term, underlying causes of global insecurity linked to poverty and inequality. Bilateral and multilateral agencies, such as the EU and UN, should use their development budgets to finance activities which constitute Official Development Assistance under internationally recognised criteria; these budgets should not be diverted toward technical assistance for short-term global or national security objectives.

"Aid programmes should be linked to performance against poverty reduction and not to performance against global security goals. The circumstances in which [we] would consider reducing or interrupting aid include

- if a country moved significantly away from poverty reduction objectives or outcomes, or the agreed objectives of a particular aid commitment – for example, through an unjustifiable rise in military spending, or a substantial deviation from the agreed poverty reduction programme
- when a country is in significant violation of human rights or other international obligations
- when there is a significant breakdown in partner government financial management or accountability, leading to the risk of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption."

(Department for International Development: Fighting poverty to build a safer world: a strategy for security and development, March 2005)

10 Financial perspectives 2007-2013

With negotiations taking place in 2005 around the Union's spending plans for the next seven-year period (the Financial Perspectives), the Commission has taken the opportunity to rationalise the profusion of aid budgets that have arisen with a proposal reducing them from 90 to just six new legal instruments. While there is a strong case for simplifying the budgets, APRODEV agencies face two problems. There is great uncertainty over the figures to be allocated to each area of spending (different figures are circulating, alternative figures are being proposed by Parliament, and there can be no clarity over the details of the development budgets until member states have agreed the total of the Union budget for the period). The parameters of some of the proposed

instruments would make it much more difficult to monitor the EU's spending on poverty reduction. What is clear from all the Commission and Parliament plans, however, is that the largest instrument, meant to deliver the Union's contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, is set to take a lower share of spending, relative to more security-focused instruments, in the years up to 2013.

The six proposed instruments are the Pre-accession instrument (PAI), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument (ENPI), the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument (DCECI), the Stability instrument, humanitarian aid and macro-finance. After the two accessions planned for 2007, the PAI will be available to two candidate and four potential candidate countries (the western Balkans and Turkey). The ENPI will be available to 17 countries to the east and south of the Union which are not expected to accede but with which the Union seeks neighbourly relations. The Commission's proposals for allocation of funds show the following distribution[36].

EC proposed distribution of funds within Heading 4 in million euros (excluding administrative costs)

Instrument	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total	% in 2007	% in 2013	% Increase 2013-2007
PAI	1400	1570	1636	1828	2080	2170	2235	**12919**	15	17	60
ENPI	1350	1450	1700	1850	2021	2255	2513	**13139**	15	19	86
DCECI	5170	5553	5820	6124	6273	6376	6490	**41806**	56	49	26
of which EDF		*2988*	*3245*	*3528*	*3619*	*3635*	*3653*	*20668*		*27*	
Stability	325	425	475	591	647	702	750	**3915**	3	6	131
of which EDF		*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*600*		*1*	
Human. aid	825	890	900	910	920	930	940	**6315**	9	7	14
of which EDF		*55*	*55*	*55*	*55*	*55*	*55*	*330*		*2*	
Macrofinance	110	140	156	170	182	190	193	**1141**	1	1	75
CFSP	75	105	125	140	155	165	174	**939**	1	1	132
Total	**9255**	**10133**	**10812**	**11613**	**12278**	**12788**	**13295**	**80174**			**44**

Notes: 1. The figures for the DCECI and SI assume that the European Development Fund (EDF), a separate five-year fund resourced by direct contributions from member states, will be added to the EC budget from 2008. Such integration looks increasingly unlikely.
2. EDF portion of the SI includes an allocation for the African Peace Facility.

Although almost all figures are projected to increase from year to year, the increases for pre-accession and neighbourhood (largely middle-income) countries and for stability are much greater and are at the expense of the share of aid allocated to DCEC, the budget which includes aid to most low-income countries. DCEC would suffer a drop in share from 56% to 49% over the seven years. The parameters of the instruments are not designed to follow the criteria set by the Development Assistance Committee of OECD for overseas development assistance, making it impossible to track what share of external relations spending is allocated to poverty reduction. The Parliament rapporteur poses the question whether it is appropriate to use 'concentric circles' (member states, pre-accession, neighbourhood, others) instead of GDP per

[36] European Commission: Working document Fiche No 37: Outstanding information Heading 4, February 2005

capita as the criteria for aid allocation. A significant diversion of aid from poverty reduction towards 'neighbourhood and security' objectives is being proposed: as Kaldor and Glasius observe, "These policies prioritise the security preoccupations of European politicians at the expense of poverty reduction and alleviation of human suffering." If the EU is serious in its commitment to long-term development and the attainment of the MDGs, the share allocated to DCEC should increase at least ***proportionately*** with the overall increase in the external relations envelope instead of the decreasing share envisaged by the Commission and the Parliament.

11 Development cooperation and economic cooperation instrument

The conception of the DCEC instrument reveals some intrinsic problems[37]. It includes a mixture of objectives, geographic scope and themes in the same instrument. It is based on two articles of the Treaty covering development cooperation (179) and economic cooperation (181a). Drawn up before the revision of the development policy statement, it fails to reflect the Commission's stated principle that policy should precede instruments. It embraces a number of large regions where EC aid is delivered (Africa, Asia, Latin America, Central Asia and Middle East) but is also applicable to OECD countries. Its coverage has a negative or 'default' definition ie all countries not eligible for assistance under the PAI or the ENPI.

There is no clear dividing line between activities eligible for funding from the DCECI and the Stability instrument. It is clear that the DCECI can aid the police, the judiciary, all aspects of asylum and migration management, conflict prevention and resolution. Rehabilitation activities and those for uprooted people can be assisted by either instrument. It is less clear whether the fight against trafficking, crime and terrorism, the fight against drugs and nuclear safety can be funded from the DCECI, as they were mentioned in the Commission's first communication announcing the instrument[38], they are no longer listed as eligible activities in the draft proposal (see footnote 37), but most of them appear as examples in the Legislative Financial Statement attached to the proposal. Because the instrument would also support spending in other developed countries, its aid to the poorest is theoretically in competition with 'enhancing the European Union business presence on the market of partner countries'. As drafted, the DCECI is encroached by

- receiving a diminishing share of aid funds
- including activities also covered by the Stability instrument
- including economic cooperation with no poverty criteria

It is deeply porous. In budgetary terms, there is no protected space for the fight against poverty. A dedicated instrument for poverty eradication in developing countries should be based on Article 179 only and should have the eradication of poverty as its single over-arching objective. Article 181a provides for the Community's cooperation with non-developing countries and the two articles should not be merged in a single instrument. The DCECI proposal does not include an overall objective. Although the institutions have insisted that the MDGs must be at the core of Community development policy, the DCECI proposal does not count them as an objective and mentions them only once, in a non-legally binding recital.

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[37] European Commission: Proposal for a regulation establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation, 29 September 2004 (COM (2004) 629 final)

[38] European Commission: Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, Communication 14 July 2004 (COM (2004) 487 final)

12 Stability instrument

Despite the exponential growth planned for its budget, the new Stability instrument[39] would still be much smaller in size than the DCECI. It has been devised to 'build on the approach pioneered under the Cotonou Agreement' and the existing EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The EU approval in 2004 of a € 250 million grant to the African Peace Facility responded to an African Union request for help in strengthening its regional peacekeeping capability. It has been appreciated by the UN Secretary-General who says in his report to the General Assembly, "Decisions by the EU to create standby battle groups and by the African Union to create African reserve capacities are a very valuable complement to our own efforts." However, it was also controversial because member states funded it by shaving 1.5% off the development allocation of each African country in the European Development Fund. This was meant to be a one-off decision but the framing of the new Stability instrument now provides the opportunity to replicate this type of support from the EC budget.

The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (not to be confused with rapid reaction forces planned under the CSDP) is a capacity in the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit of the External Relations Directorate. It allows for rapid disbursement of aid for projects of up to six months in potential conflict situations. Its budget (€ 27.5 million in 2003) has gone to primarily civilian initiatives in such countries as Indonesia, Philippines and Pakistan. The proposed EU instrument also has a parallel in the stability funds set up by the Danish and Dutch governments and in the two 'pools' (global and African) whereby the Foreign, Defence and Development ministries in the UK have agreed to make coordinated responses to peacekeeping needs. Like these national models, the Stability instrument was planned to combine ODA-eligible and ODA-ineligible funding.[40]

Its aims are to respond to crises in order to re-establish the conditions for regular aid (from DCECI, ENPI or PAI), and to cooperate in confronting global and regional trans-border challenges, technological threats and weapons proliferation. The 'development of peacekeeping and peace support capacity in partnership with international, regional and sub-regional organisations' is envisaged along with 'military monitoring and peacekeeping' and the proviso that 'peace enforcement operations shall require a UN mandate'. But, 'with the current exception of some elements of peace support operations, most assistance delivered will qualify as DAC-eligible', meaning, as Geraldine McDonald says, that a portion of EU development aid will be diverted into this new instrument which makes no mention of poverty eradication. What is ruled out? Arms, ammunition, recurrent military expenditure, military training for combat; no direct financing of EU military activity would be permitted. 'The financing of military operations of third parties will create a responsibility to ensure independent monitoring of the conduct of forces.'

In order to ground this enquiry in practical challenges, APRODEV interviewees were asked what should be done to end the suffering in Darfur and the DRC. The consensus was that short-term military stabilisation was necessary, perhaps with a stronger mandate from the UN or the AU, and that the EU was right to play its part, but that its

[39] European Commission: Proposal for a regulation establishing an instrument for stability, 29 September 2004 (COM (2004) 630 final)

[40] There are now signs that the DAC-ineligible items (peacekeeping, nuclear safety and non-proliferation) may be removed.

support should be completely separate from development expenditure. Otherwise, "we confuse aid with European security interests. It blurs the lines." Defence budgets should pay. This is easier to implement at national level than at EU level. To say that the CFSP should pay fails to recognise that the EU does not control its own defence forces and that the CFSP has only a small administrative budget. Where it authorises military or police missions involving member state forces, the principle is that 'costs fall where they lie'. APRODEV agencies are not against the principle of EU support to African peacekeeping forces fulfilling a UN mandate; the question is how? If, in the medium term, member states were to design an (intergovernmental) European stabilisation fund to share the costs of actions involving troops or police from member states, this would be the most appropriate home for the financing of third party peacekeeping operations.

One step the EU might take is to eliminate the unhelpful overlap of activities between the DCECI and the Stability instrument. There is no reason why a revised DCECI should not finance DAC-eligible poverty-reducing parts of the Stability instrument portfolio (eg rehabilitation, fight against drugs). But the Commission's real justification for a Stability instrument is 'where such actions need to be delivered in response to crisis'. It is not the nature of the activity but its delivery in a context of crisis that underpins the instrument. If the Stability instrument no longer includes DAC-ineligible peacekeeping, there is a case for dispensing with it and keeping all DAC-eligible expenditure under the poverty eradication instrument (a revised DCECI). On the other hand, it might be easier to protect poverty eradication spending from repeated raids for crisis purposes if a DAC-eligible and ring-fenced Stability instrument is adopted. A ring-fenced 'crisis' instrument could produce more clarity from a development perspective. At the same time, the SI needs to be governed by the principles of the development policy statement and should explicitly mention the objective of poverty eradication

13 What counts as ODA: the DAC criteria

As well as keeping under review the activities classified as official development assistance (ODA), the DAC has issued recent guidance about security system reform.

> Security system reform (SSR) seeks to increase *partner countries' ability* to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing. The security system includes the armed forces, the police and gendarmerie, intelligence services, and judicial and penal institutions. It also comprises the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (eg parliament, the executive and the defence ministry). *OECD Policy brief: Security system reform and governance: policy and good practice, May 2004*

While advocating whole-of-government approaches to reform, it makes a, "distinction between… governance activities and those designed to strengthen the operational capability of security forces, while acknowledging that partner governments in developing countries concerned with providing security effectively need to address both dimensions." This is not just a distinction between civilians and the army: in some countries the police as well as the armed forces would be seen as a security threat by vulnerable people. The discussion about what counts as ODA is thus about 'where to draw the line', especially with the trend towards pooled funding by donors.

In March 2005 the DAC reported the outcome of the latest round of discussions about whether new areas of aid could be classed as ODA[41]. There was agreement to extend eligibility to the six items in the box below. The DAC defines ODA as 'the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries'. It already excludes from ODA the supply or financing of military equipment or services and use of military personnel to control civil disobedience. In March the DAC discussed two other items – training the military in non-military matters, such as human rights, and extending the coverage of peacekeeping activities (where incremental costs of the deployment of military personnel from DAC member countries are already reportable as ODA). These were not considered appropriate for ODA (unlike the six new items, they currently involve large sums, mostly from defence budgets) but the DAC agreed to revisit them in 2007.

1	**Management of security expenditure** through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure.
2	**Enhancing civil society's role in the security system** to help ensure that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance.
3	**Security system reform** to improve democratic governance and civilian control.
4	Supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of **child soldiers.**
5	Controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of **small arms and light weapons.**
6	**Civilian** activities for **peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.**

Reactions to these inclusions vary. No 6 is uncontroversial. 4 and 5, as examples of DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration), could be seen as classic cases of 'turning swords into ploughshares'. With the first three, it could be argued that the security services should be democratically controlled in the first place, without the need for ODA support: why is management more acceptable as ODA than security force activity on the ground? One view heard was that the changes in statistical criteria simply reflect changes that have already occurred in government policies. But, in view of the close relationship between ODA eligibility and EU instruments, it would be important to monitor the DAC discussions, perhaps by agreement between APRODEV and the World Council of Churches. 'No further erosion' might be a guiding principle but there may also be a case to explore the 'roll-back' of eligibility in such cases as the costs of DAC members' military mentioned above[42]. Another answer to the problem of how to ensure that EU development funds are not diverted to non-development purposes might be to require that a minimum percentage of EU external assistance be accounted for by ODA.

14 Conflict prevention[43]

Development policy is, "the greatest trove of experience in conflict prevention, stabilisation of weak societies, and civil activities in post-conflict situations. How can [its] experiences, both positive and negative, be translated, in cooperation with weak

[41] OECD-DAC: Conflict prevention and peacebuilding: what counts as ODA?, statement, March 2005
[42] Were any costs of the 2003 EU mission Operation Artemis to the DRC reported as ODA?
[43] 'Crisis prevention' is preferred to 'conflict prevention' by German NGOs because conflict can be managed positively to avoid violence. See Verband Entwicklungspolitik Deutscher Nichtregierungs-Organisationen (VENRO): Poverty reduction and crisis prevention: how can poverty reduction be shaped conflict-sensitively?, 2003

states, into manageable, country-specific, long-term and realistic strategies?"[44] It is also said to be a less expensive and more effective tool to create stability than peacekeeping and peace enforcement.[45] Throughout this enquiry, there were frequent references to the efforts of EU institutions and NGOs to promote crisis prevention.

In 2001 the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts was adopted in Gothenburg. *Country Strategy Papers* (CSP) were identified as key tools for improving crisis prevention. (The SI, on the other hand, is not about prevention but about post-conflict reconstruction.) A list of crisis and conflict indicators (check-list of root causes of conflict) was drawn up, to be systematically used in the drafting of Country Strategy Papers and performing both an early warning and a monitoring function.[46]

APRODEV agencies familiar with Darfur underlined the need to make political efforts to prevent a worsening of the crisis. Constructive engagement with the parties, addressing wealth-sharing, technical help to find solutions, time and space were needed to allow Darfurians to address the problems through their own mechanisms; such was the lesson of the eventual resolution of the conflict in southern Sudan. This political track, and non-violent economic alternatives, needed to be followed as well as military intervention to stop the violence, which had received more attention. More 'Darfurs' could be avoided with cost-efficient preventive actions, but non-military forms of involvement in conflict areas had disappeared from public discourse. This approach was 'down-to-earth' and related to local initiatives, a far cry from the EU aspiration to be a 'global actor'.

Women can be key change agents in crisis prevention through social networks across conflict lines (the women in black in Palestine/Israel and many other examples). Their unique experience in peacebuilding brings added value; it is not simply a question of women's vulnerability. The churches have a special vocation to work for reconciliation and diminish Muslim/Christian tensions. There are two areas in which the churches can do more. They have not systematically brought together all the experiences they have had of grassroots crisis prevention.[47] And, in the ten years since the Rwandan genocide, the ecumenical movement has not had a forum or process to discuss the dynamics underlying violence (what do our spiritual foundations tell us, where do 'just war' and 'just peace' approaches stand in an age of non-statal conflict?).[48]

[44] Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik: Development policy – a core element of European security policy, 3/2004

[45] Mørup, Louise: Strengthening African security capacities, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004

[46] Verband Entwicklungspolitik Deutscher Nichtregierungs-Organisationen (VENRO): Poverty reduction and crisis prevention: how can poverty reduction be shaped conflict-sensitively?, 2003

[47] The VENRO report (footnotes 39 and 42) includes a case study from EED on promoting democracy through non-government actors in Kenya. Other case studies appear in APRODEV: Gender and violent conflict, GOOD Annual Conference, 11-13 September 2001

[48] For a start on this, see Anna T Höglund: Gender and war – a theological and ethical approach, in APRODEV: Gender and violent conflict, GOOD Annual Conference, 11-13 September 2001

15 Recommendations

To the EU

1 The EU needs a financing instrument clearly dedicated to the support of its poverty eradication and development cooperation objective, and not diluted by overlap with its stability fund or by economic cooperation with richer countries. This should replace the current DCECI proposal.

2 EU support to third country peacekeeping forces fulfilling a UN mandate is an acceptable objective to be implemented through a stability instrument but this should be financed separately by the CFSP and never from development funds.

3 To maintain the EU's commitment to fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals, the share of external relations funds allocated to DAC-eligible development cooperation should increase at least ***proportionately*** with the overall increase in the external relations envelope. The EU should make this commitment at the 2005 UN general assembly review of progress towards the MDGs.

4 While it is reasonable to put declaratory counter-terror clauses in international agreements, aid programmes should be linked to performance against poverty reduction and not to performance against global security goals.

5 Any proposals for CFSP command and financing of police, legal and other civilian staff as part of a human security response force should not extend to aid workers who must remain under civilian management in the terms recognised by the UN and the Red Cross.

6 EU conflict prevention and crisis management activities should begin not with military options but with intensified political efforts towards constructive engagement with the parties, offering mediation and technical assistance, especially at local level.

7 The Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 3.2) entrusted the Community with the task of promoting equality between men and women and seeking to eliminate inequality in all its actions. This principle should be extended to all activities implemented under the CFSP.

8 The General Affairs Council should commission independent studies of the extent to which European arms exports and EC funding of armaments research contribute to fuelling of conflict outside the Union.

To the EU and other donors

9 There should be 'no further erosion' of the civilian character of overseas development assistance through inclusion of quasi-military expenditures. The DAC should review whether some existing items of this nature should be excluded from eligibility.

10 Donors should avoid the distorting effect for social cohesion of financing the strengthening of third country armed forces as such. Civil society needs strengthening more than the military. Only specific peacemaking objectives should be considered for support and military interventions should be examined for cost-efficiency in relation to other options.

11 Donors should ensure that peacekeeping personnel are governed by clear codes of conduct (including sexual conduct) and should monitor all operations which they support.

12 In the processes of peacebuilding and reconstruction, care should be taken that civil society actors, especially women, are consulted from the first planning exercises onwards.

13 Women's equal participation with men in political decision-making, including in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security, needs to be actively promoted. This entails putting women in positions of authority in peace talks, addressing gender perspectives in peace agreements, recruiting and promoting women in security institutions (including peacekeeping forces), consulting women's peace movements, and addressing violations of the human rights of women and children in conflict. Donors should ensure that in these activities they meet the standards of UN Security Council resolution 1325 and develop new and more adequate instruments.

To APRODEV and other ecumenical actors *(division of labour with World Council of Churches to be discussed)*

14 As the baseline for future work on monitoring the next Financial Perspectives, a short-term study should be made to quantify any losses to development funding in the transition from the 2000-2006 Perspectives to the new instruments proposed for 2007-2013.

15 APRODEV and WCC should discuss who is better placed to carry out proactive work on recommendation 9 (ODA eligibility).

16 APRODEV's next steps on the 'security and development' dossier should take into account the value of southern partner input.

17 There should be a systematic effort to bring together (for use with policy-makers) the experiences of ecumenical agencies in grassroots conflict prevention.

18 Together with other development networks, APRODEV and the WCC should promote reflections about a set of principles defining the objectives and values of civil development, the relationship of development agencies to beneficiaries, civil society, governments and security institutions and the conditions under which development work should be supported.

19 The churches should hold consultations with women who are victims of rape in conflict or who have experience of such situations to ask them what further steps policy-makers should take to address the use of rape as a weapon.

20 The churches should undertake a process to explore the spiritual and theological sources for human security.

21 The ecumenical movement should convene a forum or process to discuss the dynamics underlying violence in an age of non-statal conflict. It should address the neglect or impunity of violence against women and children that feeds a culture of impunity towards violence more generally.

22 There is a need for world religions to consult and issue prophetic guidance on the changing types of conflict which mainly target civilians.

16 Conclusions

The Commission's consultation paper on the development policy statement anticipates this study when it identifies two options for the future of cooperation: a defensive approach, avoiding interactions with other policies in order to ensure the autonomy of development. The opposite approach, it says, would entail clarifying the links in order to demonstrate the role of development cooperation which is mainly to address the root causes of problems. This study has been an attempt to clarify.

From discussions with APRODEV member agencies, they appear comfortable with:

- dialogue between the development and security communities. As part of this, we have to relate to the military but this does not necessarily imply sharing their goals and so would not normally be described as civil-military cooperation.
- the principle that the EU should support (for example) African Union peacekeeping forces as a last resort and when authorised by the UN. This should be financed from the CFSP or defence budgets. Clearly, there is a difficulty when we say, 'the CFSP should pay'. The EU does not have a defence ministry or a defence budget. But the answer is not to take resources from development. Several times there was the reminder that global resources for development are around US$ 60 billion a year while global defence budgets amount to US$ 900 billion.
- coherence, which APRODEV has long advocated. But this does not mean that development policy should concede resources to non-developmental policies or instruments. The figures quoted on page 18 unfortunately suggest that this is what the Commission intends.

While subscribing to coherence, APRODEV agencies believe that there should be a division of labour and mandates. In policy-making, integration and synthesis are important, but a lesson we can learn from gender analysis is that disaggregation and analysis are also important.[49] Integrity (of tasks, of budgets) is a value that APRODEV agencies would apply to the EU's work for poverty reduction.[50] Development inputs reinforce security by being what they are: development inputs. APRODEV agencies put poor people at the centre of their attention. EU citizens are entitled to a clear picture of how much the Union is spending on poor people and the MDGs.

The prime objective of overseas aid must remain poverty reduction and not global security. Changing development priorities to meet security goals would only serve to compromise both. The distinct contribution of development assistance is to tackle the longer-term, underlying causes of global insecurity linked to poverty and inequality.

Ultimately…

The Jesuit theologian, Gerard W Hughes, writes of a voice which says, "In my name you have exterminated millions who are precious in my eyes, whom I honour, for whom I died. You fled from me in life because you could not tolerate my love for all creation. Depart from me: I do not know you, for you have preferred your security to my glory." He goes on, 'There is no security, except in God, who is love and who loves all that he has made.' *Gerard W Hughes: God of surprises, 1985*

[49] The recent UN report on integrated missions observes, "Only that which needs to be integrated should be integrated, and 'asymmetric' models of integration may provide for deeper integration of some sectors than others." Eide, Espen Barth, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen von Hippel, op cit.

[50] Integrity is a value recognised in the draft constitution's external action provisions: "… a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity." (Article III-292 para 2)

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