

# Voices of the Margins

A Participatory Study on and  
by Sudanese Multi-Marginalised  
Women and how “Freedom—  
Peace—Justice”, the Demands  
of the Sudanese Revolution of  
2018/2019, Can be Turned into  
their Structural Empowerment



KURVE Study Papers

Bana Group for Peace and Development  
in Cooperation with KURVE Wustrow—Centre for Training and  
Networking in Nonviolent Action



**KURVE**  
Wustrow  
Centre for Training and Networking  
in Nonviolent Action

# About this Publication

## Voices of the Margins

A Participatory Study on and by Sudanese Multi-Marginalised Women and how “Freedom—Peace—Justice”, the Demands of the Sudanese Revolution of 2018/2019, Can be Turned into their Structural Empowerment

Published by Bana Group for Peace and Development  
in cooperation with KURVE Wustrow—Centre for Networking and Training in Nonviolent Action  
[www.kurviewustrow.org](http://www.kurviewustrow.org)

Supported by the German Civil Peace Service Programme (Ziviler Friedensdienst)



Available in Arabic and English



### Creative Commons Licence:

You are free to share and adapt, with attribution/appropriate credit and for non-commercial purposes.

### Contact details:

#### Bana Group for Peace and Development:

[bana.kh@protonmail.com](mailto:bana.kh@protonmail.com), [bana.darfur@protonmail.com](mailto:bana.darfur@protonmail.com)

Bana Germany: [mai.shatta@protonmail.com](mailto:mai.shatta@protonmail.com)

KURVE Wustrow: [info@kurviewustrow.org](mailto:info@kurviewustrow.org), [www.kurviewustrow.org](http://www.kurviewustrow.org)

Proofreading / Editing: Annedore Smith

Editorial processing: Steffi Barisch, Anja Petz

Photos: Bana Group for Peace and Development

Layout: Gregor Zielke

Year of Publication: 2021

KURVE Study Papers ISSN: 2748-2405

ISBN: 978-3-9823256-0-6

Printed on environmentally friendly paper with environmentally compatible paints.

# Acknowledgements

We wholeheartedly thank all interviewees who took part in this study. Even though, for technical reasons, unfortunately not all of the interviews collected could be used for this study, we nevertheless are confident that this document significantly reflects the voices of multi-marginalised women in Sudan.

We furthermore thank the fantastic and inspiring Bana team, namely the interviewers (in alphabetic order): Amani Hasabo, Amna Mohammed Osman, Bedour Zakaria, Ebtessam Mohammed Mousa, Ekram Hamza, Hamida Mustafa Gasi, Mashair Ali, Namareg Ibrahim Yahya, Sanaa Abdalla Ragab, Yasmin Dawood Atron, Zaida Mohammed Hussein, as well as Bana members who supported and participated, namely Azza Rashid, Khalda Saber, Nuha AlBadri Mohammed, Samia Ali Hamza, and of course Mai Ali Shatta for the overall coordination and initiative.

A big thankyou goes out also to Mona Habiballah, Yousra Mahdi, and Yousra Derar for translation and support, and all others who contributed in making this study possible.

Last but not least, we thank the authors of Bana and KURVE Wustrow.

*Dedicated to  
marginalised and violated women  
all over the world.*

# Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations	7
Abstract	8
<b>Chapter 1: How to Bring the Revolution Home?</b>	<b>11</b>
Introduction—Context and Purpose of the Study	11
Purpose and Focus of this Study	14
Structure of the Report	15
<b>Chapter 2: From Marginalisation to Taking the Stage</b>	<b>17</b>
Background and Relevance	17
A Brief Conflict History of Sudan	17
The Current Conflict Reality in Sudan	20
Empowerment and Marginalisation: An Intersectional Perspective	24
<b>Chapter 3: Understanding Multi-Marginalisation and its Overcoming</b>	<b>27</b>
Theory	27
Previous Research	27
Key Concepts	28
Discrimination and Marginalisation	28
Multi-Marginalisation and Intersectionality	29
Empowerment	30
Further Definitions of Terms	31
Assumptions	32
<b>Chapter 4: Experts in our own Right</b>	<b>34</b>
Research Design and Methods	34
Exploratory-Inductive Approach	34
Research Design	34
Participants and Selection Criteria	34
Reasons for Empirical Scope	34
Materials	35
Interviews and Focus Group Discussions	35
Demographic Data Sheets	35
Procedure	35
Data Analysis	36
Data Collection	36
Analysis of the Data	36
Operationalisation	36
Definition of Content—Analytical Units	36
Category Definitions	38
Level of Abstraction	38

<b>Chapter 5: From Village to IDP Camp to Town, from Gineina to Kadugli to Port Sudan, from Coffee Stall to Classroom to Family Care Work</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Data and Empirics</b>	<b>40</b>
Description of the Sample	40
Inducted Categories	43
Limitations, Challenges and Opportunities	46
Context Challenges	46
Methodological Challenges	47
<b>Chapter 6: Voices of the Margins</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Analysis</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Part 1: Needs and Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women in Sudan</b>	<b>50</b>
Experiences of Intersecting Marginalisation and Discrimination	54
Needs of Multi-Marginalised Women in Sudan	66
Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women in Sudan	68
Linking Discrimination, Needs and Demands	77
<b>Part 2: Future Governance Structures</b>	<b>78</b>
Role of Previous Government with regards to Marginalisation and Demands	78
Installation of Mechanisms for Communicating Needs and Participating in Decisions	80
<b>Part 3: The Transition Process and the Needs and Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women</b>	<b>83</b>
Changes since the Revolution	83
Voices of Multi-Marginalised Women in the Transition Structures	89
<b>Part 4: Influencing the Transition Process</b>	<b>93</b>
Sense of Ownership and Experience of the Revolution	94
Unity, Cooperation and Overcoming Discrimination as Key Factors to Bring about Change	97
Ideas and Key Factors for (Self-)Organising to Bring about Change and Make the Voices of Marginalised Women Heard	98
Ideas and Key Factors to Bring about Change, Related to Education	100
Individual Participation Processes and Possibilities	102
<b>Chapter 7: From Analysis to Action</b>	<b>104</b>
<b>Synthesis—Summary and Strategic Conclusions</b>	<b>104</b>
<b>Sub-Question 1: What Are the Needs and Demands of Women in Sudan, Especially those Facing more than one Form of Discrimination or Marginalisation?</b>	<b>105</b>
Gender-related Discrimination and Marginalisation, Needs and Demands	106
Ethnicity-related Discrimination and Marginalisation, Needs and Demands	109
Class-related Discrimination and Marginalisation, Needs and Demands	111
Discrimination and Marginalisation, Needs and Demands to War and Displacement	114
Intersecting Aspects, mostly with regards to the Political System	116
Intersecting Conclusions	118
<b>Sub-Question 2: How Do the Governance Structures Resulting from the Transition Process Need to Look Like, so that they Are Inclusive and Ensure that Marginalised Women’s Needs and Demands Are Continuously Reflected and Met?</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>Sub-Question 3: To what Extent Does the Transition Process up to now Open up Possibilities for Marginalised Women’s Needs and Demands Being Reflected and Met by the Resulting Structures?</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>Sub-Question 4: How Can Women—Especially those Facing Several Forms of Discrimination and Marginalisation—Influence this Transition Process so that it Results in such Structures?</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>Potential Implications of the COVID 19 Pandemic</b>	<b>125</b>

<b>Chapter 8: The Revolution Continues with All of us</b>	<b>127</b>
<b>Conclusion and Recommendations</b>	<b>127</b>
<b>Concluding Summary</b>	<b>128</b>
Needs and Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women in Sudan	128
Potential Future Governance Structures	128
The Transition Process and the Needs and Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women	129
Influencing the Transition Process	129
Strategic Conclusions	130
Recommendations	130
<b>Recommendations in Detail:</b>	<b>131</b>
By Marginalised Women to Marginalised Women in Sudan—for their Empowerment	133
To the Transitional Government	134
To the Sudanese Civil Society	136
To the International Community	137
<b>Bibliography and Annexes</b>	<b>140</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>140</b>
Annex 1: Questionnaires	142
Annex 2: Demographic Data Sheet	148
Annex 3: Inductive Category Formation Forms	149
Annex 4: Interviewees' Demographic Data	150
Annex 5: List of Interviewees	157

## List of Abbreviations

CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
FFC	Forces of Freedom and Change
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Person(s)
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
NCP	National Congress Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIS	National Intelligence and Security Services
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SPA	Sudanese Professionals Association
SRF	Sudanese Revolutionary Front
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SWU	Sudanese Women's Union
WHRD	Women Human Rights Defenders

# Abstract

“Bana Group for Peace and Development” is a diverse group of women activists from all over Sudan, which was founded in 2017 and took part in the December Revolution of 2018/19. Our mission is to spread the culture of peace and support multi-marginalised women all over Sudan to have their needs met. After the Revolution, we wanted to understand if and how the transition process is reaching multi-marginalised women in Sudan—and if the newly emerging structures and actors can really better their lives and bring “Freedom—Peace—Justice” for those most in need.

Therefore, in December 2019, we set out for a participatory action research, interviewing multi-marginalised women and activists in seven Sudanese States, starting in IDP Camps in and around Gineina, West Darfur, along-side empowerment workshops with these women. Our aim was to find out how we and (other) multi-marginalised women can influence the transition process in Sudan such that the resulting structures are inclusive and assure that the needs and demands of multi-marginalised women are continuously reflected and met. Hence, what you are reading is not a desk study compiled by outside scholars, but the outcome of a participatory action research conducted by an activist group (partly) in their own communities, supported by consultants.

Through our exploratory-inductive study, using a qualitative content analysis approach, we found that

- Two thirds of the interviewees face intersecting experiences of ethnic or racist discrimination, about one third recount experiences of gender-based discrimination and violence, and one fifth have experienced forms of discrimination related to class and economic status.
- The different experiences of discrimination and marginalisation cannot be viewed independently of each other. Rather, they strongly interact in an intersectional way.
- The most often identified needs and demands relate to discrimination with regards to class and economic access, war-related violence and marginalisation, as well as improvements in the quality, accessibility and affordability of education for all.
- A future system of governance would need to be based on the inclusion of all segments of society in the decision-making processes of a civilian regime and ensure that multi-marginalised women speak for themselves.
- Some of the issues of importance to marginalised women have already started to be addressed by the Transition Government; yet, many identified needs and demands are not yet met.
- Multi-marginalised women developed a realm of ideas for influencing the transition process that comprise ways, values, activities and strategies which they can use to empower themselves and be the true agents of change.



Based on the main conclusions that we drew from this, we developed specific strategies for the following measures:

- realising gender equality
- ending ethnic and gender-based discrimination and marginalisation in education and on the job market
- fostering the stabilisation of the economy as well as climate justice
- promoting peace, security, trust and healing
- introducing intersectional representation
- (transitional) justice
- protecting the Revolution and building a society based on justice and freedom
- installing mechanisms that ensure accountability
- utilising the current potential of multi-marginalised women to be heard and strengthening empowerment processes of multi-marginalised women in Sudan.

Based on this research, we developed recommendations to the Sudanese Transitional Government, to Sudanese civil society and to international actors, as well as to multi-marginalised women themselves for their empowerment. For the use in advocacy work, we also developed a policy brief containing the main findings of this study as well as our derived strategies and recommendations.



*Photo: Bana members from West Darfur and the Nuba Mountains at the Sit-In in front of the Military Headquarter in Khartoum, May 2019.*

## Chapter 1:

# How to Bring the Revolution Home?

## Introduction—Context and Purpose of the Study

---

A year before this study was written, the Sudanese nonviolent “December Revolution” resulted in dictator Omar Al-Bashir having to step down on 11<sup>th</sup> April 2019 after 30 years in office. Despite severe massacres (the biggest one on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2019, leaving around 200 dead), protests, strikes and civil disobedience did not subside for at least another two months, until the alliance of the “Forces of Freedom and Change” negotiated a three-year and three months transition phase to democracy. For this period, a Transition Government was set up, with a Sovereignty Council of both civilian and military representatives, a civilian Prime Minister and a civilian Cabinet (except for the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior, who are selected by the military and appointed by the Prime Minister).

The Revolution did not come out of the blue. Many activists and human rights defenders had organised protests for years, until the movement—as well as society’s outrage and courage—was big enough. Many of them were detained and tortured by the Bashir-regime, and many eventually had to leave the country. One of them is Mai Ali Shatta. Even in exile, she continued working for nonviolent social change in Sudan. In 2017, she was able to start implementing a vision she had developed when she was arrested in Omdurman women’s prison in 2012 after a protest: To bring together Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRD) from all parts of Sudan to network together and empower themselves as part of the social movement for an end of the military dictatorship. Her reasoning behind this was that she saw marginalised women enduring the dictatorship, wars and gender-based violence at its worst, while their voice was being stolen by this political system. Moreover, even in nonviolent social movements, marginalised women had little chances of participation and less access e.g. to capacity building than men or those from privileged groups. In addition, she knew that especially for marginalised women, it was difficult to travel or have workshops together with men. Thus, it was important to create safe spaces for women only to empower themselves and be able to talk freely about specific issues, before going into mixed settings. Mai Ali Shatta says:

*“Change should not only come from the city and from people who are in peace. Change needs to be inclusive. And this is our duty. If those people in power don’t reach them or think about them, we should try to bring these kinds of voices and let them be heard and be visible. (...) We need not to lead them [the marginalised women] but let them be part of it [the change]. And maybe later they can raise their voice by themselves.”*

F-GE-Berlin-01-A-B

For the first gathering at the beginning of 2018, fifteen of us came together from the states of Blue Nile, South Kordofan, West Kordofan, Red Sea, North Sudan, West Darfur, South Darfur, North Darfur, Central Darfur and Khartoum. We were activists working on issues ranging from women's rights, to the right to basic facilities like health and water, to an end to war, ethnic- and colour-based discrimination and dictatorship. Many of us have ourselves been facing human rights violations, effects of war and displacement as well as gender-based violence. Among us are teachers, social workers, agricultural engineers, an ex-rebel, lawyers, psychologists, mothers, home carers and students. After a number of meetings, we decided to call ourselves Bana Group for Peace and Development, after the medicinal Bana tree (*Moringa oleifera*) growing in Western and Southern parts of Sudan and beyond. It symbolises the African movements for liberation from slavery and marginalisation.

First, we met out of the country, for security reasons. In a workshop format called "Space of Transformation", we engaged in strategising for nonviolent social change, in technical capacity building and also in strategising for holistic security management. Further issues revolved around cross-ethnic trust-building, conflict transformation and reconciliation as well as strengthening our resilience and creating spaces for sharing, understanding psychosocial trauma dynamics and sometimes healing. The "Space of Transformation" approach is an open process of a series of workshops, more and more involving the participants in its organising and content creation with the goal of self-organisation and empowerment. Its methods don't come from an NGO- or humanitarian approach, but from an approach of grassroots activism. We brought the discussions about nonviolence and the advantages of nonviolent resistance versus violent means back to our groups and communities and triggered many important strategic debates. This also strengthened our motivation and the trust that nonviolent resistance can work.

Our main mission as Bana Group for Peace and Development is to have the needs of multi-marginalised women met and to spread the culture of peace. We do so through the following activities:

- supporting peaceful coexistence and nonviolent conflict resolution
- building the capacities of women through awareness raising and advocacy campaigns
- empowering women both economically and politically and including them in the peace and political process
- showing respect for diversity and acceptance of others
- supporting disadvantaged groups and war-affected communities.

Through this, we hope to contribute to our vision of a supportive environment for women.

In May 2019, we were able to meet in Khartoum for the first time to contribute to the ongoing Revolution. We joined the Sit-In in front of the Military Headquarter. One incident there led to an intense discussion: While it had been arranged that we could speak on the main stage of the Sit-In that night, when we showed up there we had to wait for a long time, and in the end we were turned down. Some organisers explained that the line-up was very chaotic and that there had been misunderstandings and technical challenges. However, in some of us this incident triggered the concern whether the fact that most of us were "non-Arab" women was part of the reason why we were not given a chance to speak. We saw the danger that patterns of discrimination may be repeated during and after the Revolution.

In the end, some of us just spoke at a small makeshift stage. We described the situation and sufferings of women in the Nuba Mountains and Darfur and pointed to the previous roles of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemetti”), the leader of the “Rapid Support Forces”<sup>1</sup>, and General Burhan, former Inspector General of the Sudanese Armed Forces, in the Darfur war. At that stage of the Revolution, Burhan and Hemetti had taken over the leadership of the country, after a second military leader replacing Bashir had given up after only one day. Due to media censorship and government propaganda, many people in Northern Sudan, including activists, were largely unaware of what had actually happened in the years of violent conflict in the Southern parts of Sudan (Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile) and Western Sudan (Darfur)—let alone the roles of Burhan and Hemetti in this violence.

Therefore, we were afraid that people may trust them too easily and may not be aware of the dangers—rightly so, as became obvious during the 3rd June massacre. We were also concerned that we, as women mostly from the margins, were being ignored once again, like so many times before, by the people from North Sudan—this time even by our co-activists in the Revolution. We knew all too well the subtle ways of discrimination which marginalised women face on top of the blatant ways of being bullied and violated. This became very clear to us in the discussions we had that night, while on the main stage predominantly male Northern Sudanese activists recited poetry.

From this incident, we as Bana realised we were facing the risk that a new post-Revolution system in Sudan—and, for that matter, even the people of Sudan—might be reproducing similar elements of intersecting racism, gender-based discrimination and marginalisation that we have been struggling against for decades. We concluded: As activists and women human rights defenders mainly from marginalised areas, it is important to keep an eye on the learning processes (or rather the “unlearning processes” of many decades of racism and gender-based discrimination) as well as the organising processes for the upcoming new political system in Sudan. We need to make sure that those at the fringes of society, those who face several kinds of marginalisation at once, will indeed see a relevant positive change with regards to their needs and political participation. Only then will a just and peaceful society be attainable, and the Revolution will reach its goal.

With this in mind, we decided to hold our next meeting in December 2019 in Gineina, West Darfur. There, we kicked off the idea of this study in order to base our work, in line with our mission, on the actual concerns of multi-marginalised women by asking them about their needs and demands and working together on their empowerment.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Rapid Support Forces are a paramilitary force that grew out of the “Janjaweed” militia in the Darfur conflict, fighting against so-called “African” ethnic groups in Darfur. Omar Al-Bashir also placed them, among other things, as border patrols to stop migrants. Migration control was laid down in the Khartoum Declaration with the EU. Also, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo sent young RSF soldiers as mercenaries to Yemen to fight on the side of Saudi Arabia.

## Purpose and Focus of this Study

That women facing multiple marginalisation raise their voice is an important part of their empowerment—which in turn is crucial for a more just future of Sudan. Fostering such empowerment processes is an important goal for us—to make sure that change for those affected comes by them and on their terms (more on what we mean exactly by empowerment and marginalisation is clarified in Chapter 3). Empowerment of multi-marginalised women therefore should be a focus of the Transition Government and of official as well as civilian transition processes, if the Revolution is to fulfil its promise of “Freedom—Peace—Justice”.

International efforts to support the transition process—be it politically, economically or otherwise—should share this focus, too. With regards to international actors, we are concerned that those who are new to Sudan after many years of sanctions and isolation may come in without appropriate knowledge of the context. And especially—even in contrast to their potential interests—there might be an insufficient focus on the needs of the people, in particularly those who face multiple marginalisation.

Hence, this study serves two purposes: It hopes to help marginalised women in their empowerment processes, in terms of organising and strategising, but also to inform the Transition Government, Sudanese civil society and international state and non-state actors who are involved in Sudan so that they be allies of multi-marginalised people.

In a process of qualitative participatory action research, we hence engaged with more than 120 multiply marginalised women and also spoke to several activists, marginalised men and decision-makers in order to find out:

“How can women—especially those confronted with intersecting discrimination and marginalisation—influence the Sudanese transition process in a way that the resulting structures are inclusive and assure that the needs and demands of women facing different forms of marginalisation are continuously reflected and met?”

In order to answer this question, the study sets out to examine in how far the Revolution and the transition period’s changes are already reaching marginalised women (being aware that the transition process is only just starting). We further explore what kinds of needs, demands and impulses exist on the side of marginalised women, what new ways and opportunities for participation are arising for the multiply marginalised, and where old patterns and power structures are still in place.

Therefore, we divide our main research question into the following sub-questions:

- What are the needs and demands of women in Sudan, especially those facing different forms of discrimination?
- How do the governance structures resulting from the transition process need to look like so that they are inclusive and ensure that women’s needs and demands are continuously reflected and met?
- To what extent does the transition process up to now open up possibilities for marginalised women’s needs and demands being reflected and met by the resulting structures? How could this be yet improved?
- How can women—especially those facing different forms of discrimination—influence this transition process so that it results in such inclusive structures?

To the above-mentioned ends, the results of this study are being shared both with marginalised women in the different Sudanese regions—to engage them further in strengthening their voices and empowering themselves—as well as with local, national and international activist groups, NGOs and decision-makers. All in all, this study is part of our effort in raising awareness and focusing on finding ways for the new emerging system in Sudan to really benefit those who, over decades, have suffered the most. We conducted it in a unique cooperation process with KURVE Wustrow—Centre for Networking and Training in Nonviolent Action, as part of the German Civil Peace Service programme.

The time of data collection for this study reflects the transition process at its stage in December 2019. At that point, the new Cabinet, the Sovereignty Council and the new Prime Minister Hamdok had taken office and started working, focusing on, among others, the following tasks:

- Ceasefire and peace talks between the Sudanese Transition Government, including the military, and different rebel groups of SPLM-North as well as the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (of different armed groups in Darfur) in Juba
- Dismantling of the old regime, e.g. ban of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and court case against Omar Al-Bashir
- Resumption of international relations and negotiations for an end of sanctions
- Re-establishing the rule of law on the basis of human rights, e.g. abolishing the “Public Order Law”, among others.

By the time of publishing this report, further legal reforms and other measures of the Transition Government have taken place, which will be mentioned later in the study. Also, the Corona crisis has considerably changed the global scene since then, and has particularly increased the economic and health crisis in Sudan. In Darfur, violence continued to flare up, mainly with attacks by persons from so-called “Arab” ethnic groups on persons from so-called “African” ethnic groups, with killings, rapes, burning of fields and land-grabbing. In July 2020, mainly people from so-called “African” ethnic groups in Darfur—including many multi-marginalised women, and Bana Group for Peace and Development—took to the streets and did sit-ins in different places, starting in Nyertiti, to demand security and bring changed structures also to the marginalised areas. In reaction, dozens of protesters were injured or even killed by men who probably belonged to militias loyal to the former dictatorship.

## Structure of the Report

In the remaining parts of this study, we provide further background on the historical and current factors that led to and uphold a system of marginalisation and discrimination in Sudan (Chapter 2). We then (further) define the key concepts we use in this study (Chapter 3), and describe the methodological approach we use for collecting and analysing data (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, we give an overview of the data we collected. With the analysis of the data in Chapter 6, the major body of this study, we provide the information we can draw from the data with regards to the research questions outlined above. In Chapter 7, we summarise the results of the analysis and describe what strategic implications they have for activism. The conclusion (Chapter 8) summarises the major points of this study. Based on the synthesis and implications outlined in Chapter 7, we develop recommendations for multi-marginalised women in Sudan as well as for various Sudanese and international state and non-state actors.



Photo: In June/July 2020, multi-marginalised people and especially women, like here at an activity of Bana and other women`s groups in El-Fasher, demanded an end to violence and for the Revolution to bring meaningful changes to their lives.



## Chapter 2:

# From Marginalisation to Taking the Stage

## Background and Relevance

---

Marginalisation is such a complex and cross-cutting issue that it has a vast variety of political, economic, social and psychological dimensions. Hence, to understand it comprehensively, one would need to consult several scientific disciplines. For us, it is important to understand it not only from general or international perspectives, but especially with its connotations and interpretations in different Sudanese environments, cultures, religions and societal situations. We find this important to help us transcend both the social realities and the psychological conditions of the affected people and move towards a more humanistic reality created together.

Specifically, if we want to explore how marginalised women in Sudan can influence the current transition process as well as its resulting structures, we need to have an idea of how the present multi-dimensional system of marginalisation and discrimination came into being and in what way it is upheld. In addition to the historical and political background, we need to clarify our concept of marginalisation in order to find out who the multi-marginalised women in Sudan really are. This will provide us with a basis to refine our research question so that it can guide us through the study process.

Therefore, this chapter briefly looks at the history of conflict in Sudan, followed by an analysis of the system of discrimination and marginalisation and how it is being upheld. It then sheds light on the conceptualisation of marginalisation and its forms in Sudan. Finally, the chapter specifies the research question so that it can serve the above-mentioned purpose in the context of the study's background.

## A Brief Conflict History of Sudan

The "December Revolution" of 2018/2019 and the system it challenged developed from a long history of different kinds and forms of discrimination, marginalisation and war.

The history of ethnically based marginalisation in Sudan dates back to at least the time when Muslim Arabs set foot in the country. It was reinforced by the Turkish colonisation and the Mahdist State as well as by the British colonisers from 1899–1956, when Sudan became an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. While earlier the territory was made up of different Sultanates and Kingdoms, colonisers drew the country's new borders, with Darfur being the last part that was added in 1874. The regions were not

well connected to the centre, and towards what is today South Sudan even a “closed-door” policy was introduced with a highly isolating effect. This isolation and exclusion triggered a magnitude of conflicts and opposition, both by civilian and military means.

After Sudan’s independence from colonialism in 1956, the country faced decades of civil wars and military dictatorships. In fact, Sudan had only short interludes of democracy and civilian rule between 1956–1958, 1964–1969 and 1985–1989. Similarly to the December Revolution of 2018/2019, the latter interludes were brought about by the people toppling military dictatorships in nonviolent revolutions in 1964 and 1985. However, the basic marginalisation structures were not transformed in their aftermaths.

Since 1956, there has been only one period of eleven years, 1972–1983, during which there was no civil war in at least some regions of the country. The first war between Northern and Southern Sudan started even before independence, in 1955 (Anyanya 1). The second war between Sudan’s Central Government and the mostly South Sudanese rebels of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army started in 1983. The term “marginalised area” became popular in Sudanese politics when the SPLM manifesto was presented on 31<sup>st</sup> July 1983. They declared that all areas of Sudan were actually marginalised, except for Khartoum and the Gezira region, where a big agricultural development programme with irrigation from the Nile was taking place. This systematic marginalisation, as was said, was established by the colonial powers and continued, after independence, as “systems of paralysing the minorities”.

The declaration also promoted a fundamental solution that adopts the concept of a united and free “new Sudan” with a socialist orientation and democratic solutions for all national and religious issues. In 2005, SPLM/A-leader John Garang signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Naivasha, Kenya. However, after he had died in a helicopter crash only a few weeks later, separatists in the SPLM/A became stronger, and in 2011, the people of South Sudan voted for independence and formed a separate state on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011.

The military-Islamist regime of Omar Al-Bashir and the National Congress Party came into power through a coup in 1989 during the ongoing civil war against the mostly South Sudanese SPLM/A. In 2003, the war in Darfur started, for which Omar Al-Bashir and several others are being accused of crimes against humanity and genocide by the International Criminal Court. In this war, the Sudanese Military Government armed “Arab” so-called “Janjaweed”—“mounted gunmen”, as the subsequent militia in Darfur was then prominently called—to fight against so-called “African” ethnic groups. This alone displays how the attribution of “Arab” versus “African” identities is at the core of Sudanese social conflicts and has been used by political leaders to their advantage. Moreover, with one of the war triggers having been a shifting of pastoralist routes due to desertification, the Darfur war is a clear example of armed conflicts erupting as a result of climate change. Later, Omar Al-Bashir gave the Janjaweed as “Rapid Support Forces” further special tasks like border protection, which was also connected to European interests in cutting off refugee routes towards the EU.

After South Sudan’s independence on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011, the people of the “remaining” Republic of Sudan continued to face the dictatorship’s oppression. They also slid deeper into an economic crisis, due to mismanagement by the dictatorship’s elites and the loss of oil revenues now mainly in South Sudan. On 5<sup>th</sup> June 2011 already, war broke out between the SPLM/A North and the Sudanese Armed Forces in South Kordofan, and in September 2011 also in Blue Nile State. A majority of (mostly Muslim) people in these marginalised regions had fought on the side of the SPLM/A during the previous war and found themselves not winning independence but rather facing further marginalisation. Later, SPLM/A North and several rebel groups in Darfur created a strategic cooperation as the “Sudan Revolutionary Front”.

At the same time, yet again war as well as governance and economic challenges in the new country of South Sudan showed that secession was not necessarily creating the peace, stability and freedom many in the South had hoped for. This strengthened the notion of “unity” in North Sudanese civil society with regards to some pro-secession efforts in other parts of the country, e.g. in Darfur.

Historically, the role of women in Sudan includes traditionally strong positions like those of queens (in North Sudan the Nubian Pharaohs called “Kandaka”, in the West and South regional queens called Mayarim, Maliki or other terms) or the Hakamat, female singers who entice war or peace. Harmful traditional practices like Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) date back around 2,000 years but have become widespread later. Women’s space in society has been considerably reduced with the implementation of Sharia law, both in the context of the dictatorship of Jaffar Nimeiri, but more so during the dictatorship of Omar Al-Bashir since 1989. This was not only visible in dress codes, but also in a reduction of freedom of movement and education for women.

This also interacts with role-related practices and limitations by families and communities. Practices like early or child marriage have been a tradition in many communities for a long time and are still present today. Widows, divorcees or single women are being stigmatised. Polygamy and rape in marriage are legal in Sudan. Women on average get less health care than men, and the maternal mortality rate in Sudan as well as occurrences of birth-related fistula are high. Women are responsible for almost all the unpaid care work and often also subsistence farming within their families, while being highly under-represented in most paid jobs. As of 2013, Sudan was one of only seven countries worldwide which had not signed the CEDAW agreement (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women). While women have had strong roles in religion, both in the traditional “Zar” practice<sup>2</sup> as well as occasionally also as Sheikhas<sup>3</sup>, strict Islamist influence has tried to diminish this role and practices.

However, women have been organising themselves, supporting each other and showing resistance for a long time as well. The Sudanese Women’s Union (SWU) was founded in 1952 already and fought colonialism and Islamist dictatorships, being made illegal and working undercover or from exile for many decades. In 1964, women successfully achieved the right to vote, and SWU member Fatima Ahmed Ibrahim became the first female member of any African Parliament. Until recently, there was a 25% parliamentary quota for women. Women also took up arms against the Islamist military dictatorships which brutally oppressed so-called “African” ethnic groups and women, seeing them as part of some rebel movements.

In 1990, tea seller Ahwadia Mahmoud Koko, a woman whose family had fled to Khartoum decades ago from the war in the Nuba Mountains, founded the Women’s Food and Tea Seller’s Cooperative which acted as a trade union for the rights of women working in these vulnerable jobs. It was later a part of the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) which played an important role in the December Revolution. In 2010, medical doctor Nahed Mohamed ElHassan went on hunger strike to protest against the negligence of health services by the Sudanese Government. In 2011, student activist Safia Ishaq publicly spoke about being raped in detention, triggering a big wave of online solidarity and protest, after which sexualised violence against (female) detainees was reported to be considerably reduced.

---

<sup>2</sup> “Zar” traditions of trance practices date back to pre-Islamic times and are still sometimes practiced in Sudan and Egypt, especially by women.

<sup>3</sup> Sheikhas can be either community leaders or religious leaders, depending on the context. Sometimes it is also referred to a woman who knows traditional healing methods.

Women were a considerable part of all three nonviolent revolutions in Sudan, lastly the “December Revolution” of 2018/2019 and all the protest waves having led up to it since 2009. They were citizens’ journalists, organisers, trainers and activists on the frontline. They created collectives and action groups like the “Manbarshad” that publicised information about secret informants of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). They faced detention, sexualised violence, exile and, in some cases, became martyrs.

The history of economic division and exploitation again goes back a long way to the times of slavery, first probably in the context of the Pharaonic culture and later the slave trade with the Arab Peninsula. Suakin, the neighbour town to Port Sudan, at that time was an important harbour not only to bring pilgrims across the Red Sea to Saudi-Arabia on their way to Mecca, but also to bring enslaved people into the Arab region. Slave traders were then working on racist grounds, with the result that certain “African” ethnic groups were either caught for slavery or pushed back towards the South. Later, colonialist forces—and even later post-colonial dynamics—exploited the country’s resources, benefiting just a few (North Sudanese “Arab”) elites.

The result: Economic access is enormously diverse until today, depending on the region, the city-countryside divide and the colour of skin that people have. Oil exploitation, for example, has funded corrupt military dictatorships with huge “security” expenses for decades and left local people with poisoned drinking water and loss of land. RSF-leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo is paying his troops partly with the revenues from gold mines in Darfur. The dams that are being built on the Nile are creating electricity for people in the cities who can afford it, while others are being stripped of their lands and livelihoods and literally sit in the dark. And there is harsh discrimination against people of “African” ethnic groups, when it comes to access to education, jobs and positions of power, e.g. in government.

## The Current Conflict Reality in Sudan

The above-described history of conflict has built up, maintained and institutionalised a system of war, violent conflict, discrimination and marginalisation in Sudan. In 2018, we identified the following aspects, in order of severity, as key problems in this respect:

- 1 discrimination
- 2 unequal distribution of power and wealth
- 3 lack of good governance
- 4 human rights violations


In order to develop promising strategies as an effective contribution to overcoming this system and these problems, we conducted an analysis—using the tool of “Systemic Conflict Analysis”<sup>4</sup>—to explain the causes, consequences and interactions of these problems. Below, we depict a slightly simplified version of our analysis.

---

<sup>4</sup> For an explanation of Systemic Conflict Analysis, see: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2016). *Designing Strategic Initiatives to Impact Conflict Systems: Systems Approaches to Peacebuilding. A Resource Manual*. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Available at: <https://www.cdacollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Designing-Strategic-Initiatives-to-Impact-Conflict-Systems-Systems-Approaches-to-Peacebuilding-Final.pdf>. Accessed: 19.7.2020.

This tool connects different problematic factors in order to make correlations visible and identify “Key Driving Factors” and “Re-enforcing Cycles” which uphold systems of conflict and violence. The strategic assumption is that if key re-enforcing cycles can be broken, even on one correlation alone, the whole system will change and can transform to a less violent or harmful system. In the case of Sudan, this can, of course, not be achieved by only one actor, but it can help to prioritise actions, projects and campaigns.

An indicator for a factor to be a “Key Driving Factor” within a conflict system is the number of arrows going out to other factors, i.e. the number of other factors caused—at least in part—by this very factor. The “Key Driving Factors” that we identified with regards to our situation in Sudan are the following, marked in orange in the graph:



Graph 1: Systemic Conflict Analysis of Sudan

## “Key Driving Factors”:

- War, Violent Conflict (9 arrows): This refers mainly to the violent conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, but also to a culture of violence which plays out on different levels of society, including the family level.
- Ethnic/Racist Discrimination (5 arrows): Here, we refer to inter-ethnic discrimination, mainly versus so-called “African” ethnic groups.
- Unjust Distribution of Power and Resources (4 arrows): As a result of discrimination and dictatorship, class differences have been created and maintained with regards to access to political participation and resources, in turn leading to poverty and higher vulnerability among specific groups of people.
- Lack of Rule of Law (4 arrows): This refers to specific laws not being implemented or enforced, practices that are not according to the law, and crimes that are not being punished or punished selectively for people with different identities.
- Many Bad Governments in Succession (4 arrows): This refers to the long history of military dictatorships, fragile democracies and colonial rule, which led to discrimination and power imbalances being deeply entrenched in the socio-political fabric as well as a lack of experience with efficient and inclusive democratic decision-making and governance.
- Gender Inequality (3 arrows): Again, gender inequality shows up on all levels of society, be it at the family level up to discriminatory laws and lack of political participation, up to gender-based violence mainly inflicted on women and girls.
- Bad Socialisation (3 arrows): Hereby, we mean educational patterns in families, schools and beyond that are reinforcing cultural violence in terms of racism, abusing privileges, use of violence as well as gender discrimination internalised from an early age and reinforced through some traditional proverbs, games or folklore.
- Bad Laws/Legal System (3 arrows): Here, we refer mainly to the contents of laws, but also legal practices which in many aspects contradict human rights and reinforce e.g. gender inequality and ethnic discrimination.

When looking at the causes and consequences of the “Key Driving Factors” and how they interact, it becomes clear how they form so-called “Reinforcing Cycles” which uphold and reinforce the “Key Driving Factors”. Some important “Reinforcing Cycles” in this conflict system are:

- War, Violent Conflict—Human Rights Violations—Insecurity: A state of war leads to structured and spontaneous violations of human rights, such as the right to life, and thus creates a state of insecurity among people. This, in turn, can entice people to use violence in an attempt to protect themselves, creating a vicious cycle. Human rights violations can also reinforce dynamics of war and draw more people into it.
- War, Violent Conflict—Gender-based Violence—Hatred: In many armed conflicts, including those in Sudan, gender-based and sexualised violence have been and are being used as weapons of war. They create hatred not only among the survivors, but also within the whole community, and thus reinforce the dynamics of war.

- War, Violent Conflict—Ethnic/Racist Discrimination—Hatred: The armed conflicts in Sudan have been significantly caused by racist discrimination, leading to inter-ethnic hatred and violence. The more violence, the more discrimination, the more hatred again—so the cycle goes both ways.
- Lack of Rule of Law—Bad Laws and Legal System—Corruption: Lack of rule of law can leave loopholes for corruption. A weak and inconsistent legal system in turn is not able to create mechanisms to prevent or deter breaches of law or corruption.
- Many Bad Governments in Succession—Unjust Distribution of Power and Resources—Bad Laws and Legal System: A long period of bad governance has left power and resources in the hands of a few. Those few, in turn, have made sure that the legal system is in their favour and strengthens their governance systems.
- Gender Inequality—Gender-Based Violence—Bad Socialisation: A socialisation, in which young people learn that one gender is inferior to the other, does not only create social imbalances in terms of rights, access to participation and resources. It also creates a mind-set in which gender-based violence can be justified and nurtured.
- Ethnic/Racist Discrimination—Unjust Distribution of Power and Resources—Lack of Rule of Law—Bad Laws/Bad Legal System: Even though there are some laws in place which do not allow for discrimination based on ethnicity, legal and law enforcement practices have actually led to different situations in which people of different ethnicity have been discriminated against over long periods of time. This, in turn, has enabled those privileged to strengthen their hold on political power and resources.

From a systems analysis perspective, a change in one or several factors or causal relationships will lead to a change within the bigger system. In consequence, strategies for change by activists do not necessarily have to target the whole system at once, or specifically the key driving factors. Rather, they can start by changing factors that they can realistically influence within the reinforcing cycles, assuming that these changes will also lead to changes in the whole system. Thus, the analysis can serve as a basis for finding options for actions that can be implemented and that might trigger change in the bigger system.

For example, popular education and awareness raising could address the cycles that involve bad socialisation. This, in turn, could help to overcome gender inequality and discrimination which is a source of violence and war in Sudan. Another example, which has been started to kick off through the Revolution and transition period, is to have a systems change through legal reforms. If the new system manages to put them into practice, this could lead to a re-distribution of power and resources.

The systems analysis has informed us for our actions until now. It also provides the basis for some of the assumptions and lenses which this study is based on. A number of the above-mentioned driving factors and cycles have already been challenged—or started to be challenged—by the Sudanese Revolution. By asking marginalised women about their experiences with marginalisation and their demands, this current study will inform us and others about the extent to which our analysis is being shared by (other) marginalised women, what demands they have, what may have already started to change, and which options of intervention they see for themselves.

## Empowerment and Marginalisation: An Intersectional Perspective

The Sudanese Revolution has been an incredible and inspiring process of empowerment. This spirit of empowerment needs to be reinforced, or at least not compromised, in any further process related to political transition and development. It is with this in mind that we look at the transition process and the resulting structures.

One of the most prominent slogans of the Revolution was “Freedom—Peace—Justice” (Hurriya—Salaam—Adala), opposing dictatorship, war and discrimination. The results of the Revolution, therefore, need to be viewed with regards to these demands as well as the problems described before, particularly looking at whether there have been changes concerning the demands of those who are most marginalised. Furthermore, the sustainable success of the Revolution should be measured by in how far there are new structures accessible to those most marginalised, so that they themselves can make sure that their needs are continuously being taken care of.

To understand what “Freedom—Peace—Justice” means and would look like for those most marginalised, and in how far they already see changes in this respect, we need to understand and ask directly those who are the most marginalised in Sudanese society.

For this, we use the lens of intersectionality, defined further in Chapter 3:

With the lens of intersectionality, in a diverse and heterogeneous society as that of Sudan, the experiences of discrimination (inter-social), human rights violations (by the ruling system) and the access to power and wealth largely depend on specific identity features of a person. According to the “Matrix of Domination” (also explained further in Chapter 3), the main fault-lines lie in gender, ethnicity/skin colour and class. These fault-lines interact with each other and also diversify in aspects inter-related to these very factors as well as further aspects.

In the Sudanese context, the experience of **racism** would mainly focus on whether one belongs to a so-called “Arab” (usually privileged) or “African” (usually marginalised) ethnic group. However, there may be differences also in terms of how these individual ethnic groups are positioned in society, where they are located in the country (particularly if it is in a war zone or not), and whether Arabic is their mother tongue or not—or if they speak Arabic at all. Also, the colour of skin may put an individual in a more or less privileged situation, which may be different from others of the same ethnic group or even family. Furthermore, there are groups of the “others”, for example those with parents of different ethnic groups (either of intermarriage, or children of sex-workers or rape, who again have a whole set of further stigmata and discriminations to deal with). So-called “others” are also ethnic minorities originating in West Africa but having lived in Sudan for many generations, pastoralists who migrate beyond national borders, or people with further previous migration backgrounds. Again, one could distinguish between refugees due to war or political persecution from Eritrea, South Sudan, Syria etc., and (often temporary) work-related migration from Egypt, China or the West. Sometimes, racist discrimination also intersects with religious discrimination in Sudan, e.g. among some ethnic groups who are not (all) Muslim, but also follow Christian or traditional beliefs

With regards to **gender**, there is—as already pointed out above—a clear divide, as many women are facing several forms of discrimination, marginalisation and gender-based violence as opposed to men.



These range from Female Genital Mutilation, the Public Order Regime<sup>5</sup> limiting women's travels, choice of clothing, political, public and economic activities as well as general disadvantages in education, employment and access to political power. Marital status is a key factor of status in Sudan: While single older women or divorced women are stigmatised, forced early or even child marriages have a big effect on the biography of the affected women. These effects do not only include probably facing rape within marriage, but mostly also ending their education. Being divorced or a widow increases the danger of poverty. Again, there are also groups of "others" who are stigmatised to an extent that it is a taboo even to talk about whether a person belongs to one of these categories: This refers to sex workers, rape survivors (which could be both female and male) or children out of rape as well as people who are not cis-gender (their self-identity not according to the gender they are assigned with), not heterosexual (not only attracted to the other sex), or who are intersex (having both male and female physical features from birth).

The experience of economic **class** and status in Sudan can largely depend on the ethnic attributes of a person, but also on whether someone lives in the city or the countryside and therefore has access to infrastructure, healthcare and specific resources. Moreover, the experience of class depends on whether or not a person has been directly affected by war, e.g. by internal displacement. Further vital elements are the access to education (which again depends often on ethnicity, gender and the economic status of the family as well as whether one lives in the city or countryside), on ability (which often is related to the access to health services) and on age. In addition, it makes a difference if a person or family has access to (fertile) land and therefore subsistence possibilities (especially in times of climate change) or other resources (like the fought-over gold-mines in Darfur). Whether a person works in the formal sector, the informal sector or is unemployed are other factors among further ones. For women, as in many parts of the world, care-work at home is an important but unpaid as well as under-valued occupation which puts them into dependency on men. For those who simultaneously have to work outside to earn the livelihood of their family, the work load doubles. Marginalised women in many cases have to resort to illegalised jobs (like sex work or making and selling alcohol<sup>6</sup>) or vulnerable and low paid jobs like being housemaids or tea sellers in the street.

As mentioned above, these main fault-lines, as well as other features like age, ability, religion etc., interact with each other, reinforcing systems of discrimination and marginalisation in a variety of ways—which we assume will also become apparent in the further analysis of the data we gathered. For the study, we focus (with a few exceptions) on those who are facing most intersecting hardships and marginalisation in society. Based on the systems analysis described above as well as a gender-perspective, we assume that women and those from so-called "African" ethnic backgrounds are the biggest groups to be marginalised all over Sudan. In consequence, we assume that women who face at least one further aspect of marginalisation with regards to ethnicity and/or class (e.g. due to their ethnic background, their economic status & access to infrastructure, education and resources) are facing multiple intersecting kinds of marginalisation.

The Covid-19 pandemic shows once again that multi-marginalised people are most vulnerable to such crises, in this case with regards to a lack of health services as well as further economic decline and price rises. Also, the climate crisis hits the multi-marginalised hardest and can even lead or contribute to long-lasting violent conflicts, with a war economy benefiting from the suffering. This is something which the Darfur conflict—being sometimes dubbed the "first climate war"—sadly shows.<sup>7</sup>

---

5 For details of the Public Order Regime and its implications, see: Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (2009). *Beyond Trousers. The Public Order Regime and the Human Rights of Women and Girls in Sudan*. A Discussion Paper Submission to the 46<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Banjul, the Gambia. Available at: <http://www.pclrs.com/downloads/Miscellaneous/Public%20Order%20Submission%20Paper%20MASTER%20FINAL.pdf>. Accessed: 30.11.2020.

6 These jobs have been legalised in July 2020 by the Transitional Government, with the limitation that alcohol can only be sold to Non-Muslims.

7 Welzer, Harald (2012). *Climate Wars. Why People Will be Killed in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.



*Photo: Impressions from an upcycling workshop of Bana in Mornei IDP Camp, West Darfur—initial stage of a tyre seat (for the later stage see Chapter 7)*

## Chapter 3:

# Understanding Multi-Marginalisation and its Overcoming

## Theory

---

### Previous Research

Previous studies and other publications on Sudan have focused on the needs and the human rights situation of the population, some on the specific situation of women. Publications since the beginning of the Revolution include for example an article by Liv Tønnessen on “Women at Work in Sudan—Marital Privilege or Constitutional Right”<sup>8</sup>. This, however, is focusing on the capital Khartoum and more on middle and upper-middle class families. Other publications shed light onto the history and dynamics of conflict and discussed opportunities for peace. Relevant publications by Sudanese authors include the brochure “Proposed Family Law—Towards Gender Justice in Sudan” by Sari Omer<sup>9</sup>, or an article by Zaynab ElSawi on “Women Building Peace: The Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace in Sudan”<sup>10</sup>. This article, however, was written in 2011 already, when some of the organisations mentioned later were being banned by Al-Bashir’s Government.

Other works again have looked at the role of social movements in challenging dictatorships in general, few of them on Sudan. The International Centre for Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) holds a database on case studies and research in this respect. In 2019, for example, the ICNC published an overall analysis of trends of protest movements that could be observed in that year.<sup>11</sup>

One analysis of the post-Revolution transition, from an international (Western) perspective, is provided by Annette Weber in her article “For a Peaceful Transition in Sudan—Current Developments and Plausible Scenarios” of October 2019<sup>12</sup>. Meanwhile, film-maker and activist of the Sudanese nonviolent resistance movement “Girifna”, Hajoj Kuka, in an interview with “Law at the Margins”, drew a much more sceptical picture of the negotiations and processes that the current Transition Government put into place<sup>13</sup>.

---

8 Tønnessen, Liv (2019). *Women at Work in Sudan: Marital Privilege or Constitutional Right*. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, 26(2), 223–244. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxz011>. Accessed: 19.7.2020.

9 Omer, Sari (2012): *Proposed Family Law. Towards Gender Justice in Sudan*. SORD (Sudanese Organisation for Research and Development).

10 ElSawi, Zaynab (2011). *Women Building Peace: The Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace in Sudan*. In Batliwala, Srilata (Ed.) 2011. *Changing Their World. The Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID)*.

11 Merriman, Hardy (2019). *Lessons of Uprisings Around the World: The Present Moment and Possible Future*. International Centre for Nonviolent Conflict, [https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog\\_post/lessons-of-uprisings-around-the-world/](https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/lessons-of-uprisings-around-the-world/). Accessed 19.7.2020.

12 Weber, Annette (2019). *For a Peaceful Transition in Sudan—Current Developments and Plausible Scenarios*. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Available at: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C39/>. Accessed: 19.7.2020

13 Gulston, Vania (2019). *The Revolution in the Streets of Sudan: An Interview with Hajoj Kuka*. *Law at the Margins*, available at: <https://lawatthemargins.com/the-revolution-in-the-streets-of-sudan-an-interview-with-hajoj-kuka/>. Accessed: 19.7.2020.

For English speakers, since the days of the Revolution, the collective “Sudanese Translators for Change” has created a Facebook page with excellent updates on the developments during and after the Revolution.

Albeit the great participation of women in the Revolution and the international visibility of activists like Alaa Salah, blogger Reem Abbas or journalist Amal Habbani, voices of non-Arab female activists, who are neither from Khartoum nor from middle or upper-middle class families, remain largely unheard and unseen. The protests in Darfur in July 2020—again with a lot of marginalised women participating—caught hardly any international media coverage. Iman Abbaro, in the article “Reclaiming Azza—the History of Women Resistance in Sudan”<sup>14</sup>, claims: “(...) Let’s not forget who this Revolution is really for. Sudanese women all across the nation and throughout our complex history deserve to be acknowledged and applauded for their efforts. The Kandakas of the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Gezira and all along the margins should not be excluded from a conversation taking place during such a crucial time in Sudan’s history. (...) Let’s make sure that we are including the women who have been marginalised throughout history as a consequence of colonialism and pan-Arabism. Despite the decades of trauma Sudan has endured, despite the west and its media contributing to this trauma, we need to create room for a nation to properly heal. The first step is rather than speaking for Sudanese women, both in the capital and in the margins, we simply hand them the microphone. The time has come for us to reclaim our nation and heal her on our own terms.”

Since the beginning of the transition period, many efforts with regards to research or data collection, strategising and programme development have started. We are aware that there are studies or data collections happening right now with regards to the role of youth in the transition process (e.g. by Gesr Centre for Development), or the role of women in general. Furthermore, both national and international actors are stepping up their work with regards to women empowerment—e.g. the network “No to Women Oppression”, the Sudanese Women’s Union or the Mansam network of Sudanese women as well as regional and local women’s groups and associations or international development actors like the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). As to our knowledge, however, this study is unique for, at least, three reasons and research gaps that it attempts to fill. Firstly, it provides insight with a focus on multiply marginalised women in the context of the Sudanese post-Revolution transition process. Secondly, it uses a participatory action research and empowerment approach. Thirdly, it is carried out by Sudanese marginalised women themselves.

## Key Concepts

### Discrimination and Marginalisation

By **‘discrimination’**, we generally mean attitudes, actions, treatments or structures that differentiate between people based on their ethnicity, gender, class, religion, age, sexual orientation, abilities and other attributes or social and political identities in such a way that it reduces the dignity, rights and potentials of self-realisation of some of these groups, while increasing those of others.

By **‘marginalisation’**, we understand the social and political process of relegating individuals or groups to the fringes of society, reducing their access to resources, rights and social opportunities, and thereby severely limiting their socio-political participation, power and influence.

---

<sup>14</sup> Abbaro, Iman (2019). Reclaiming Azza—A History of Female Resistance in Sudan. Sisi Magazine. Available at: <https://www.sisimag.com/blog/2019/6/7/reclaiming-azza-a-history-of-female-resistance-in-sudan>. Accessed: 19.7.2020.

In combination, discrimination and marginalisation overlap and influence each other in such a way that the discrimination of persons and groups usually goes along with marginalisation experiences in their societies. The more marginalised a person or a group is, the more likely it becomes that the levels and structures of discrimination they are subjected to increase—thereby, in turn, furthering the process of marginalisation. Discrimination and marginalisation thus reinforce each other. They increase the likelihood to be affected by different kinds of violence, be it physical violence, structural violence (economic, social) or cultural violence (acting also as a justification for the other two), as Swedish peace researcher Johan Galtung defined in his “Triangle of Violence”.<sup>15</sup>

## Multi-Marginalisation and Intersectionality

Oppression, discrimination and marginalisation do not necessarily operate on only one aspect of a person’s or a group’s social or political identity. Rather, individuals and groups often experience discrimination and marginalisation along several aspects of social or political classifications or aspects of their identities. These experiences, though often described with regards to each single aspect, interact and thereby create complex modes of discrimination and marginalisation along the lines of several dimensions and combinations. The approach of **‘Intersectionality’**, as described by Kimberle Crenshaw in *“Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color”*<sup>16</sup>, provides a framework to better understand experiences of discrimination in their interacting ways. In this study, we use an intersectional approach, by which we look at different forms of discrimination and marginalisation, while also considering their intersection and interaction.

We use the term **‘multi-marginalisation’**, therefore, when a person is experiencing marginalisation or discrimination along the lines of several classifications or aspects of their identity.

In the **‘Matrix of Domination’**, Patricia Hill Collins describes how discrimination particularly along the main fault-lines of gender, ethnicity<sup>17</sup> and class interact<sup>18</sup>. Although people or groups might experience discrimination and marginalisation along just one of these aspects, they are often still interconnected. Both in Collins’ work and in the real life of Sudanese women, these interactions also occur with other dimensions of oppression, discrimination and marginalisation. Even so, the dimensions of gender, ethnicity and class appear particularly relevant in the Sudanese context (see Chapter 2). We therefore use the **‘Matrix of Domination’** as one lens as well as a structuring guideline for our analysis. While also considering other forms of intersecting discrimination and marginalisation experienced by the interviewees, we particularly focus on the intersection of gender and ethnicity, as well as the often resulting class implications within the Sudanese context. Saying this, we are aware that the country Sudan itself is being marginalised by many means of global economic and political mechanisms against the background of a history of colonialism.

---

15 Galtung, Johan (1969). Violence, Peace and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*. 6(3): 167–191.


16 Crenshaw, Kimberle (1991). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color. *Stanford Law Review*, 43(6), 1241-1299.

17 In this study, we usually replace the word “race”, which Collins also uses in her “Matrix of Domination”, by the term “ethnic group”. We do so, as genetic research has shown that there are no human races except for “homo sapiens” currently living on this earth. Theories that imply otherwise have largely been developed to “prove” superiority of one “race” over others, as a pretext for racist colonisation, exploitation and discrimination. Ethnicity, on the other hand, points not so much to the biological descent of certain groups, but rather to various identity traits—including cultural, religious, or linguistic - that are attributed to certain groups or individuals. Therefore, we use the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic groups’. Sometimes we add “skin colour”, since in specific racist discourses and actions, racist actors do solely respond to the skin colour of a person independently of the (assumed) ethnic background or citizenship etc. See also; *Hasters, Alice (2019). Was weiße Menschen nicht über Rassismus wissen wollen aber wissen sollten*. Berlin: hanserblau. And Sow, Noah. 2018. *Deutschland Schwarz Weiß: Der alltägliche Rassismus*. Norderstedt: Books of Demand.

18 Collins, Patricia Hill (2000). *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routledge. Available at: <https://uniteyouthdublin.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/black-feminist-thought-by-patricia-hill-collins.pdf>. Accessed: 30.11.2020.

## Empowerment

By empowerment, we mean a process in which those affected by oppression and marginalisation are organising and using their own capacities to take their lives into their own hands and claim their rights. Power in this sense does not refer to “power over” others, but to “power to”, “power with”, and “power from within”. The empowerment spiral reflects the (not necessarily linear) steps involved.



Graph 2: Empowerment Spiral<sup>19</sup>

19 The Empowerment Spiral, as displayed here, is adapted from Kramer, Julia Katharina (2003), Can Facilitating Empowerment be a Tool for Conflict Transformation in Asymmetric Conflict? Towards an Integrative Framework of Empowerment. Unpublished MA Thesis. Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford.

## Further Definitions of Terms

Our understanding of other main terms and concepts used in our research questions is described below.

### Needs and Demands

By **'need'**, we understand the gap between the current situation and a desired situation with regards to basic needs and human rights, as laid out in the declarations of political, social and cultural human rights. In addition, we are looking at women's needs with regards to the opportunities of representation and participation in political processes at all levels in Sudan. By **'demands'** we understand the message related to a need that women facing different forms of discrimination might strategically direct to key people, groups or institutions, based on the assessment of their needs,

### Human Security

The paradigm of **'human security'**, as opposed to military security, assumes that security cannot be achieved through military threat and violence—neither at home nor internationally. Rather, security can be achieved by ensuring, for all people, „freedom from want“ (freedom from hunger, thirst, avoidable sickness...) and „freedom from fear“ (everyone having their human rights met). To our understanding, such a system would need to build on a needs-based and sustainable economy and a human rights-based participatory system of governance.

### Inclusiveness

By **'inclusiveness'**, we envisage a quality in attitudes, actions, treatments or structures that include everyone either directly or indirectly, without discriminating according to ethnicity, gender, class, religion, age, sexual orientation, abilities or other attributes. Thus, it also relates, for example, to the question of who is able to speak out in public and be heard. In line with the types of discrimination that we focus on, we look at the intersectional implications of gender and ethnicity with regards to inclusiveness, as this, to our understanding, constitutes the biggest correlated discrimination line and the largest affected group in Sudan.

### Governance Structures

By **'structures'**, we mean a form or organisational pattern in which different parts of one societal dimension are relating to each other, usually following a particular format.

By **'governance structures'**, we mean the laws, institutions and customs in Sudan through which political units at different levels exercise authority and power, take decisions, perform functions and create facts on a political level.

## Influencing Governance Structures

By **'influence'**, we mean the capacity or power to cause a change in or an effect on governance structures in a direct or indirect way. Influencing, in turn, is the act of using this capacity or power.

## Transition Structures

By **'transition'**, we mean a movement from one place, state or stage to another. We understand transition as a process, not a state of being. In the case of this study, the term refers to the passage from dictatorship to democracy within the post-Revolution transition process in Sudan. It was officially agreed that this process should take 39 months as of July 2019.

By **'transition structures'**, we refer to the formal and informal patterns of organisation through which the transition process is organised, as well as the governance structures that are in place to exercise the authority of how the transition process looks like.

## Assumptions

Some of our assumptions have already been pointed out in previous chapters. As mentioned above, the main fault-lines of ethnicity/skin colour, gender and class, as well as other fault-lines of identity traits, interact with each other, thus reinforcing systems of discrimination and marginalisation in a variety of ways. We assume this will also become apparent in the analysis of the data we gathered. For all efforts regarding freedom, peace and justice to be fully emancipatory, we allege that they need to be meaningful and effective for the most marginalised. Therefore, in this study, we focus (with a few exceptions) on those who are facing most intersecting hardships and marginalisation in society. From a gender-perspective, we presuppose that women and those from so-called "African ethnic groups" are the largest groups being marginalised all over Sudan. In consequence, we postulate that women, who face at least one further aspect of marginalisation, e.g. with regards to ethnicity and/or class (e.g. their economic status and access to infrastructure, education and resources), are facing multiple intersecting kinds of marginalisation.

We further assert that, for marginalisation and discrimination to end, a process of (self-) empowerment is essential. Therefore, we postulate that for any national or international intervention to avoid reinforcing asymmetries of power and privilege, they need to be designed in a way that they correspond to and fulfil the needs of those facing multi-marginalisation and contribute to their self-empowerment. We accordingly consider participatory action research as a valuable instrument. We further consider intersectional sensitivity and the *Do No Harm* approach as essential for any governance process and international intervention in the transition period and beyond. With the demands of the revolutionaries for "Madania", i.e. civilian rule, we share the assumption that a civilian elected government is more likely to create governance structures for "Freedom—Peace—Justice" than a military dictatorship. And importantly, civilian rule is also more likely to provide opportunities for the marginalised to actually gain (more) control over their lives and the political decisions concerning them.





*Photo: This egg was painted as part of an exercise at one of the Bana workshops. It is about expressing and caring for each other's visions for Sudan.*

## Chapter 4:

# Experts in our own Right

## Research Design and Methods

---

### Exploratory-Inductive Approach

#### Research Design

This study is an exploratory-inductive study in an action research context. In such an exploratory-inductive study, we do not deduct hypotheses from a theory and then test them against data. Rather, we generate information and hypotheses inductively through developing concepts and identifying trends based on the data we collect.

As we are part of the context that we are studying and are actively influencing this context, we conduct the study as a participatory action research. Thus, it also serves as one basis that we use for generating strategies and plans of action which we will implement and evaluate with regards to their impact.

#### Participants and Selection Criteria

With one criterion of selection being accessibility of people and places, the participants of this study reflect a convenience sample. In addition to interviews with all available Bana members, we aimed at talking to at least five persons in individual interviews or focus group discussions in each of seven Sudanese States, including South, North and West Darfur, South Kordofan, West Kordofan, Red Sea and Khartoum. Focus locations included camps of internally displaced persons (IDP Camps), remote villages and marginalised city areas. The main inclusion criteria were that the interviewees are women with multiple experiences of discrimination. In addition, we interviewed a member of the Transition Government as well as female and male Sudanese activists who are themselves affected by (multiple) marginalisation. They may, at the same time, have relevant experience and knowledge of power and governance structures as well as inclusion processes in post-Revolution Sudan. The participants were also selected as such that they are from a Sudan-wide geographical spectrum as well as different ethnic groups, genders, religions, abilities, language, age and social position.

#### Reasons for Empirical Scope

The selection is based on the biggest possible and study-relevant variety of people, with a focus on those affected by multi-marginalisation as experts on these dynamics. This way, the study reflects different perspectives of multi-marginalised people as well as people who have relevant information and experience with governance and transition structures.

# Materials

## Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

The main body of data was collected through interviews and focus group discussions. Whilst we were interested in gathering information by using multiple-choice questionnaires, the content of this study cannot be structured in the form of multiple choices. Thus, we developed semi-structured interview questionnaires with open questions.

As this study focuses on people facing discrimination and multi-marginalisation, it is essential that its design and materials do not reproduce such marginalisation and discrimination. Therefore, the questionnaires have been carefully developed over a period of several weeks through sharing information between us Bana members and an international consulting team of KURVE Wustrow. The criteria for developing the questionnaires were the relevance of the individual questions for the overall research questions as well as the foci of the sub-questions and the analysis approach—bearing in mind cultural considerations concerning the way in which information can be gathered from different sources. In addition, the questions were adjusted in terms of language so that all interviewees would be able to connect to them. Furthermore, we decided not to ask the participating interviewees to reply to our questions in writing. Instead, we decided to audio-record the interviews.

Based on our first draft of a research question and questionnaire, we discussed and finalised both during a workshop in the first half of December 2019. The final interview questionnaires are attached to this report in Annex 1.

## Demographic Data Sheets

In addition to the audio-recorded interviews, we collected demographic data of the interviewees (Annex 2).

## Procedure

The interviews were carried out by us as Bana members, and occasionally by members of the international consulting team, between December 2019 and February 2020, usually in connection with workshops on, for example, upcycling, FGM and other topics. In each individual conversation, the interviewers chose the main theme for their interview or focus group discussion from the pool of questions within the questionnaire. The choice was based on the consideration to which topics the interviewee(s) might give the most relevant information for the study. Depending on which direction the respective conversations took, the interviewees sometimes chose to explore other focus areas as well. Two international consultants of KURVE Wustrow (one with research know-how and one with knowledge about Sudan and the Bana group, both with expertise in empowerment processes) coded all interviews and, until July 2020, developed a first draft of the study in liaison with the international Bana coordinator. After translation into Arabic, the Bana group then gave feedback, formulated observations and developed strategies, recommendations and demands on the basis of the data analysis. After inclusion of these inputs, the study was finalised in consensus by January 2021.

# Data Analysis

## Data Collection

All interviews were individual conversations, except for one focus group discussion. Most interviews as well as the focus group discussion took place in Arabic and were audio-recorded. In a few cases, local languages besides Arabic were used. The recordings were then transcribed by Arabic mother-tongue speakers and translated into English. The coding used a process of inductive category development and thus constituted the first step of an analysis of the data. The processed data served as the basis for qualitative content analysis.

## Analysis of the Data

The preparation and analysis of the data was done by using a qualitative content analysis according to Mayring. The main interest was to further develop the quantitative content analysis, while keeping its advantages, into an approach of a qualitative-interpretative analysis. The latter allows for interpretations of the collected texts which—as in the case of this study—were used for the inductive development of categories as close as possible to the data collected. The data were then sorted and analysed according to these developed categories.


This approach is particularly appealing for an exploratory-inductive study like ours, as we were able to use a qualitative data analysis to stay close to the texts and still extract categories that we consider as a relevant base for structuring and analysing the data.

We followed a typical process of a qualitative content analysis as shown in the graph below. First, we defined the criteria according to which categories were to be defined. In a second step, we started looking through the coded data and deduced and formulated categories using inductive category formation forms (Annex 3). After having gone through about 10% of the material, we revised the categories and checked their reliability, before working through the rest of the texts. Once the data were analysed according to our categories, we described them, identified relations between the different categories and thereby shed light on the research questions asked.

# Operationalisation

## Definition of Content-Analytical Units

The coding unit for the categories relates to clear semantic elements in the text. The context unit constituted the whole interview, the demographic data sheet, background information about the interview context and the interviewee's context. The recording unit comprised all interviews.



Graph 3: Step Model of Inductive Category Development<sup>20</sup>

20 This graph was taken—with some linguistic adjustments—from Mayring, Philipp (2014). Qualitative Content Analysis: Theoretical Foundation, Basic Procedures and Software Solution. Klagenfurt. [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/39517/ssoar-2014-mayring-Qualitative\\_content\\_analysis\\_theoretical\\_foundation.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2014-mayring-Qualitative\\_content\\_analysis\\_theoretical\\_foundation.pdf](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/39517/ssoar-2014-mayring-Qualitative_content_analysis_theoretical_foundation.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2014-mayring-Qualitative_content_analysis_theoretical_foundation.pdf). Accessed: 26.02.2021.

## Category Definitions

The category definitions were as follows:

Coded as categories of **'intersecting marginalisation'**—experiences of combinations of at least two types of marginalisation in the socio-political and economic sphere, which can be caused or emerge at different levels (local, regional, national).

Coded as categories of **'needs'**—expressions of unmet needs of persons experiencing intersecting marginalisation. These include needs as laid out in the declarations of political, social and cultural human rights as well as their current and their desired state. They also comprise expressions of unmet needs not mentioned in the declarations, but relating to the opportunities for people facing intersecting marginalisation of being represented and participating in political processes at all levels in Sudan.

Coded as categories of **'demands'**—formulations of wishes and messages of desired changes related to a need that people facing intersecting marginalisation might direct to key people, groups or institutions that can influence such changes.

Coded as categories of **'needs-related changes since the Revolution'**—descriptions of how the needs and demands of people facing intersecting marginalisation have changed since the Revolution and the start of the transition process.

Coded as categories of **'influencing transition process'**—descriptions of current or desired ways of influencing the transition process.

Coded as categories of **'governance structures'**—descriptions of current and desired characteristics or designs of governance structures at different levels that might lead to the needs and demands of multi-marginalised women being continuously reflected and met.

## Level of Abstraction

For the categories on intersecting marginalisation, needs and demands, the level of abstraction relates to specific experiences of intersecting marginalisation, specific expressions of needs and specific formulations of wishes and demands of the interviewee her\*himself or of a group that the interviewee is or might be part of<sup>21</sup>. The coded expressions should not be idiosyncratic, but rather such that they could also appear in other interviews.

For categories on needs-related changes since the Revolution as well as influencing the transition process and governance structures, the level of abstraction was put at concrete descriptions rather than general evaluations of the situation.

---

21 People affected by marginalisation and discrimination might decide not to open up about their respective experiences. This might be, for instance, due to experiences of stigmatisation or for security risks they might face in the event of their experiences becoming known (e.g. being a rape survivor or a child out of rape in war). In addition, the demographic data sheets were not all available or completely filled in for all participants. Therefore, in some cases, we had to assume a person might be part of a certain group and thus considered the information given accordingly.



*Photo: Graffiti in Khartoum after the Revolution, artist unknown.*

## Chapter 5:

# From Village to IDP Camp to Town, from Gineina to Kadugli to Port Sudan, from Coffee Stall to Classroom to Family Care Work

## Data and Empirics

---

### Description of the Sample

We talked to a total of over 150 participants/interviewees of whom, for technical reasons, unfortunately only 129 could be included in this study. Yet, the number of interviews was more than sufficient for the purpose of this report. The collected data are subject to confidentiality and privacy as well as anonymity. Therefore, the full names of the interviewees were not collected or recorded. Apart from doing the audio-recordings, the interviewers filled in demographic data sheets containing information on dimensions like gender, ethnic groups, education, profession and age. For about 30 interviewees, especially from Port Sudan and Abazar IDP Camp in Gineina, the demographic data sheets are not available or not fully filled in. Therefore, for a full description of the sample, some of the data are missing. Still, it constitutes a convenience sample covering a wide range of geographical areas, ethnic and age groups as well as intersecting experiences of marginalisation along the lines of gender, ethnicity, class, experiences of war and displacement plus other dimensions of discrimination and marginalisation.

The interviewees come from the Sudanese States of Darfur North, Darfur South, Darfur West, Red Sea, Khartoum, South Kordofan and West Kordofan. One person lives outside of Sudan with political asylum. Two persons belong to refugee families from Ethiopia, living in Sudan. Of the 129 interviewees, 117 are categorised as women, 12 as men. 15 of the female and 7 of the male interviewees are activists. Furthermore, Mohammed Hassan al-Ta'ishi, a member of the Sovereignty Council of the Transition Government, was interviewed.



The remaining demographic data (apart from the location and the gender as well as status of the interviewees) cannot be described for the whole sample of all 129 persons, due to the fact that not all data sheets could be filled in fully for all interviewees. Of the interviewed women, at least 11 are divorced and one abandoned by her husband, two of them disclosed having been married as minors. At least four women are widows and 22 single. The majority of the rest is married. For some issues that are relevant for marginalisation and discrimination but are taboos, we have to assume that those affected would not have mentioned it in the interviews (e.g. if they are differently abled, if they are survivors of rape or children out of rape, if they are non-heterosexual, non-cis-gendered, i.e. not identifying with the gender assigned at birth, or other issues). Several interviewees said that they faced FGM. We assume a larger number did so, too, without mentioning it.

Of 96 interviewed persons of whom information about their ethnicity is available, 85 belong to so-called 'African' ethnic groups. 17 of the female interviewees are Nuba, 14 Zagahwa, ten Massalit, 11 Fur, six Bargo, four Logory, three Barnu, three Barta, three Jalat, two Dajo, two Haware, one Hawazma, one Golfat, one Tanier, one Artag, one Teisi Abdul-Salam, two Taishi, one Kabashia and two Tagali Abasia. Of the male interviewees, three are Nuba, three Messairya, two Fur and one each come from Taishi and Tagali Abasia ethnic group. 12 interviewees come from Arab ethnic groups, of whom eight are Messairya, with seven from rural Sunut, two Rizeigat, one Banya Amir and one Jaalya. In addition, one person was interviewed who is Dinka (mainly considered South Sudanese), two Ethiopians (born of refugees in Sudan) and one Nubian (Dongolawi, North Sudan).

Most of the interviewed marginalised women are housewives, do family care work, are unemployed, or work in precarious job situations. Only few of them are teachers or engineers. Of the interviewed men, a majority has stable jobs.

Of the female interviewees, 14 did not attend school, 20 attended basic schools and three Quran schools. 17 dropped out after high school. Another 17 got college education, while ten got a university degree (graduate or post-graduate). All of the interviewed men attended high school, and seven went to college or university.

In terms of age, 14 of the interviewed marginalised women are below 20 years young, 31 are between 31 and 45 years and 26 between 46 and 62 years old. Of the interviewed men, five are between 20 and 30, three between 31 and 45 and two between 46 and 50 years old.

More detailed demographic data of the interviewees are shared in Chapter 6. A comprehensive list of demographic data can be found in Annex 4.



Graph 4: Map of Sudan: States, Locations of Interviews, Conflict Regions<sup>22</sup>

## Conflict Regions

### Locations of Interviews:

East Darfur: Gineina (capital, incl. 2 IDP camps), Mornei (IDP camp)

Khartoum (national capital): mainly Daressalam, Hajj Yousif

North Darfur: ElFasher (capital) and a village

Red Sea: Port Sudan (capital)

South Darfur: Nyala (capital, IDP camps)

South Kordofan: Kadugli (capital), Deleng

West Kordofan: Sunut region (villages)

Not in map: Berlin, Germany (1 interview)

<sup>22</sup> Map copied from: <https://fanack.com/sudan/governance-and-politics-of-sudan/>, accessed on 1.12.2020

## Inducted Categories

Following a process of inductive category development, we generated a total of 44 categories following the six category definitions outlined in Chapter 4. In the table below, you find all developed categories with the number and percentage of occurrences (i.e. how often information coded in this category was mentioned). In addition, the table displays the number of persons who gave information coded in the respective categories<sup>23</sup> and what percentage of the whole sample they constitute.

Intersecting Marginalisation		Number of occurrences	Percentage of all codings	Number of persons	Percentage of sample
1	Intersecting experience of ethnic and/or racial discrimination	85	4.78	78	60.47
2	Gender-based discrimination/ violence	46	2.59	40	31.01
3	Class and work related factors of marginalisation	30	1.69	27	20.93
4	Marginalisation related to war & displacement	18	1.01	18	13.95
5	(Not) seeing/defining oneself as marginalised	16	0.90	16	12.40
6	Education as a factor of marginalisation	11	0.62	11	8.53
7	Religion as a factor of marginalisation	9	0.51	9	6.98
8	Violations of political human rights	4	0.22	4	3.10

Needs					
9	Humanitarian needs and infrastructure	45	2.53	39	30.23
10	Education	30	1.69	27	20.93
11	Livelihood	22	1.24	19	14.73
12	Safety	21	1.18	20	15.50
13	Human rights, women's rights	6	0.34	5	3.88

<sup>23</sup> The difference in the number of occurrences and the number of persons is due to some of the interviewees naming several aspects falling into the same category (for example, naming several demands relating to physical needs, livelihood, employment and infrastructure), or mentioning the same / similar aspects several times.

<b>Demands</b>					
14	Physical needs, livelihood, employment and infrastructure	99	5.57	79	61.24
15	Peace & security	82	4.61	70	54.26
16	Education	60	3.37	53	41.09
17	End to discrimination and marginalisation	33	1.86	31	24.03
18	Political power & participation	32	1.80	24	18.60
19	Justice and transitional justice	23	1.29	19	14.73
20	End to gender-based violence and discrimination	19	1.07	15	11.63
21	Freedom	15	0.84	14	10.85

<b>Needs-Related Changes Since Revolution</b>					
22	Human rights improvements	69	3.88	60	46.51
23	Improvements in terms of peace and security	68	3.82	56	43.41
24	Changes in livelihood and infrastructure	57	3.21	48	37.21
25	No changes observed since revolution	56	3.15	51	39.53
26	Democratisation and representation	27	1.52	19	14.73
27	Justice/Transitional justice	18	1.01	17	13.18
28	Racism is diminishing	13	0.73	12	9.30
29	Concrete interactions with new government	9	0.51	8	6.20
30	Other	3	0.17	3	2.33

<b>Influencing Transition</b>					
31	Representation in transition	110	6.19	96	74.42
32	Sense of ownership and experience of Revolution, and impulses from that	102	5.74	86	66.67
33	Unity, cooperation, and overcoming discrimination as key factors to bring about change	86	4.84	74	57.36
34	Ideas and key factors to (self-)organise to bring about change and make our voices as marginalised women heard	84	4.72	61	47.29
35	Access to decision making and self-organising	77	4.33	55	42.64
36	Individual participation processes and possibilities	49	2.76	37	28.68
37	Acquiring information about transition process	40	2.25	32	24.81
38	Ideas and key factors to bring about change, related to education	35	1.97	31	24.03

<b>Governance Structures</b>					
39	Role of previous government with regards to marginalisation and demands	84	4.72	80	62.02
40	Demands to previous government that were not met	55	3.09	55	42.64
41	Installation of mechanisms/ structures for communicating needs and participating in decisions	15	0.84	14	10.85
42	Ensuring citizen's security and human rights	7	0.39	5	3.88
43	Livelihood, development and economic stability	5	0.28	5	3.88
44	Ending military rule and corruption	3	0.17	2	1.55

	<b>Total</b>	<b>1778</b>	<b>100</b>		
--	--------------	-------------	------------	--	--

Table 1: Categories generated through inductive category development

# Limitations, Challenges and Opportunities

In this study, there are several dimensions and challenges to be considered. They are outlined below, together with our ways of handling these challenges.

## Context Challenges

**Ethical considerations** are relevant especially in terms of security dimensions. We assumed that taking part in such a study—with a diverse sample of people from different backgrounds in a multi-ethnic context ridden by violent conflict—could bear risks for the interviewees to be targeted for their very participation. In addition, the topic of the study is related to a very sensitive and unstable political situation which has escalated in the past and might escalate again in the future. Therefore, we presume participants in the study might face the risk of being targeted when seen to challenge an established system by aiming to influence it. While being aware of this, we also postulate that the participants are facing these risks anyway through their usual activities. After all, with our transparent request for an interview, they could freely decide whether they wanted to take part or not. We took measures to reduce the security risks by keeping the interviewees anonymous. We did not offer any benefits apart from providing impulses from our study for their action plans, assuming that potential interviewees will therefore be able to decline the request for participation easily. In addition, we closely accompanied the study process with a security management plan in order to protect participants in various ways.

As we are facing a very **volatile and dynamic situation** in Sudan, we were aware that the context of the study might change considerably before its publication, with the potential result that some relevant developments may not be represented. The Corona pandemic plus its repercussions for Sudanese society is one prominent example of a relevant topic arising between data collection and analysis. It is, therefore, not covered to an extent reflecting its real impact on the questions studied.

Although it is not the declared aim of this study, we hope that, as a side effect, it was and will be a means to listen to needs, validate suffering and help create spaces for discussions about a solid, concrete change for the better. We also saw it as an opportunity for the participants to use the interviews as a reflection and analysis space in order to explore realistic ways of empowering themselves and strategically addressing their issues in the current transition process.

In addition, we aim at channelling the discussed contents to the current institutions of decision-making, to privileged parts of the population and to new international actors relevant to the context. All these aims are very ambitious to be reached within the framework of one study. Although they are also catered for by other components of our overall project, we were aware of the need to point out the limits of this study very clearly to all stakeholders. We therefore worked on **expectation management** before even starting to do the interviews. When asking people for demands, we might have created the expectations that we a) take over their demands and b) there will be rapid change at a political level based on our study.

Therefore, we decided to communicate the possibilities and limits of this study in a very clear way. Firstly, the recommended demands will be based on the results of the analysis and might therefore be different from the demands we asked people about. Secondly, we communicated clearly that this study merely offers a basis on which different groups can strategise activities. For itself, however, this study will not be the driving factor for rapid political change into a desired direction.

Another challenge is the follow-up with the participants. Several interviewees mentioned that they had been interviewed before and then never saw or heard about the research again, with nothing changing on the ground. We therefore not only connected the interviews mostly with mini-workshops and other sessions, but also attempted follow-ups with the interviewed women, e.g. through further workshops or by keeping in touch with them and eventually also sharing the outcomes of this study and making them available for further strategising. Additionally, we will try to involve the interviewees directly in further advocacy work after the study has been published in order to create spaces for them to raise their voices directly. For example, there were follow-up interviews and support activities, after violence broke out in Kirinding IDP Camp in Gineina at the end of December 2019. For the purpose of further follow-ups as well as for ensuing advocacy and lobby activities by multi-marginalised women, we have also developed a policy brief summarising the study in a shorter version.

## Methodological Challenges

In the context of Sudan, one methodological challenge was the availability and accessibility of data, e.g. with regards to the structures of decision-making. Therefore, it was important to include at least one decision-maker into the list of interviewees. Furthermore, we had to consider that developing research capacities is not an obvious skill of people in volatile contexts of armed conflict—and even less so for those facing multiple forms of marginalisation and discrimination. It was important to us, however, that this study is implemented as a report by multi-marginalised women for multi-marginalised women. We therefore made sure that we contributed to building the capacities of the interviewees before conducting the interviews. Bridging the gap between individual perspectives and language of the people on the one hand, and abstract concepts and analytical levels of the study on the other hand, was a methodological challenge connected to experiences of marginalisation and discrimination. We therefore engaged, for example, in an intensive process of developing questionnaires which were of a high scientific quality and yet appropriate to use with the people we wanted to reach.

Further methodological challenges included the documentation of the interviews and security concerns with regards to the data. We decided to audio-record the conversations rather than writing them down on the spot, so that the interviewees were fully able to focus on the interview and the person they talked to. This, unfortunately, led to some technical challenges which meant that we lost a considerable number of interviews. Moreover, we took digital security precautions with regards to the means of recording and storage of the digital data. Language added additional layers of complexity. The goal to reach multi-marginalised people while publishing a study in English and Arabic necessitated several instances of translation from local languages to Arabic, from Arabic to English and vice-versa. We catered for these challenges with a competent team of translators and lots of time allocated to the feedback cycles.



Photo: This graffiti in the streets of Khartoum after the Revolution depicts a street tea and coffee seller cleaning and sorting the coffee beans.



## Chapter 6:

# Voices of the Margins

## Analysis

---

How can women—especially those confronted with intersecting discrimination and marginalisation— influence the Sudanese transition process in a way that the resulting structures are inclusive and assure that the needs and demands of women facing different forms of marginalisation are continuously reflected and met?

This is our main research question for this study. Breaking down this key question, we identified the following relevant key sub-questions:

- What are the needs and demands of women in Sudan, especially those facing more than one form of discrimination or marginalisation?
- How do the governance structures resulting from the transition process need to look like so that they are inclusive and ensure that women’s needs and demands are continuously reflected and met?
- To what extent does the transition process up to now open up possibilities for marginalised women’s needs and demands being reflected and met by the resulting structures? How could this be yet improved?
- How can women—especially those facing several forms of discrimination and marginalisation— influence the transition process so that it results in such inclusive structures?

In this chapter, we analyse the data collected through the interviews and the inductive category formation in depth. In the first part, we analyse what forms of discrimination and marginalisation multi-marginalised women face, before displaying their identified needs and their demands to their government. The second part of the chapter sheds light on the role of the previous dictatorship in upholding and furthering the system of marginalisation and discrimination. We then focus on how future government structures could look like, so that they are inclusive, participatory and just. The third part of the chapter starts off with a description of the changes that the interviewees have observed since the Revolution, before highlighting to what extent the voices of multi-marginalised women are being heard in the transition process. The fourth and final part of the chapter is dedicated to the realm of ideas that multi-marginalised women developed for influencing the transition process. Though focussing on the transition period, the developed ideas are ways, values, activities and strategies that multi-marginalised women can generally use for empowering themselves and being the true agents of change.

## Part 1: Needs and Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women in Sudan

When describing the needs and demands of women in Sudan, especially those facing more than one form of discrimination or marginalisation, we first analyse what specific forms of discrimination and marginalisation the interviewees encounter. Later in this part of the chapter, we summarise the needs and demands that the interviewees identified. Based on Table 1 in Chapter 5—which relates to the “Categories generated through inductive category development”—the main findings are now summarised in Table 2 as well as in the summary before the display of the analysis.

Type of discrimination experienced	Number of times mentioned as experience	Number of times mentioned as needs or demands	Examples of demands
Racist/ethnic	85	34	ending discrimination in direct interactions, job market etc.
Gender-based	40	16	ending gender-based violence & underage marriage, IDs for children born from rape, socio-political participation, more education for women and girls, fairer work distribution etc.
Class-related	28	103	health-care, water, employment, livelihood etc.
War-related	18	86	safety, peace & security, transitional justice
Education-related	11	70	(affordable) access to education for all, including girls and women
Violations of political human rights	4	34	political power and participation, freedom, human rights
Other discrimination factors mentioned: Religion, age, ability			

Table 2: Distribution of main experiences of discrimination as well as needs / demands mentioned by the interviewees

# At a glance: Intersecting experiences of discrimination and marginalisation as well as connected needs and demands

## **Summary of results with regards to gender-related intersecting experiences of discrimination and marginalisation**

As women, the interviewees often face gender-based discrimination and violence, both in public and private settings. This is exacerbated by their vulnerability due to precarious work or household duties like collecting firewood, and is especially severe in conflict zones. They have less access to positions of power or social and political participation, which again is increased by their limited access to education. Education is made more available to boys, especially when the family cannot afford to send all children to school. Moreover, the educational path of girls and young women who do go to school or, in some cases, even higher education often ends when young women get married—sometimes underage or against their will. Forms of physical violence that are being mentioned include FGM, domestic violence, sexual harassment and rape.

## **Summary of results with regards to gender-related needs and demands mentioned**

Specific identifications of gender-related needs and calls for an end to gender-based discrimination came from about 12% of the interviewees and included an end to all forms of gender-based violence like rapes, killings, attacks, all forms of harassment and abuse as well as underage and forced marriages. The interviewees also call for an end to FGM as a practice, which—by the time of writing the study—has been announced as becoming legally banned by the Transitional Government. However, we assume that the demand persists, since ending the practice itself is perceived by the interviewees as more difficult than issuing a ban, particularly in conflict contexts. Moreover, in addition to an equal division of work and equal access to education for girls, women, boys and men, the interviewees demand the amendment and adjustment of the Personal Status Law and the Public Order Law as well as Sudan signing the CEDAW Agreement. However, only about one eighth of the interviewees mentioned demands in the context of gender-based violence and discrimination.

## **Summary of results with regards to intersecting experiences of discrimination and marginalisation related to ethnicity and skin colour**

In addition to discrimination along the lines of gender, around two thirds of the interviewees specifically mention experiences of discrimination along the lines of their so-called “African” ethnic group and/or their skin colour. This experience of discrimination prevails when a statement on ethnicity is asked for both in official documents and, at times, in conversations between people. It also manifests itself when members of specific ethnic groups or people with certain skin tones encounter different forms of violence, ranging from verbal abuse to physical and structural violence. As a manifestation of structural violence, for example, access to spaces, events, education and the job market can be severely limited due to informal practices of ethnic discrimination. Ethnic groups that don’t speak Arabic as a first language are disadvantaged and discriminated against for this reason, too. For women, the pressure of having light skin also leads to harmful practices like, for example, the use of lightening creams.

### **Summary of results with regards to needs and demands mentioned with regards to ethnicity and skin colour**

About one quarter of the interviewees stated needs and demands for an end to discrimination and marginalisation based on ethnicity, postulating equal rights, access and treatment for all ethnic groups. For example, interviewees asked for all services to be available to all citizens and for an end of double standards when it comes to job opportunities or the prosecution of violence and crimes. In addition, the urban-rural divide should end, with equal opportunities for all states and regions.

### **Summary of results with regards to class-related intersecting experiences of discrimination and marginalisation**

With regards to class, it became obvious that discrimination along the lines of gender and ethnicity in turn leads to increased poverty among women and among so-called “African” ethnic groups. This includes a higher vulnerability to rising prices, water shortages and other economic and humanitarian challenges. Particularly in marginalised areas and especially the conflict areas of Darfur, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile as well as in village settings, there are less infrastructure and services available, for example in the health sector. Marginalised women are often responsible for unpaid and undervalued care work in their homes, while either fully depending on their husbands or other family members for the provision of their basic needs. Often, however, they also have to work themselves for ensuring the livelihood of their families, usually in precarious, underpaid jobs (like selling tea or local food). Some of their occupations (like prostitution or making alcohol) were “illegal” until very recently. Due to all this, women in Sudan have much less capital and resources at their disposal than men and hence are poorer.

### **Summary of results with regards to class-related needs and demands mentioned**

Needs and demands related to economic status and class are put forward by about 80% of the interviewees. They include calls for measures that reduce poverty, ensure economic stability and sustainable development—including the marginalised areas—and thereby also tackle the rising commodity prices and cost of living. The suggested paths to a better life vary among the interviewees: Some demand a protection of the Sudanese economy and independence of foreign loans and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while others prioritise an end to sanctions and an opening of markets for stabilising the economy. What is common is that they all call for the fulfilment of basic needs such as food, clean water, electricity and good housing to be made available in marginalised areas and not just in the capital.

Moreover, the interviewees demand a fair distribution of job opportunities that is tied to qualification instead of ethnicity as well as fair employment, including measures to minimise inequality at the work place. Healthcare should also be accessible and affordable for all, including in marginalised areas. In addition, the interviewees ask for improvements in the infrastructure, such as a better transport system, better roads and waste disposal systems.

More than half of the interviewees articulate needs as well as demands for free, or at least affordable, education for all in order to also ensure that children do not have to work at the same time as pursuing their studies. Education should be accessible in marginalised areas, and girls should have the same chance to get education as boys.

### **Summary of results with regards to war-related intersecting experiences of discrimination and marginalisation**

Some women in marginalised areas that turned into war zones—due mostly to inter-ethnic and racist discrimination—face multiple additional marginalisation effects. These include experiences of direct violence and displacement, but also a lower access to resources and infrastructure, e.g. with regards to healthcare.

### **Summary of results with regards to war-related needs and demands mentioned**

More than two thirds of the interviewees put forward needs and demands related to security, peace and transitional justice. They see peace as a precondition upon which a positive new system can be built and wish for a peaceful coexistence of all Sudanese people. Accordingly, they call for an end of war in the different affected regions of Sudan through a Peace Agreement and an end to all forms of violence. Disarmament and removal of landmines is also named as necessary. Displacement should stop and a voluntary return of displaced people made possible. In the view of some interviewees, constructive means of conflict resolution should be established and focus on sustainable development instead of war and related expenses. Also, transitional justice mechanisms should be installed to foster the transition from dictatorship to democracy.

### **Summary of results with regards to other intersecting experiences of discrimination and marginalisation**

Besides reporting biased laws (see “gender”) or flawed practices of job access and legal prosecution (see “ethnicity” and “class”), some interviewees mention the experience of human rights violations like killings or political arrest. While many of the interviewees feel part of the recent changes (see below), they mostly do not consider themselves as having a lot of access to decision-making.

### **Summary of results with regards to other intersecting needs and demands mentioned, mainly related to the political system**

Needs and demands focusing on political power, participation, freedom and human rights were articulated by about a quarter of the interviewees. This included calls for a civilian government in a system of democracy, equality and the rule of law. The new system should have ethnic and regional representation. Political decision-making and positions should be accessible for marginalised people and for women as well. The demands often have a special focus on women. Accordingly, interviewees state that women should have political power in decision-making, with some demanding the already existing 40% quota rule to be implemented.

# Experiences of Intersecting Marginalisation and Discrimination

We found that about 60.5% of the interviewees face intersecting experiences of ethnic/racist discrimination. About 31% recount experiences of gender-based discrimination and violence, whilst almost 21% state to have experienced forms of discrimination related to class and economic status. 18% of the interviewees have experienced marginalisation connected to war and displacement. 11% recounted instances of discrimination related to education, 9% to religion and 4% to the violation of political human rights. 16% of the interviewees mentioned that they did not see themselves as marginalised. However, in the course of the interview, most of them then did speak of their experiences of marginalisation and discrimination.

What we summarise in numbers are experiences related to specific forms of discrimination. At the same time, in the course of the interviews, it becomes obvious that these different forms interact with each other. This also entails that some interviewees might see their experiences of discrimination and marginalisation through a specific lens, whilst others might see similar experiences through other lenses. When we go more deeply into the analysis, the interconnectedness of these experiences becomes more apparent, supporting the intersectional approach that we suggest when trying to understand and be active against discrimination and marginalisation.

In the following paragraphs, we look into these different experiences of marginalisation and discrimination in more depth.

## Intersecting Experience of Ethnic and/or Racist Discrimination

85 interviewees mention racist discrimination based on ethnicity or skin colour. Mostly, it is attributed to being from a so-called “African” ethnic group. 78 interviewees identified themselves as belonging to such an “African” group, while 12 attributed themselves to so-called “Arab” ethnic groups—a distinction that is commonly used in Sudan and hence becomes a factor of discrimination. Special cases are three Felata (a community that moved to Sudan from West Africa generations ago), one Dinka (an ethnic group which is usually considered South Sudanese) and two Ethiopians (born in Sudan to Ethiopian refugees).

As we are looking at the situation of women, whom we assume to be already discriminated against due to their gender, all the experiences described are intersecting ones. Again, within the experiences related to ethnic and racist discrimination, there can be different aspects and dynamics (or “sub-intersections”) which the interviewed women describe:

- colour-based and ethnic
- colour-based and regional
- ethnic and religious or also: colour-based, ethnic, religious (liberal Muslim, Christian)
- nationality-based (refugees, ethnic groups that also exist in other countries)

Some interviewees note that they experience discrimination from different ethnic groups as well as discrimination by the Government against specific ethnic groups.

As an interviewee from the Nuba Mountains points out, ethnic discrimination started to divide people more during the regime of Omar Al-Bashir being in power:

***“I was born in Haj Yousif. As kids, we used to play together regardless of the diverse ethnic backgrounds we all come from. This started to change approximately in the mid-1990s: We started hearing things like we were slaves, thieves and that we didn’t have any religion. We use to be all equal and all of a sudden we were discriminated against.”***

M-SK-Kadugli-01<sup>24</sup>

The previous regime was blamed by several interviewees as “planting the seed”, as one Bana member from South Kordofan put it, of ethnic and racist discrimination among the people and in the socio-political structures:

***“The government stood still and did nothing, they wanted us dead, they only recognised specific tribes and ethnicities, and these were definitely not black.”***

F-DS-Nyala-02

Another interviewee from Darfur says:

***“I think that these problems already existed, and the government only helped to ignite these conflicts and to increase them. Although we are all the same, you would always see people from the same tribe clustering together and calling the other tribes names and all, and I think that this is not right at all.”***

F-DW-Mornei-06

Another one refers to how cultural violence was used in schemes to justify discrimination:

***“Their project, the ‘civilisation project’ of the Islamic Movement, was based on discrimination: They set a specific language, which was Arabic, and a specific religion, which was Islam, as default, so all the other people who do not belong to these specific groups were automatically discriminated against.”***

F-KH-Daressalam-11

The concrete ways ethnic and racial discrimination play out are manifold. There are everyday life experiences or incidents. One experience many interviewees shared is being repeatedly asked to which tribe they belonged to. In addition, people are called names like “slaves” or “thieves” and are being mocked for their skin colour, hair or being treated in patronising ways. One example given was about situations in which they were queuing, for example for bread, petrol or at ATMs, and someone from another ethnic group would go in front of them in the queue without being stopped.

Also, when members of ethnic groups speak mother tongues other than Arabic, this often becomes a disadvantage:

***“We are made fun of due to the way we talk. As Arabic is not our native language, we have minor problems with pronouncing all the letters correctly.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-07

Local languages other than Arabic are ignored in Sudan and have no official use, not even in primary schools. Ethnic discrimination is also reflected in the media, as one interviewee points out—for example through less representation on TV for so-called “African” ethnic groups, people with darker skin or non-Arabic languages. In addition, there is the dimension of people getting different kinds of access according to their ethnic group, both in a structured way and in more random favouritism.

---

<sup>24</sup> The abbreviations below the quotes denote, first, the gender (f = female, m = male) of the interviewee, then the State, then the specific location, and then the interview number. The additional letters denote A=Activist, D=Decision-Maker, B=Bana Member. The complete overview of interviewee abbreviations can be found in Annex 4.

People who are not from so-called “Arab” ethnic groups are experiencing exclusion, for example, by not being accepted to go to specific events or enrol in certain institutions, including universities. People, who have a darker skin or do not belong to specific ethnic groups from the North or Centre of Sudan, do not get the jobs they apply for and get paid less than others, regardless of their qualifications. A number of interviewees therefore speak of ‘unequal job distribution’.

The previous government enhanced all this, as

***“They included a field for writing the name of one’s tribe in several documents such as the passports and ID cards, which wasn’t necessary because we are all Sudanese.”***

F-KH-Other-03-A-B<sup>25</sup>

When applying for personal documents, papers or credentials from state institutions, some people face difficulties. Moreover, people from ethnic groups that live on both sides of a national border, or who are born in Sudan to refugee families, were not seen as Sudanese and encountered problems in receiving citizenship.

A telling expression that a number of interviewees used for those who are usually favoured—and therefore having better access to education, jobs and other class-related factors—was “elite tribes” or “dominant tribes”.

***“They [the previous government] used to go with the ‘divide and conquer’ method. In fact, they marginalised three quarters of the Sudanese tribes. The previous ruling party members all knew each other and were either cousins or from the same tribe. You didn’t have any chance to live a good life in Sudan if you didn’t belong to the known elite tribes.”***

F-E-Port Sudan-06

Furthermore:

***“[The previous government] ... singled out certain groups and granted them economic reforms while the others were left out.”***

F-DW-Mornei-01-A-B

The results of different access and support are also visible in the geographical areas inhabited by different ethnic groups, as one interviewee explains:

***“I’m not sure if you have noticed this before, but walking down a neighbourhood inhabited by Northern tribes, you will see that it is always better looking and cleaner than the neighbourhoods where people of Western Sudan [Darfur] live. If this is not marginalisation, I don’t know what is.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-06

There are also differences in the context of legal prosecution. Some interviewees state that people of the same ethnic group support each other in situations of wrongdoing. Some point to situations in which persons from so-called “African” ethnicities were punished for certain crimes, whilst persons from so-called “Arab” ethnicities received no punishment.

***“For example, if you have a problem like you’ve been attacked by the Arabs or something, you’ll have to bribe the police first so that they take action about it.”***

F-DW-Mornei-17

---

<sup>25</sup> This interviewee lives both in Khartoum and in Zalingi, Central Darfur.



Lastly, there is the dimension of direct violence that people from different ethnic groups encounter. Interviewees recount that they and their relatives, including children, are being beaten, robbed, their relatives killed, being forbidden to farm or driven off their land—all of this also, but not only, in relation to war or armed conflict.

***“We have been ethnically and tribally marginalised and discriminated: Since 1956 and until now, the marginal areas have been neglected. They have been through wars, rapes and genocides. Tribal and colour-based discrimination led to wars between the tribes. People have this flawed concept that white people are better than black people.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-13

Again, in the eyes of the interviewees, the previous government was playing a crucial role in this:

***“The previous government [...] went as far as arming some certain ethnic groups so they can attack other ethnic groups.”***

F-KH-Other-02-A-B<sup>26</sup>

Another example of direct violence being mentioned referred to universities where campus security reportedly condoned attacks on students from a different ethnic group or region, as for example from Darfur.

At the intersection of racism and gender, gender-based violence is part of the repertoire of oppression and marginalisation:

***“When you go out gathering grass for your cattle, the Arabs say to you ‘you Nuba, you black, what are you doing?’ Sometimes they hit you, they exploit girls, hit them and do anything until you go back. This is the biggest inequality we face.”***

F-DW-Gineina-04

As mentioned before, most of the actions and structures of discrimination and marginalisation that the interviewees encounter and that are observed in Sudan in general are directed against so-called “African” ethnic groups, often implemented by so-called “Arab” ethnic groups. This does not mean that members of so-called “Arab” groups don’t face difficulties at all. For instance, “Arab” pastoralists often have a low level of education and are affected by climate change. Some interviewees of so-called “Arab” groups also suffer exclusion, e.g. if their ethnic group is known to have crossed the border. Here is the example of a tea seller in Port Sudan who accounts for being ethnically discriminated against:

***“Sometimes, after I serve the customers, I get called names and they say that I’m stupid and that I know nothing, and they don’t pay me my money—all that just because I’m an Arab.”***

F-E-Port Sudan-01

Some interviewees—particularly from the Nuba Mountains—mentioned that they face discrimination both for their ethnic background and their religion. Also, they were constantly asked about their religion or considered not as Muslim because of their skin colour and ethnic background.

One woman’s account shows graphically how racism in many cases is learnt at an early age already:

***“When I was a student in basic school, one of the girls insulted me [in a racist way], and we had a huge fight and got expelled from the school. I kept telling the girl that we are all equal, but she didn’t think so.”***

F-SK-Deleng-06

---

<sup>26</sup> This interviewee lives both in Khartoum and in the Sunut region, West Kordofan.

Apart from effects on the access to livelihood and resources, interviewees also describe psycho-social effects like feelings of isolation, frustration and anger. Stereotyping and violence, it is said, bear a mark on people over time. For example, several interviewees from Darfur describe that—independently of their ethnicity—they are being viewed as violent and brutal just because they come from a war zone.

At the same time, there is a huge gap between cities (centre) and the countryside (margins) with regards to the perception of different regions and what is going on there:

***“If you talk about Darfur in the city, one year, two years ago, before the Revolution, some of the people don’t know what is going on there. They know it is part of Sudan, some even wish it wasn’t, and some would say ‘ah, this is the Darfurian issue’, as if it is not belonging to us. They don’t understand it. They try to ignore it. They make people feel ashamed about it, even though they should be the ones to be ashamed, as they contributed to it. And all that increased the gap between the margins and the centre, and the hatred became bigger and rooted. The Transitional Government should look into the roots of the problem. And this discrimination needs to be solved before one can work together.”***

F-GE-Berlin-01-A-B

How do people cope? Strategies that the interviewees named are “learning how to handle it”, which sometimes means also to ignore or “look dumb”. Particularly younger women are said to use skin bleaching in order to get a lighter skin, despite knowing that it is unhealthy. One interviewee said that in the IDP camp where she is staying different (presumably so-called “African”) ethnic groups live together without any problems, but the problems start when they leave the camp.

Addressing issues directly has also been mentioned as a strategy, like calling the police, even if they may not respond adequately. Another strategy lies in challenging the stereotypes one is confronted with:

***“Generalisations cannot help. And then you get to a point of being tired. But sometimes you also think it is a useful discussion, so that people can be aware.”***

F-GE-Berlin-01-A-B

## Gender-Based Discrimination and Violence

Gender-based discrimination and violence are mentioned 46 times in the interviews, by 40 interviewees. This is—given the total number of 129 interviews and 117 of them female—a surprisingly small proportion of less than a third. As we assumed that women in Sudan are per se discriminated against, this could be challenging our pre-conception. Alternatively, it could tell us something about the severity of other factors (like racist discrimination that is often directly linked to war) or about the level of internalisation of discrimination and patterns of cultural violence. Given the severity that is described by those who do mention cases of gender-based discrimination, we assume that it is one or both of these possibilities—rather than assuming that we were fortunately wrong about considering gender a severe factor in intersectional discrimination and marginalisation dynamics in Sudan. One interesting hint could be that an over-proportionate eight out of eight interviewees from “Arabic” ethnic groups in rural Sunut have been all speaking about gender-based discrimination. This may imply that ethnic/racist discrimination in Sudan weighs more heavily among women from “African” ethnic groups, so that racism would be the first thing to come to the affected people’s minds. One interviewee from Mornei IDP Camp, West Darfur, mentions how she has been affected by several different forms of intersecting discrimination, adding up:

***“Personally speaking, I’ve been through gender discrimination, being a woman who has no right whatsoever to decide for my own. I also consider FGM as a type of violence that was practised upon us, in addition to colour-based discrimination and racism both locally and regionally, and marginalisation in all its shapes.”***

F-DW-Mornei-01-A-B

All experiences of gender-based discrimination and violence mentioned in the interviews centred around repercussions against women and girls. When raising their voices, the interviewees recount acts of verbal and psychological violence as well as physical or sexualised violence, both within the family and outside. In their experience, they as women are not allowed to decide for themselves when things affect them and their quality of life, both with regards to their personal lives like clothing or whom they want to marry. Restrictions prevail even more with regards to political decision-making, like being an activist.

This starts with women or girls—and especially those facing multiple marginalisation—being subjected to discrimination and inequality in education, as pointed out several times before. Girls are often not enrolled in school either due to attitudes within the family or due to financial burdens of education, in which case boys receive preference. Also, a number of women experienced being forced to drop-out of school for early marriage.

***“Women are marginalised here, they have no important role whatsoever. They work all day and all night, they go to the fields and work and then come back home to work more. If a woman has three daughters, they would only allow her to educate one, and once she turns 13, they would force her to get married and drop out of school. I would be a liar if I said that the percentage of girls going to school is 10%, it has to be much more below that.***

***[Q: How old were you when you got married?]***

***I was 13 years old. I didn’t know anything about marriage life. I was an illiterate, I never went to school. When I turned 14 I had my first child.”***

F-WK-Sunut-02

Women usually face an unequal distribution of work load, being responsible for care work (children, household, fetching water, cooking—for family and guests), often in addition to subsistence income generating or main bread winning activities such as working in the fields or selling tea. Some of the interviewed women, on the other hand, are not allowed to work, or gender-stereotypes affect their choice or professional opportunities. With regards to employment, even if they studied computer engineering or agricultural engineering, they often do not get jobs because those are deemed for men. Likewise, women are often not accepted by society and their families when they become activists.

Structural dimensions add their part. For example poor healthcare affects women differently to men, especially with regards to pregnancy and giving birth, as a male (activist) interviewee pointed out. This is particularly the case, of course, for women who are FGM survivors:

***“Women are truly suffering around here, they are living in brutal conditions. This could be traced back directly to the obsolete customs and traditions of the area, from FGM—which girls undergo at a very young age—to underage marriages. Women are marginalised by men themselves. They are looked at solely as child-bearing rearing machines. The worst thing of all is the neglect of the health problems women face.***

***I suppose that the poor healthcare service is one of the main reason women are suffering around here. Untrained midwives are still delivering babies, which is a huge risk for both the mother and the***

***baby. It leads to several cases of miscarriages and many unfortunate events. The medical staff does all in their power to save the cases that could be saved without need for medical equipment. But there is also the problem of the scarcity of medical care institutions. If ever you find one, it would be too far away, and so many women suffer until they reach the nearest healthcare centre. There is the known problem of transportation, and many of the people can't afford to hire private cars for that matter. The rate of obstructed labour and miscarriages is really high due to the poor healthcare services."***

M-WK-Sunut-01-A

Interviewees also talked about experiences of sexism and sexual harassment on the streets and in the families as well as abuse of women and children through, for instance, domestic violence, rape, killings or robberies, including violence by security forces. Two women from Darfur mentioned rape in the context of armed conflict by men from so-called "Arab" ethnicities against so-called "African" ethnic women.

***"A particular problem following sexual violence against women is the discrimination against children of raped women. This discrimination plays out both in the community as well as from the official authorities, as they do not get birth certificates and are therefore excluded from education, health services etc. The interviewed decision-maker considered this a result of lack of economic justice and proposed 'to establish an institution in which those children find a solution for the problem'."***

M-KH-Other-01-D

A woman from Mornei IDP Camp in West Darfur depicts how different kinds of gender-based marginalisation and gender-based violence come together in a situation of war:

***"Since 2013 until 2019, we have been through a lot, you name it, violence, rape, killings, robbing and so many other things. We were separated from our families and loved ones, and we have no idea where they are now. Some people say that some of them escaped to Chad, but these all remain speculations. We had no voice whatsoever, we felt as though we were imprisoned. But this new government has somehow given us the chance to speak our minds clearly, thanks to you we can now speak about our problems. As you already know, women and children here are living in appalling conditions, they are in need of so many things, most importantly protection. Although it is unspoken of over here, rape is happening. People should hear about this so that we can stop it once and for all."***

F-DW-Mornei-05

## **Class and Work-Related Factors of Marginalisation**

Precarious situations and economic imbalances also are patterns of marginalisation and discrimination. The circumstance of where people live has a huge impact on their access to services and livelihood. In the case of our interviewees, 37 live in Khartoum, 32 of them in marginalised areas of Khartoum like Daressalam, Hajj Yousif, Mayo or Umbadda. Some of them move back and forth from their places of origin, e.g. for economic and educational reasons or depending on the security situation. Nine interviewees are living in the countryside, mostly in the Sunut District. 49 interviewees live in the IDP camps of Gineina, Nyala or Mornei (between Gineina and Zalingi). 75 interviewees live in conflict zones and are thus directly exposed to dynamics of war and a war economy, 57 of them live in different parts of Darfur and 19 in the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan.

The interviewed marginalised women are housewives or do family care work (21), are unemployed (12), tea sellers (9), teachers (8), activists (7), daily workers (6), housekeepers (3), students (3), farmers (3),

factory workers (2), secretaries (2), agricultural engineers (2) or have other jobs like being a Sheikha, a midwife or doing national military service. The interviewed men include one doctor, three activists, one member of the Sovereignty Council, one carpenter, one unemployed, one employed (profession unknown), one self-employed, one student, one project manager and one agricultural engineer.

This already gives a picture of many marginalised women having either to provide for their families, with often not well-paid and precarious jobs, or having no own income at all and doing care work while depending on their husbands and families. However, marginalised women—if they do have a chance—also make big efforts to get an education and improve themselves and their families.

The pressure of providing a livelihood and doing care work at home leads to a high work load. One interviewee claims she has to work so much for earning a living that she does not have the time to get informed about, let alone take part in, socio-political processes.

Moreover, as stated before, work is distributed unequally between men and women. One woman claims:

***“I just hope for the father of my children to start working and helping me out with things around the house.***

***[Q: Have you ever talked to him about that?] No, I have never told him that, this is only what I feel should happen.***

***[Q: Do you think he is capable of getting a job right now?] I don't really think he can do that.***

***[Q: So you are the main breadwinner of the family?] Yes.”***

F-DW-Mornei-02

Poverty resulting from precarious and low paid work situations also leads to a lower ability to pay for health services or education, thus often leaving the next generation in the same precarious position. As one woman illustrates:

***“I worked as a tea lady before, and then I worked as a maid. I have always known that I should work harder because I am a woman and a mother, I should be patient for the sake of my children. A while back one of my sons was so sick and needed an operation. I didn't have the sufficient amount of money to pay for it, so I plead the people's committee for help. I got nothing, they didn't help me and my son went blind.”***

F-KH-Daressalam-08

But even if well-educated, women will be at a disadvantage to get appropriate jobs and access to power:

***“I am an agricultural engineer, I have been educated as a woman, but I cannot find a job because I am not a man, and for such a job a man is intended and preferred. We asked the government to dispose the inequality at work. The evaluations of employees and applicants should be only through their qualifications. ”***

F-KH-Other-01-A-B

As mentioned above, ethnicity plays a huge role when it comes to work and employment. In some cases, the very direct level of ethnically based security challenges might impair livelihoods:

***“When I was going to cut the grass, Arabs hit us. We can only gather wood for fire, sometimes we cannot gather, we have to buy, it costs 10 pounds.”***

F-DW-Gineina-02

The access to getting a job in the first place or remaining unemployed is another factor:

***“People are suffering from unemployment, all the Arabs have jobs, but we don’t.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-08

Or be it the access to specific higher paid and more powerful jobs:

***“Yes, I suppose they [the previous government] did [play a role in marginalisation]. This manifests itself in the fact that the majority of the high ranking officials within the job market are 90% Arabs.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-02

***“I think that the high ranking and well paid jobs such as medicine and architecture were reserved for the so called upper classes who possess lighter skin tones. That was also the case with education, especially in universities.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-01-A-B

As stated beforehand, the previous government played a role in discrimination at the job market. Interviewees repeatedly talk about not getting accepted to jobs they are qualified for, or even generally to well-paid jobs, due to a certain skin colour or being from specific ethnic groups. Additionally, they report that it was difficult to get jobs for anyone who was not seen as a supporter of the ex-regime. One interviewee describes that trainees in government jobs had much better chances for promotions if they supported the previous government, in which case they quickly found themselves in positions of being the boss of their former trainers.

Interviewees also tell stories about the former government authorities driving away certain people from their work places, not allowing them to sell at public markets or confiscating working materials that then have to be re-bought by the workers. Furthermore, they report about people giving jobs only to their relatives, others being forced to pay large sums of money for no apparent reason. Some share the observation that richer people would treat poorer people differently—e.g. not help them in situations of need.

In IDP camps, authorities are said to be cheating with regards to issuing food cards and

***“manipulating the poor”***

F-DW-Mornei-15

with no possibility for them to file a successful complaint or protest about it.

Living in the countryside, particularly in marginalised areas, makes a huge difference too: At a structural level, many interviewees report about the government not providing infrastructure or services like healthcare to those areas, as this man explains who is from a so-called “Arab”, traditionally pastoralist ethnic group:

***“I grew up in one of the so many marginal areas in Sudan that is famous for its ethnic diversity. We practically had nothing, the environment wasn’t fit for living, we didn’t have water nor electricity. It was a pastoral region, so the people worked mostly on herding and agriculture, the government totally neglected the people, providing no services or institutions of any kind.”***

M-SK-Sunut-02-A

In addition, people living off farming or pastoralism—the big majority of the Sudanese—are particularly vulnerable to weather conditions, especially with regards to climate change. Many interviewees also speak about how the price rises of the last couple of years have drastically increased the difficulties to make a living, particularly for those already poor.

The interviewees have developed different approaches to address class-related challenges of marginalisation. While giving up is not an option, often a matter of survival, some marginalised women have, for example, turned to entrepreneurship to make a living. They also organised themselves and demanded from the governor that qualified local people would be hired for local jobs rather than bringing in people from the North—even if to no avail in many cases:

***“Most of the employed people would be males deriving from Northern tribes”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-04

Beyond the three categories of the “Matrix of Domination”—gender, ethnicity/skin colour and class—there are still further factors of marginalisation, present in Sudan and witnessed by the interviewees, which intersect and reinforce marginalisation.

## Marginalisation Related to War and Displacement

Marginalisation is reinforced by war and displacement, and war can also be the result of ongoing marginalisation. The interviewees share their stories of (families of) victims of war, torture, displacement and genocide. Some experienced how their villages were being burnt, how women and children disappeared and cannot be found, and how they encountered problems with the Janjaweed militia operating in Western Sudan (Darfur). This points to the fact that the Sudanese civil wars are closely linked to racism and ethnic marginalisation, as the violence mostly occurs along the lines of so-called “African” and “Arab” ethnic groups. One prominent example is the Janjaweed militia being largely made-up of Darfurian so-called “Arabs”, who were armed by the former regime and later also “promoted” to become “Rapid Support Forces” of the Sudanese Security Services and border patrols. As one interviewee explains:

***“People have been suffering for so long, not only for the past 30 years. We were marginalised in health, education and all the other things. This, in turn, has led to the emergence of the now known conflicts and wars between the tribes. The wars in the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Blue Nile were also a result of marginalisation and discrimination. It weighed hard on them to the extent that they decided to take the matters into their own hands.”***

M-SK-Sunut-02-A

Those affected by the wars again face increased marginalisation. Refugees recount not getting provided with basic needs—for example, people might be getting food, but had no tent or other shelter apart from a tree in their refugee camp. Some of the interviewed IDP women also mentioned difficulties in getting education.

One woman from an IDP camp in Gineina, West Darfur, accounts how war and displacement, on top of trauma, destroy personal support systems as well as possibilities of livelihood:

***“Through war and displacement, we were separated from our family, from our people who were killed, from our homes from which we were expelled. Now we have no farms or garden.”***

F-DW-Gineina-05

An intersection of war-related marginalisation with gender does not only become obvious in the testimonies about rape as a weapon of war, but also in the overall effects on the lives of men and women:

***“The main target of the wars were the young men. They were practically eliminated, so the heavy load of supporting a whole family was upon the women’s shoulders alone. They had to quit their jobs and drop out of schools. And I think that the ex- government did all that on purpose.”***

F-DN-EIFasher-01

## Education as a Factor of Marginalisation

Of the female interviewees, 14 did not attend any school whatsoever, 20 went to basic schools and three to Quran schools. 17 dropped out after high school, another 17 got college education, while ten got a university degree (graduate or post-graduate). One interviewee does not speak Arabic at all, which is making access to information and getting one’s voice heard in broader society more difficult.

Many interviewees explain how women are denied an education or drop out of school because of early marriage or attitudes within their families that schooling is only for boys—especially when there are school fees that cannot be paid for all children. A few say that this slightly improves when families have enough money. School fees certainly make it more difficult for people with low incomes to educate their children. Some ethnic groups who face more precarious economic situations than others thus have less access to education. The combination of exhaustion due to long walks to school and having to help at home and in the fields has also been mentioned as a reason for students dropping out of school, again mainly girls.

Aside from gender-based discrimination in education, the interviewees mention the experience of not getting accepted to specific universities due to their so-called “African” ethnic group. This, in turn, results in an unequal distribution of jobs between different genders and different ethnic groups.

Several women stated that their education ended when either their father left or passed away, or when they got married. One interviewee describes the effects of a lack of education on her biography and self-esteem:

***“My father left when I was a very little girl, so I had no actual chance to get educated. Until I grew up and got married and had my own kids, I was all alone, and nobody offered me any opportunity to get education. I think of myself as a completely ignorant person.”***

F-DW-Mornei-02

## Religion as a Factor of Marginalisation

A few interviewees mentioned they were discriminated against in religious dimensions. This mainly concerned Muslim women not wearing a headscarf, thus following their religion in different ways from what was promoted by the previous government. One woman experienced discrimination due to being a Christian. In another instance, an interviewee mentioned being called a Christian in a derogative manner, even though she was Muslim, due to her appearance and skin colour.



## Violations of Political Human Rights

During the military dictatorship of Omar Al-Bashir, everyone who was dissenting from the government experienced political human rights violations, and those who actively opposed it were facing tough measures like unfair trials, arrests, torture, killings etc. Due to emergency laws, the applied measures were harsher for those who lived in war zones. In particular, stories are told about such marginalisation in West Sudan/Darfur, as one example shows:

***“Darfur as a whole is marginalised with all its people. I have a personal experience. In 2004, the forces from the former system came to our house and wanted to arrest my uncle. I was a child and asked, ‘Who are you and why do you want him?’ So they hit me, just like this, for no reason. I was a child.”***

F-DN-Village-01-A

Threats and actions of security personnel, like in this example, reinforce structures and attitudes of discrimination and marginalisation and install fear in marginalised groups.

## Other Factors: “Agism, Ablism”

At least one interviewee felt there was discrimination between different age groups, with older people around 60-70 being prioritised to younger ones in decision-making. At least one other woman describes a physical disability as an additional obstacle, however did not talk about it in terms of herself being marginalised.

## (Not) Seeing/Defining Oneself as Marginalised

16 interviewees expressed that they never experienced marginalisation. In the course of the conversations, however, some of them did refer to discriminatory practices they had been subjected to. Still describing themselves as “not marginalised” may be a strategy of appearing strong and belonging to society—and/or recognising that there are others facing much more extreme effects of marginalisation.

To sum up, in all the aforementioned examples, the overall majority states that they experience marginalisation and discrimination for the simple fact of being a woman and/or coming from a certain ethnic group, region or religion and/or having a certain skin complexity, opinion, age or economic status. Metaphors and impressions that some interviewees use when recounting their specific experiences include that people feel put into

***“very low places, as if we were not even humans.”***

(F-SK-Kadugli-01-A-B)

## Needs of Multi-Marginalised Women in Sudan

Based on their experiences of life and of hardship, women facing different forms of marginalisation and discrimination are constantly confronted with a gap between their current and their desired state of living—even if the latter might be just a modest state of life in dignity. In the following paragraphs, we depict the needs that the interviewed persons identified for themselves and their families.

Of all the needs mentioned, about 30% relate to humanitarian dimensions, including infrastructure, followed by education with almost 21%. Also mentioned relatively often, by shortly less than 15%, were needs related to livelihood and safety. Some interviewees additionally spoke of needs with regards to human and women's rights.

### Humanitarian Needs and Infrastructure

The humanitarian need that 19 interviewees listed as most urgent is water, which in some regions is scarce and/or difficult to access. Thus, availability and accessibility of water—like having a water pump or running water at home rather than having to walk to far-away wells or buy from traders—are some of the needs mentioned most often. Further humanitarian needs include food (mentioned by 11) in terms of its availability and affordability. The latter is particularly relevant, since food cards for IDPs are no longer valid, and prices of commodities have been rising sharply. The second most mentioned humanitarian need is healthcare, including hospitals and medicines (15 mentions), which is an issue both in remote areas and in Khartoum. In rural areas, it's an issue of availability (and affordability), in the cities it's rather just the affordability. Also related to health and environment, an interviewee living on the outskirts of Khartoum mentioned a lack of drainage and waste disposal systems as a health-hazard especially during the rainy season. Another interviewee, from a marginalised area, mentioned the need for support for weak and old persons.

Electricity (8 mentions), stable housing (a problem especially during the rainy season) and firewood were called humanitarian needs as well. With regards to infrastructure, better roads and access to remote places were named by those living in these areas, in combination with calls for a better transport system in general. Marginalised women in Khartoum mentioned street lightning as an important need in order to feel safe.

As the interviewees point out, the consequences of these humanitarian needs not being met imply that people are hungry and experience higher rates of sickness and premature death. As a result of hunger, children are searching through waste deposits for things to sell in order to buy food. Moreover, children, especially girls, are dropping out of school so that they can get married or go to work.

The expression "I wish to have a stable life" is used by many of the interviewees. It seems connected with the constant uncertainty and fear of not being able to provide for their families.

## Education

27 interviewees mention improvements in the accessibility and quality of education as an important need. The consequences of children having to work to (help) buy food for the family are also connected with education. Schooling is not possible any more if children have to provide for their families or the resources available do not even cover food expenses. Thus, if education is not affordable, children are more likely to stay at home and miss out on education.

Simply put, the corresponding needs are education for all, including girls and women, lower school fees or even free education as well as an improved education system.

## Livelihood

19 interviewees spoke about livelihood and jobs as important needs. The needs related to livelihood often, but not always, concern agricultural equipment, such as tractors to help grow crops more easily, land to farm and assistance with farming. The need of being able to work on one's farms safely was also expressed several times. Moreover, the need of stalls for selling agricultural produce was pointed out. In addition to farming land, equipment for fish-farming was identified by one interviewee as a need and an alternative to other forms of farming. People also spoke of the need for start-up money for a small business, like for washing machines or refrigerators for home-made produce.

In short, interviewees would like to be able to provide for themselves and their families, e.g. through stable jobs or a stable work environment and would like to see the related needs being met.

## Safety

20 interviewees speak about safety-related needs. Safety is mentioned as a precondition to be able to farm land or to have access to water and firewood. In addition, interviewees express the need for safe roads without the threat of robberies. Safety is mentioned also in connection with war and violent conflicts. Related needs are, for instance, the removal of land mines, secure villages, an end to killings and assassinations and other forms of bloodshed, disarmament of people and an end of conflicts and discriminations in general so that people are no longer being hurt or violated. Several IDP women wish for a voluntary return to their original villages, but would need both physical safety and human security in terms of livelihood, healthcare etc. To sum up, people do need safety, peace, and security.

## Human Rights, Women's Rights

When asked about needs, individual interviewees mention an end to underage marriages and for all human rights to be regarded in Sudan as well as citizenship rights for refugees, freedom and an end to discrimination, in general.

# Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women in Sudan

Referring to the background of their experiences of marginalisation and discrimination and their experiences of urgent basic needs and rights not being met, the interviewees put forward demands to the Transitional Government of Sudan, which we outline in this chapter.

Demands for safety, peace, security and transitional justice—i.e. demands that relate to experiences of marginalisation and discrimination connected to war—are named by almost 69% of the interviewees. Demands related to experiences of discrimination and marginalisation concerning economic status and class—e.g. asking for improved healthcare, access to water, employment and means to provide for one's livelihood—are put forward by more than 61%. More than 41% of the interviewees articulated demands that are related to better access or systems of education for all. Almost 29.5% raise demands for political power and participation, freedom and human rights in response to violations of political human rights. Demands with regards to ethnic or racist discrimination and marginalisation—such as ending discrimination in direct interactions or on the job market—are named by around 24%. Demands in relation to experiences of gender-based discrimination or violence—i.e. asking for an end to it—are put forward by almost 12% of the interviewees.

## Demands in Conjunction with War-Related Experiences of Marginalisation and Discrimination

### Peace and Security

Similarly to establishing political participation and equality, peace is seen as a precondition for a positive new system to be built. Interviewees demand peaceful coexistence among all Sudanese people so that things that have gone wrong during the last 30 years can be fixed. This also includes the demand for a civilian government instead of a military one. Emphasising this, one interviewee said that

***“The Hamdouk<sup>27</sup> Government has no real governmental power because there are still some of the old government involved, and therefore needs protection from the UN.”***

F-DW-Gineina-15

Others are concerned that the Transition Government needs to take care to avoid a counter-revolution. This perspective is particularly prominent with people living at the margins, as outside Khartoum the old structures and the representatives of the old government are still much more in place than in the capital. But even in Khartoum, they are still holding most administrative positions in the ministries.

Important for the interviewees is that measures leading to peace and security are not merely talked about, but properly implemented. When there is peace, they see the chance of bringing about further changes by themselves.

Demands for peace go along with demands for an end to war in the different affected regions in Sudan through a Peace Agreement. For marginalised women, e.g. in Darfur, security also means, for example:

***“We want to go out and work in the fields without being afraid all the time.”***

F-DW-Mornei-11

---

<sup>27</sup> Abdalla Hamdouk is the civilian Prime Minister of the Sudanese Transition Government.

Furthermore, marginalised women, especially those living in IDP camps, demand an end to rape and child prostitution as well as robberies. The displacement of people should stop, and instead the return of people to their homes should be made possible. The government needs to prevent assaults and ensure safety. Others say that there should be efforts in disarmament, and arms should be made illegal. Children should no longer be recruited as soldiers. Beyond this, alternative means of conflict resolution should be established, for example through traditional systems and Sheikhs.

Many interviewees refer to “security and stability” in a way that is reflected in the “human security” model. They demand for the degrading economy to be taken care of, including support for the private sector and measures against unemployment. Instead of war, development should be the process to focus on. One important aspect mentioned in this regard is to eliminate corruption.

Interviewees from the Nuba Mountains particularly ask for roads to areas formerly closed due to war to be re-opened so that people can travel safely back and forth even across the former fighting lines and return to their families. Some also welcome that this has already happened in a few instances.

One interviewee points out that the use of land is key for social peace. Therefore, the government needs to make sure that a fair distribution between different ethnic groups as well as between farmers and pastoralists is re-established as part of ending violent conflict. The following quote shows how demands and strategies to foster change are interrelated:

***“Each and every tribe in Sudan has their own land and territories, these possessions need to come back to them, there is an agreement between the farmers and the shepherds on where to plant and where to herd. This could be a start to reshape the whole community. We need to raise the people’s awareness through the native administrations, and we can’t do that without proper education and healthcare services. Peace must be achieved, this new government needs some more work to do on the matter.”***

F-DN-ElFasher-01

## **Justice and Transitional Justice**

19 interviewees mentioned demands of justice—often generally as part of the revolutionary slogan of “Peace—Freedom—Justice”, but also more concretely as social justice, e.g. in terms of absence and prosecution of discrimination as well as transitional justice. The rule of law should prevail with the state guaranteeing all rights. Transitional justice is deemed important especially for women who were being raped as well as for displaced people and those who have been killed in the course of the Revolution. One interviewee specifically mentioned that Omar Al-Bashir should be brought in front of the International Criminal Court for all the suffering he has created. As a part of reparations, displaced people should be helped to come back to their villages and reunite with their families.

Land rights also keep being an important issue: One interviewee describes that her family’s land had not been recognised as their own by the former Ministry of Urban Planning, despite the presentation of ownership papers. In consequence, people lost their land and thus their base of living.

## Demands Related to Experiences of Discrimination and Marginalisation Concerning Economic Status and Class

### Physical Needs, Livelihood, Employment and Infrastructure

Interviewees demand social justice which includes fair employment and a fair distribution of job opportunities that also makes jobs available for people from marginalised areas. Jobs should lead to financial independence, and the government should take measures to minimise inequality at the work place. Positions should be filled according to qualifications and not ethnic groups.

In order to provide for better employment opportunities, the interviewees ask the government to fix economic problems. This includes addressing unemployment, but also starting new developmental projects based on sustainability. It might also include the distribution of start-up money to found small businesses (specifically for women) and the provision of material equipment such as tractors, washing machines or refrigerators for food vendors.

One central demand of the people is that the government should tackle the current high prices and reduce the high cost of living.

No matter what exactly the measures could be, the government, in the opinion of the interviewees, should take steps to reduce poverty so that children don't have to be prostituted to earn money for their families. The interviewees wish for economic stability, including an end of international sanctions and the establishment of functioning economic relations with other countries (import and export). Development should be

#### ***“balanced and sustainable”***

F-KH-Daressalam-11

so that all regions get to a similar standard.

One interviewee makes a point of demanding a reform of the economic system as a whole, moving away from capitalism and focusing on self-sufficiency:

***“Not to remove subsidies, the government budget should yet be designed with no more debts and to support the poor people. Sudan should avoid capitalism and the International Monetary Fund, the giveaways and debts shall not be the main source for the budget. We shall depend on ourselves, we are a rich country and have many resources, water and agricultural land, we have to build infrastructure to support trade and other services. [...] But the present Minister of Finance is making the same mistake that used to be done in the former system. This will lead the country to more problems and complications.”***

F-KH-Other-06-A

Most interviewees` demands relate to humanitarian and basic needs, such as food, clean water, electricity, good housing, and all of it to be made available in marginalised areas as well, not only in the capital. Many emphasise that marginalised and rural areas in general should be developed and the villages should be

#### ***“equipped and self-sufficient like the cities.”***

M-SK-Kadugli-01

This is a clear sign of the extent marginalisation is also perceived in terms of urban-rural divides and that development policies need to focus on rural areas to catch for striking a balance.

At the same time, as has already been mentioned, people do not just want provisions, but they want to earn their livelihoods:

***“I would like for the prices of things to become much cheaper—because they are very expensive—and for people to be able to feed themselves.”***

F-DW-Mornei-04

Hospitals and healthcare constitute another key area of demands. The former should exist also in remote places and be well staffed and equipped. Healthcare in general should be affordable for all, as a woman from Deleng, South Kordofan, describes:

***“There are no nearby hospitals, and if there are, they are under-staffed and under-equipped and on top of it expensive. So if you don’t have money, you will suffer a great deal here. If you do, though, you can seek treatment elsewhere.”***

F-SK-Deleng-01

Participants also demand improvements in the infrastructure, such as a better transport system and better roads, so that public transport is available in general and that travelling is still possible when it is raining and roads get muddy. One interviewee mentions how they had demanded—still needed—hygiene measures from the previous government, but to no avail:

***“We also asked for a healthier environment through providing bins in the neighbourhoods, to avoid diseases because of the insects that might swarm around the garbage. When it rains, it is another story. Mosquitoes swarm around the pools of water, and we suffer from malaria and other diseases, in addition to the blockage of the streets because of the poor drainage.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-09

## **Demands Related to Education**

Interviewees show a very high conviction that education is really important not only for personal development, but for the whole country to develop. They repeatedly mention how crucial education is and how a lack of it, in their opinion, is also connected to political violence and war:

***“Education is one thing that we cannot gamble with.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-05

***“If it weren’t for the lack of education, we wouldn’t go on wars. People are ignorant, that is why they are driven to trivialities, and that is why you might get killed on a simple thing around here.”***

F-DN-ElFasher-07

Therefore, the interviewees demand the right to education through a free or at least affordable schooling for all. This should include all children in such a way that they do not have to work at the same time. It also should include education for those who dropped out of school early as well as for adults who did not have the chance to go to school at all. Education should be made accessible in marginalised areas as well, not only in the capital. One interviewee says that schools should be exclusively government-run without any private schools so that education is available for all. Others insist that girls should

have the same chances to get an education as boys. Several marginalised women mention yet again that some families cannot afford to send all children to school, with the effect that some kids get more and others less education.

In addition, the quality of schools and the education system itself should be improved. Here, people demand an innovative school system and well-equipped schools—for example with computers. Educational equipment should also be made available outside of school, and there should be informal approaches of awareness-raising.

An interviewee from Port Sudan connects education with the

***“wish for a non-sexist and non-racist Sudan”***

F-E-Port Sudan-03

implying that the educational institutions should reflect that need in structure/accessibility and contents.

Feeling very strongly about education, the interviewees also hope that brain-drain will be prevented or reversed:

***“I would like for it [the new government] to push us further when it comes to education, new ideas, knowledge and culture.”***

F-DW-Mornei-03

***“This country has lost some of its finest youth, I hope that someday they could come back.”***

F-E-Port Sudan-07

## **Demands in Response to Violations of Political Human Rights**

### **Political Power and Participation**

Demands around political power and participation include calls for democracy, equality and the rule of law to be established. Power should not be taken by force, but by merit and by respecting the demands of the people:

***“The December Revolution is a Revolution for dignity. We look forward to a state, which is based on institutions and democracy. This Revolution happened because the former regime did not respect the demands of the people.”***

F-DW-Gineina-07

It is seen as important that the government should not be a military, but a civilian one and should be united—an endeavour not easily achieved and that probably needs time to be established, as some interviewees point out:

***“The transition needs time, three years, as 30 years of military rule are not quickly undone. All goals of the people might not be met during the transition period, but there is hope that quite a number will be.”***

F-GE-Berlin-01-A-B



The demands for participation and political power often have a special focus on women. They should have political power in decision-making, with some asking for the already existing 40% women quota rule to be truly implemented. This should also apply to marginalised areas, as an IDP woman from Kirinding Camp, Gineina, emphasises. Others ask for an 'equal' division of power. One argument mentioned several times in favour of women having power in decision-making is that they are specifically affected by war and carry a lot of societal responsibility both in times of war and peace. Therefore,

***"We demanded that women have places in the decision-making positions. Women only got unimportant ministries, and this is still the situation now, even in the time of the Transitional Government."***

F-KH-Other-01-A-B

Others observe that, even during the Revolution, women were not fully considered:

***"I worked with many Revolutionary Committees and I found sometimes no women. When I asked about it, they said 'what shall a woman do here?' They still underestimate the women's role. This is the male culture that must be fought."***

F-DN-Village-01-A

Others, again, stress that there needs to be ethnic and regional representation, since

***"racism is still there."***

F-DW-Gineina-10

***"Representation of colour and culture ..."***

M-KH-Other-01-D

is something that the interviewed decision-maker strongly views as necessary to overcome the ethnic, religious or racist discrimination which, he says, three quarters of the population face.

So it is clearly seen as vital to make political decision-making and positions accessible for marginalised people, including women:

***"Even local languages can be translated."***

F-DW-Gineina-15

To ensure representation, in general, the necessary mechanisms should be put in place:

***"I would like for us to be our own representatives so that we could speak up for the things that we want all by ourselves."***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-11

Being able to speak up for themselves, some woman also demand for the government to visit marginalised places and hear people's voices, so as to find out about their needs and provide for them.

Some interviewees mention the "native administrations" of traditional leadership as a system that should be re-introduced,

***"so that the Sheikhs could solve any problem that might occur among the people."***

F-DN-ElFasher-01

What is seen as important, in general, is

***“connecting different social structures”***

F-DS-Nyala-13-A

so that problems can be solved and people

***“feel they belong.”***

F-KH-Other-02-A-B

The governing people should have specific qualities, such as being just and appropriately qualified and chosen not according to their ethnic group. As one interviewee says:

***“We need equality and democracy. If those are achieved, then all the other demands will be achieved.”***

F-DN-Village-01-A

## **Freedom**

Even though it is mentioned by 14 interviewees, freedom seems to have a comparatively low urgency in comparison to other, often vital, needs and demands. However, it is mentioned frequently as a basic human right and a precondition to voice one’s demands and thus effect change:

***“I hope for people to be more free because without freedom you cannot achieve anything.”***

F-DW-Mornei-15

Accordingly, Sudan should be a free and democratic country, including free elections. One interviewee refers to a debate about personal freedom versus political freedom:

***“Our most famous slogan during the days of the Revolution is “Freedom—Peace—Justice”, but some of the young boys and girls misunderstood the freedom that we were longing and shouting for as personal freedom, which is not the case. The freedom that we want is freedom from slavery of the ex-regime, freedom of injustice and oppression. We’ve kept our mouths shut for 30 years. The freedom we are all asking for is not personal freedom relating only to the way you dress or where you work, it is much deeper than that.”***

F-DS-Nyala-12

## Demands Related to the Experience of Ethnic and Racist Discrimination and Marginalisation

### End to Ethnic and Racist Discrimination and Marginalisation

Interviewees shared their visions of a Sudan without discrimination and marginalisation: Sudan should be

***“a home for all the people to live and work together in peace.”***

F-DS-Nyala-02

It should be intolerant of racism and tribalism,

***“... a true country of citizenship and dignity”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-01-A-B

***“... a society and community that accepts each other without any fears.”***

F-GE-Berlin-01-A-B

All people should be equal and treated accordingly, independent of their ethnicity. There should be no double standards when it comes to prosecution of violence:

***“I would like for the senseless violence inflicted by the Arabs to stop. An Arab can kill one of us and go unpunished, but when one of us kills an Arab, they are sure to get their punishment. I think that this should stop because we are all humans.”***

F-DW-Mornei-17

The interviewees demand of the government to give people their rights, as much as citizens should have duties and obligations. In all this, however, people should be treated equally. For instance, all services should be available to all citizens. Finally, the people demand an end to all forms marginalisation. The urban-rural divide should end and there should be equal opportunities for all states and regions:

***“I hope for all the things enjoyed by individuals in the centre to also be available in the marginal areas, such as a good education, hospitals and good healthcare and services.”***

F-KH-Other-03-A-B

These demands connect to a longing for tolerance and understanding and for people to accept each other, as many interviewees shared:

***“We hope for so many things like social justice, fair employment, and for everyone to feel like they belong and to feel like they are all right on the place where they wish to be. We hope for Sudan to move forward with moderation and balance.”***

F-KH-Other-02-A-B

## Demands in Relation to Experiences of Gender-Based Discrimination or Violence

### End to Gender-Based Discrimination and Violence

One major demand is for an end to all forms of gender-based violence. This includes rapes, killings, attacks and all forms of harassment and abuse—both inside the families and outside. It was also pointed out that children out of rape do not only face stigmatisation in society, but are also not having a chance to get birth certificates and other legal documents. In effect, they are thus excluded from education, social life and citizenship. The demand is to give these children at least legal documents so that they can lead a normal life.

The demand for an end to gender-based violence includes making underage marriages and forced marriages without the agreement of the woman illegal. Women should be able to work securely in the fields or go collecting water and firewood safely and not be easy targets for assaults by armed groups. Some interviewees also ask for an end to FGM—which by the time of the publication of this study has been banned by the Transitional Government, but ending the practice itself is seen as more difficult, particularly during times of conflict:

***“This is more difficult to achieve in conflict areas than in urban areas, so the war needs to end first. But there is already more awareness in the society about it.”***

M-KH-Other-01-D

In addition, interviewees demand for girls and women to have the same access to education (school and college) as boys and men, and there should be an equal division of work. One woman qualifies this to mean that men should go to the fields and women do the work at home, so that the women do not have to take care of both at the same time.

On a legal level, the interviewees explain how they demanded the amendment and adjustment of the Personal Status Law and the Public Order Law. In addition, they demand Sudan to sign the CEDAW Convention (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women). Some are already engaged in actions putting forward exactly these demands:

***“We organised today a protest. We want Sudan to sign the CEDAW-Agreement, without any reservations, and the laws that stand against it have to be cancelled and edited to avoid any practices of discrimination against women. I mean the cancellation of Public Order Law is a very tiny part of the laws which are enacted against women, there are still many other paragraphs which are against women. They are oppressive, and they limit the freedom of women, and most of these laws are not really cancelled, they are just frozen during the transitional period. We want all the laws which are inconsistent to the CEDAW-Agreement to be cancelled.”***

F-KH-Other-06-A

## Linking Discrimination, Needs and Demands

When looking at the analysis of needs and demands related to specific forms of discrimination and marginalisation, we find that the interviewees prioritise needs and demands that are not necessarily connected to the most prominent forms of discrimination and marginalisation they are confronted with.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, whilst about 60.5% face intersecting experiences of ethnic/racist discrimination, only 26% name ending such discrimination in direct interactions or on job markets etc. as important needs or demands. About 31% of the interviewees recount experiences of gender-based discrimination and violence, but only around 12% articulate corresponding needs and demands. These are related to gender-based violence, underage marriage, introducing IDs for children born from rape, increasing socio-political participation, guaranteeing more education for women and girls or fostering fairer work distribution. Inversely, while only 21% state to have experienced discrimination related to class and economic status, needs and demands in the humanitarian and economic sphere are put forward by a majority of 80%, like healthcare, water, employment, livelihood etc.

Similarly, although the percentage of interviewees who experienced marginalisation connected to war and displacement amounts to 18%, as many as 67% ask for increased safety, peace and security as well as transitional justice. About 4% experienced discrimination and marginalisation related to the violation of political human rights, but 26% ask for increased political power and participation, freedom and human rights. 11% of the interviewees recounted instances of discrimination related to education, while 54% see improvements in the quality, accessibility and affordability of education for all as a key need and demand.

We interpret these numbers as showing how different forms of discrimination and marginalisation are categorised differently by various people and especially how they are intersectionally related. Therefore, satisfying the identified needs and implementing the demands, especially those connected with immediate survival, would affect a variety of different experiences of multi-marginalisation and discrimination.

---

<sup>28</sup> As the interviewees often did not thoroughly differentiate between needs and demands, the following numbers reflect the percentage of interviewees who mentioned needs and/or demands in the respective categories. The numbers thus differ from those used in the separate descriptions of the needs and the demands.

## Part 2: Future Governance Structures

In the light of the needs and demands of women facing more than one form of marginalisation and discrimination, how would governance structures need to look like in the future so that they are inclusive and ensure that these needs and demands are reflected and met? A look into the last 30 years of dictatorship that have just ended may give hints about the dimensions of political structures that should be changed. But interviewees also shared their own visions of an inclusive and participatory system that could meet their needs and demands.

### Role of Previous Government with regards to Marginalisation and Demands

When establishing how future governance structures could look like, so that they are inclusive and reflect women's and other marginalised people's needs and demands, it is worthwhile looking into previous and current experiences of governance. One might then see what could still be useful in the future and what should be changed—on top of looking into the abovementioned needs and demands which reflect prominent issues that concern multi-marginalised women and therefore need to be addressed.

Only one of the people interviewed stated that the previous government did not have a role in marginalisation and discrimination. Most participants emphasised that the previous government's role was essential in building up and maintaining an oppressive and unjust system in which the government ruled

***“with an iron fist.”***

F-KH-Other-04-A-B<sup>29</sup>

Here, many referred to inter-ethnic discrimination, but some also to political opposition and gender-based discrimination. Some pointed out that the previous government used and increased attitudes and structures that were already in place long before Omar Al-Bashir came to power. In any case, almost all interviewees see the previous government responsible for this discriminatory system in passive and/or active ways.

Passive ways mentioned were that the government did not prevent discrimination, racism and tribalism and did not support marginalised people to organise themselves. Neither did it take steps, in the perception of the majority of the interviewees, to improve the situation of marginalisation and discrimination. For example, demands regarding humanitarian or other needs of people in marginalised areas or of displaced people were neglected. Thereby, the government would passively contribute to installing and upholding a discriminatory system by preventing positive change and not becoming active about it.

Most examples that the interviewees mention, however, show the previous government as actively installing and maintaining an unjust system in more or less visible ways, both with regards to inter-ethnic or racist as well as gender-based discrimination and class divisions.

---

<sup>29</sup> This interviewee lives both in Khartoum and in Kadugli, South Kordofan.

With regards to inter-ethnic and racist discrimination, corruption and nepotism are named, as were privilege policies. Inter-ethnic discrimination is said to have been escalated through constantly pointing out differences between ethnic groups and especially neglecting the rights of those not belonging to so-called “Arab” ethnicities. Installed structures of discrimination and marginalisation included legal

measures, such as a field designating the ethnic group of people in official documents like passports and ID cards. This put ethnicity in focus and made it likelier for people to be judged by it. Likewise, installing Arabic as the main language and Islam as the main religion is named as a discriminatory act against people with other languages and religions. Some state that people from Darfur and South Kordofan were not recognised as being Sudanese.

Visible consequences of such policies and practices included the unequal distribution of jobs according to ethnic groups, especially with regards to governmental jobs that many interviewees view as having been assigned to so-called ‘elite’ or ‘dominant tribes’ only, regardless of qualifications. Other examples of observed consequences included a difference in punishment between “Arab” and “non-Arab” people for the same criminal acts. Also, interviewees mention delays in court cases when poor people filed complaints. Several referred to the so-called “civilisation project” of the former regime as a core of its discrimination policies, be it with regards to ethnic group, language, religion or gender.

With regards to gender-based discrimination, the interviewees point out an attitude of the former government that

***“... they thought in their ideology that the woman is a sin. [...] They enacted laws, they wanted that the women return behind the lines and they designed a lifestyle for women: Women had to wear specified clothes and to play a specified role. The women’s freedom was limited in the time of the former government.”***

F-KH-Other-06-A

Another field where the previous government was perceived responsible for discrimination and marginalisation relates to inflicting violence and being responsible for wars and conflicts. While the wars were also triggered by previous discrimination, the resulting displacements, killings, rapes and harassments were actively contributing to further marginalisation and discrimination. The previous government was often directly involved and also indirectly through arming specific ethnic groups and militias.

One interviewee called these discrimination tactics a “divide and conquer” approach which made it virtually impossible for double- or triple-marginalised women to propagate and address their needs-based demands. As the interviewed decision-maker points out:

***“I think marginalised women have no mechanism to raise their voice. This is one of the causes of marginalisation, and also that the former government did not help in preventing marginalisation. They did not help them to organise themselves, and they did not support them. Often, there are individuals who speak on behalf of women, but this cannot replace marginalised women. After they are organised and supported, marginalised women can raise their voices directly to the decision makers.”***

M-KH-Other-01-D

Sometimes, in the past, people did actually address authorities with their needs and demands—usually to no avail. Some interviewees mentioned that their needs were instead taken care of by NGOs.

## Installation of Mechanisms for Communicating Needs and Participating in Decisions

The interviewed representative of the Transition Government, as well as some of the interviewed activists, also see the previous government responsible for the limitation of freedom and the creation of a deformed justice system, which inhibits lively and direct participation and communication between margins and the centre. The Transition Government claims to aim for the establishment of a Sudanese state based on the rule of law and an active civil society. In the view of the interviewed decision-maker, this needs to include an independent judiciary system, an end to corruption and transparent institutions where all Sudanese people are represented. Such a system should include a quota of 40% of female representatives, an end to marginalisation and discrimination and prevention of inequality.

A discussion about the CEDAW Agreement in the Legislation Council is mentioned as one step into the direction of a more just system. The interviewed decision-maker sees civil society organisations in a crucial role and therefore states his intent to create a thriving environment for civil society, including financial support. A precondition for the establishment of such structures of governance and implementation would be, in his view, peace to be achieved through a Peace Agreement. Other areas of reform should include infrastructure, education and health as well as improving the situation of women, youth and displaced people. The interviewed government representative did not specify any further how such institutions could look like. So he did not make clear what existing or specific new structures with which qualities might be put into place in order to ensure that women's and marginalised peoples' needs and demands were continuously reflected and met.

With regards to potential mechanisms and structures that a future governance system could provide for people to communicate their needs and participate in decisions, the interviewees who face multiple marginalisation point out several possibilities. A precondition, though, would be a more stabilised country. Underlying principles should be democracy, equality and the rule of law. Furthermore:

***“The complete dissolution of all of the previous government’s figures is required at this point, and it is no easy task to do so. They had the grip over this country for so long now, they were unqualified, unfit people in all of their positions, they were only here to benefit themselves and not the citizens. That is why they messed up everything. Urgent dissolution and replacement is required of this new government.”***

M-SK-Sunut-02-A

In the opinion of the interviewees, representation should not be according to, but rather across ethnic groups and should reflect the diversity of the Sudanese people, including the marginalised. They identified a need to nominate female representatives.

Some mentioned representation, in general, through voting or nomination of people who would speak directly to the government. The identified self-organised structures that could play a part in representation or were deemed suitable for communicating needs and participating in decision-making were trusted activists or activist groups that also played a vital role in the Revolution. This refers to resistance committees, women's groups, further organisations or unions as well as youth groups—both at local and central level. In some instances, neighbourhood committees already collect needs and demands of people who cannot reach the decision-makers, for example by using questionnaires, in order to channel them to the Transition Government. They formed sub-committees to take care of specific tasks as well as a forum of neighbourhood committees as an umbrella body. However, until now, such neighbourhood committees only operate in cities.



Again others pointed to the possibility of establishing new groups and associations for representation. Some said that the interviewees themselves, belonging to Bana as an activist women's group with diverse ethnic backgrounds, could have such a role. Formal structures mentioned that could be used for representation and collecting opinions of the people are political parties or also governors—especially once their appointment is based on elections. Other existing structures and groups that could play a role are traditional ethnic leaders or people in charge of IDP camps as well as 'Sheikhs' as traditional religious authorities. They were mentioned by some as being already trusted by the communities.

Others referred to existing structures of local government representatives who could communicate needs and demands, as this woman from a Nyala IDP Camp states:

***"We have a person here in charge of listening to our complaints, then taking it over to the people in charge in the State and then to the decision makers in the capital."***

F-DS-Nyala-01-A

Important for this mechanism to be trustworthy, some interviewees mention, would be the establishment of a civil administration instead of a military-based one:

***"I really hope for the change that people in Khartoum are always talking about to happen. Perhaps it would help if they established some civil administration. They could tell us what to do if anything went wrong, and we will get to talk to them about our needs and issues. Then, our voices might be heard."***

F-DW-Mornei-11

Representation should, among other things, be based on geography in order to make the representatives approachable and accessible—and on gender, as women

***"... are fully able to speak for themselves."***

F-DW-Gineina-01-A-B

People also refer to native administrations or traditional systems as suitable for the above-mentioned function:

***"Well, I think that it is somehow getting better, and I think that we should get back to the native administrations and run the things like it used to be in the past, through the heads of the tribes, the Sheikhs or Nazirs. They will fix the problems that are between the tribes and help bring people together as one."***

F-DN-ElFasher-01

One quality of future structures that was repeatedly mentioned as important is the inclusion of all segments of society in Parliament and decision-making so that all genders, cultures, ethnic groups and regions are represented.

Some interviewees show scepticism whether representation could work at all and prefer a more direct approach to raise their voices. In this regard, the resistance committees created during the Revolution provide a model and a structure for participation and bottom-up decision-making, thus leaning more towards a council democracy model. Many interviewees point out how important it is, in any case, to unite and organise and to speak with one voice.

## **Ensuring Citizen's Security and Human Rights**

The interviewees further state that the new system should guarantee people's security, both in terms of physical security—where the police should intervene when people are subjected to violence—and in terms of economic security.

## **Livelihood, Development and Economic Stability**

One principle of economic security, as mentioned by some interviewees, would be to support the local economy and be self-sufficient. Others focus on establishing functioning import-export systems and make sure that all currency transactions are done via legal financial institutions. Some say the new system should end the reception of loans from other countries and engage for an end of international sanctions. Several said that funding decisions by the government should be prioritised in such a new way that the resources invested in war could be used for development to fulfil basic needs instead.

## **Ending Military Rule and Corruption**

The interviewed member of the Transition Government criticises the way military and administrative leaders were appointed in the past. Other interviewees claim that the role of the military should change in principle. They opt for a complete end to military rule and of related corruption, starting with a decrease of the military's influence in the peace process.

## Part 3: The Transition Process and the Needs and Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women

The function of the Transition Government is paving the way for new governance structures to be put into place after the transition from military dictatorship to civilian-led democracy. People put much hope into the changes they want to see in future Sudan—and whether or not the Transition Government will be able to generate a number of these changes will be decisive for its success. In this first part, we describe which changes women and other people facing more than one form of discrimination or marginalisation have experienced since the Revolution.

### Changes since the Revolution

#### No Changes Observed since the Revolution

Almost 40% of the interviewees stated, in December 2019/January 2020, that they had not observed significant changes since the Revolution with regards to their expressed needs. Some of them claimed that people talked about changes, but there was no real change to be observed—apart from the old ruling party and the president having gone:

***“We only keep hearing about this word ‘change’, but it is not happening in real life.”***

F-DW-Mornei-11

People express their disappointment about this, as they expected changes to happen, but instead see the Government as procrastinating in decision-making. Others claim that not only has there been no change, but also the same bad things are happening as before: people being arrested, racism, discrimination and marginalisation still being in place, robberies, murders and killings still happening. Therefore, people feel insecure, and poverty is still prevailing in the light of high prices and a lack of water, food, and electricity. Some even claim that things got worse, citing the economy to be deteriorating with prices rising even higher, scarcity of food and petrol prices increasing, while some aid organisations are leaving deprived areas like camps.

16 of the 51 interviewees who do not see changes yet are optimistic, however: They are convinced that even though changes might not be visible as yet, they are on their way. Examples mentioned were projects that are being talked about—a train line that was planned or that the government had addressed liquidity problems. They also state that some things had happened already, but not enough to make a difference in people’s lives as yet and not enough to justify the sacrifices people made, giving their lives to the Revolution.

Some interviewees show an understanding that change takes time, especially considering the long period of the previous system in place:

***“I don’t see that there is much of a difference between Sudan before and after the Revolution, but I do not expect that a 30-year-old damage could be amended in such a short period. I would like for people to work together so that things would change faster [...]”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-06

Other respondents shared this expressed hope for the future. Some of them have the impression that the new government was at least better than the previous one and specifically declare faith in the Hamdouk Government:

***“We have such a new qualified Government and Prime Minister.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-07

Against the background of the long period of the previous system and the fact that many people do not observe major changes yet, some interviewees do express scepticism. They've decided to wait and see, before judging whether or not they consider the new government to be better than the old one. They underline their scepticism with a referral to the fact that some of the members of the new government also held positions in the previous one.

## Racism Is Diminishing

Twelve interviewees observed that, since the Revolution, racism has diminished and that, in contrast, tolerance, understanding and respect regarding the cultural diversity of Sudan have increased. For example, the question which region or ethnic group people are from was asked less frequently. Some say they felt more respected and less discriminated against and that people were being harassed less often than before. Also, it is mentioned that religion plays a less significant role in political discourses. While structural changes with regards to racism are not being observed or mentioned, some interviewees still notice that a change of mentality is occurring, a “revolution of consciousness”, a process of uniting people, reminding them of the respectful unity between people from different backgrounds during the Revolution:

***“On the days of the Headquarter [of the military in Khartoum] Sit-In, I saw a small version of the new Sudan, free from the tight grip of both racism and sexism. (...)There was an absolute rejection of racism. I remember this night once when we were eating, and I took a look at the hands reaching for the food. I saw many colours. It was wonderful. We loved each other so much, regardless of where we came from. As young people, we suffered a great deal to reach the point where we are today. We have come a long way from the harsh reality that was imposed on us by the previous government. We are now more educated and have overcome the wrong perceptions of the past, like racism and hate. It is way behind us now.”***

M-SK-Sunut-03-A

Also, the Revolution's phrase of

***“You arrogant racists, Darfur is the beating heart of the country”***

F-DW-Gineina-01-A-B)

touched people, and showed a new face of society. However, an interviewee from Port Sudan reported about new inter-ethnic tensions in their region.

## Changes in Livelihood and Infrastructure

48 interviewees observed changes in terms of livelihood and infrastructure. 28 of them, however, speak of harder living conditions since the Revolution. Prices for commodities are most frequently mentioned as increasing, with prices of sugar and coffee doubling, bread being hardly available,

leading to a scarcity of food that already prompted some people to steal in order to feed their children. In addition, people report a lack of water, medication, petrol and gas. Some interviewees state that the situation was better before the Revolution, when foreign organisations distributed basic commodities. On the opposite side, six interviewees have the experience of basic needs being provided better than before, such as food or the installation of electricity or generators in some areas.

The hardship in living conditions is attributed by some interviewees to the ongoing economic crisis, with many loans from foreign countries, the currency being down, most international sanctions still in place and a focus on import rather than local products. However, one participant states that changes in the economic sector could not be achieved as long as the military is in control over large parts of the economy.

The situation in education is still considered bad by some respondents. People from Kadugli reported, however, that a new school was being built, but they were not sure if it was funded by the government, as young people were building it. Other interviewees observed that some hospitals were in the process of being fixed. Two interviewees experienced more job opportunities than previously—both for themselves and for others.

In terms of infrastructure, it is positively noted several times that roads in conflict regions (Nuba Mountains) which were previously closed are now open. Three interviewees notice work efforts starting to fix roads. Nine respondents (mainly in Khartoum) observe improvements in the transport system, like better availability and the installation of new passenger buses to provide a better transport system and make it easier for people to get to work. Six interviewees, on the contrary, report that the transportation situation has become worse due to petrol shortages and price rises.

## Human Rights Improvements

46.5% of the interviewees express the opinion that the human rights situation has improved since the Revolution. The majority of them names freedom of speech as the most prevalent factor. Interviewees say that they as women, as well as others, can now freely speak their minds about their ideas and feelings, their needs and their criticism, without being arrested or harassed by the National Intelligence and Security Services. Interestingly, this had not been mentioned at all as an important need in the interviews, but when asked about it directly, the marginalised women often considered this an important precondition for change.

The media being able to report freely and people being able to work and research without anyone hindering or censoring them, are further examples named, as is the possibility to meet in public. Some interviewees point out that even the existence of a group like Bana shows that there is an improvement with regards to freedom of speech, as is the fact that there are people—just like during the Revolution—who are standing up for “Freedom—Peace—Justice”. Some others, however, think that people who were afraid to speak up previously were still afraid to do so now.

Some interviewees welcome that the state of emergency has ended. Further improvements in human rights that were mentioned are a higher degree of freedom of religion, with Christmas being a public holiday now in Sudan. There was also the perception that people were now more aware of their rights as well as their responsibilities.

Interviewees stated that policies to promote equality between men and women were on the way—for example the cancellation of the Public Order Law—even though it would take time to change practices, especially in rural areas. One participant stressed that women were still being arrested for the clothes they wear.

Several interviewees criticise that people interpret freedom as authorisation to do whatever they want and start stealing, robbing and killing in the name of freedom. They think this is based on a misconception of what freedom means—at least what was meant by it in the Revolution. They raise the aspect of freedom coming from within, rather than one's outward appearance, and distinguish between personal and intellectual freedom:

***“I think that the bad thing is that most of the people are unaware of the reality of a democratisation process, and they have a very flawed concept of freedom. They often mistake it for personal freedom when in fact it's more of an intellectual freedom. And it's not very good for our case if people went along with their flawed concept of freedom and act accordingly, this will greatly detriment our hopes for change, for it might deter potential people joining the process of change, and the change itself might take a wrong turn. So I really hope if we could talk to the people more often and educate them about the true meaning of change.”***

F-SK-Kadugli-01-A-B

## Improvements in Terms of Peace and Security

The interviewees differ in their assessment of changes in terms of peace and security. 22 respondents, both from South Kordofan and from Darfur, report that combat ended, while six point out that there are no ceasefire agreements and disarmaments as yet, and the militias are still in power.

***“We don't hear gun shots like we used to in the past. Nowadays, a whole month would go by and we would hear not even one gunshot!”***

F-DW-Mornei-14

The Transition Government, on the other hand, would not interfere with some military and intelligence institutions that have a severe history of committing crimes:

***“The negative thing is that the new government is turning a blind eye on some of the governmental institutions, such as the intelligence agency and some of the military institutions. They are still working, despite the grave crimes committed by some of its personnel.”***

M-SK-Sunut-02-A

The fact that military and security forces still keep much power, also in the economy, is generally considered negative by the interviewees. Accordingly, the participation of the military and armed militia—e.g. Hemeti as the leader of the Janjaweed / Rapid Support Forces—in the Transition Government is viewed with scepticism. In fact, it's seen as a risk to the success of the Revolution and a potential obstacle to the peace process:

***“I see that this new government is adopting leniency with the ex-regime's figures, which gave them a space to still try and sabotage the Revolution.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-11

Apart from the controversial role of the military and militias in the peace negotiations in Juba, some interviewees see the risk of the participating rebel factions and individuals working for their own interests. They therefore call for external mediators. However, eight interviewees, both from conflict zones and non-combat areas like Port Sudan and Khartoum, see it as a big step that the peace talks in Juba are taking place at all, the more so as the people involved appear to show a sincere interest in achieving and implementing a Peace Agreement. It might take time, though, as some of them note.

16 interviewees report improvements in personal security for citizens, be it in Port Sudan, Kadugli, Mornei, Sunut, El-Fasher or Khartoum. They said they were not being attacked anymore and were walking in the streets without fear now because they would not get robbed or mugged. Also, people did not receive threats anymore, and soldiers had stopped “moving around harassing people”. However, 13 people from Port Sudan, Nyala, El-Fasher, Kadugli, Deleng, Khartoum and Gineina still report security incidents like harassments, stealing or violence. Some even see an increase, like this interviewee from El-Fasher:

***“The good things are the ceasefire and resolution of the conflicts. As for the bad things, these are the random killings that have started to happen around some of the villages. The people are scared, they don’t feel safe anymore.”***

F-DN-ElFasher-07

Six interviewees report about people, who were previously hiding in the mountains, being able to return home and that roads to the rebel-held areas had opened.

Specific security-related incidents mentioned were new interethnic conflicts in Port Sudan, violent conflict and displacement in Kirinding IDP Camp, Gineina (both December 2019), unspecified unresolved conflicts in some other districts (ElFasher) and ongoing cattle-related conflicts between Baggara and Nuba (Deleng). Two interviewees reported that people still get arrested for nonviolent action or because of how they dress as women.

Interviewees frequently attribute a decrease in personal security to some people misinterpreting or taking advantage of freedom, resulting in chaos:

***“According to my own opinion some of the people misunderstood the meaning of freedom and the civilian government, they took an advantage of that and started stealing and doing illegal things”.***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-03

## Justice and Transitional Justice

With regards to changes in the field of justice and transitional justice, the two main positive developments seen by the interviewees are the toppling of Omar Al-Bashir and handing over his and other ex-regime figures’ cases to the International Criminal Court (ICC). For some, this process goes too slow, but nonetheless people value human rights violations and corruption being tried.

What interviewees are missing is justice for the people who were killed in the massacre at the Sit-In in front of the Military Headquarter in Khartoum on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2019 as well as other killings in the context of the Revolution. They are concerned about the role of the military and specific military figures in the transition process:

***“You can only see Hemeti pushed to the first line [in the peace talks]. Burhan and others are hiding in silence. He wants to be a nice person who brought peace to the conflict areas. He wants to wash his guilt away and show the people in Sudan and internationally that ‘I am the one bringing peace and not the one bringing violence’. And I am sure that there is a hidden agenda, as they violated people in Darfur and during the massacre, and up to today people are being violated. I think they are marketing themselves. But I don’t trust them as they still carry the gun and violate and threaten people, the story is not ended. This is the challenge of the military being involved in the transition, as to my understanding the military has a different business or role to do.”***

F-GE-Berlin-01-A-B

Interestingly, none of the interviewees mentions that, as yet, there is no debate on or approach to a comprehensive transitional justice process in sight at all.

## Democratisation and Representation

19 people observe changes with regards to democratisation and representation. The two most prominent changes in this respect are, on the one hand, the fact that Omar Al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) is no longer ruling, despite NCP-related representatives and security agents still in place, particularly in some rural areas. Secondly, the formation of the Transition Government and the structures built-up to design the transition process in the next two-and-a-half years, especially as a civilian government, belong to the most crucial developments. While there is some concern about the “soft-landing” approach with the involvement of military and militia in the Transition Government, people are also prepared to wait and observe intently. In addition, the efforts of building up and maintaining relations with other countries and actors are pointed to as positive.

Some interviewees note that there is more political dialogue between different official actors and the people. Also, ordinary people are getting more involved because the relevance of political participation gets clearer, as does the conviction that the Sudanese people are the ones who should have the decision-making power. They now organise and engage in critical discourse—as one of the positive results of the Revolution:

***“The people discuss their issues openly and accept each other. Some people were absent from the political scene, but now they are aware of the consequences, and they support the ways of peacefully solving problems. Many of the young people revealed the history and the reality of many parties which take part on the political platform.”***

F-KH-Daressalam-02-A

Interviewees view ongoing political processes as promising, for example reports about the Transition Government having banned the former ruling party NCP and passed a new budget. Some people also commend the increased diversity in governmental positions, including a larger involvement of women. However, others criticise that the representation of women is still too small with less than the 40% that the Transition Government promised, although participation and representation of women in decision-making has started to become more visible. People feel better represented through the increased gender, regional and ethnic diversity in the Transition Government, which they feel picks up the experience of the Revolution as a democratic process where all people were equal.

One perception among interviewees is that the Transition Government does take care of issues important for marginalised ethnicities and women. Others do not feel represented or heard and criticise that rebel groups were still fighting for their own power and not for the people. In addition, the system still appears to be quite centralised, with the margins left behind. Although the military dictatorship is gone, democracy still needs time to arrive in Sudan:



***“The change that happened is still only in Khartoum, and they do not know about our real problems. We need representatives from our province to share with them our issues and matters.”***

F-DN-Village-01-A

As one interviewee puts it:

***“It would be utterly unjust to judge the new government now, it hasn’t been much since they took over. They have so many things on their to-do list, including the dissolution of the deep state which is no small deed. I would at least give them three years and then start to form a solid opinion.”***

F-E-Port Sudan-05

## Voices of Multi-Marginalised Women in the Transition Structures

With the Transition Government in charge of paving the way for future governance structures, their current operations (based here on the interview time in December 2019/January 2020) can be indicative of how future structures might differ from previous or desired ones. In this part of the study, we are exploring how women facing different forms of marginalisation and discrimination can voice their needs and demands to the Transition Government. This includes the question to what extent they have access to decision-making and enjoy transparency about the current political processes. For this purpose, we first shed light on how the transition structures are composed and its members appointed. We then depict the interviewees’ experiences with acquiring information, their interactions with the new government and their current state of representation in the transition process.

### Composition of the Transition Bodies

The interviewed member of the Sovereignty Council describes the Transition Government’s structure at national level as follows:

***“There are three bodies responsible for decision-making in the Transitional Government. The first one is the Supreme Council [Sovereignty Council] whose authorisation is documented in the Constitutional Document. It is its obligation to represent the State and to deal with the peace and security issues. Also, the Consecutive Government and its authorities are documented in the Constitutional Document as well: It has to achieve the goals of the transitional period and give guidance on issues laid down in the Constitutional Document. And the Legislative Council, which [as an interim Parliament] legislates the laws, appoints the authorities and approves the by-laws for the Constitution. So it represents the legislative body and is the supervisor of the Transitional Government. [...] The Supreme Council has by-laws, which are organising its work, how to hold meetings, how to take decisions and how to approve them. As you know, it is a partnership between civilian and the military representatives. But it is not a complicated partnership because it is documented in the Constitutional Document. The nature of the discussions between the two sides is based not on the differences between them, but about the issues, economic matters and security and international relations. So the opinions are not based on military or civilian perspectives. Every member in the Supreme Council has their own opinion. Then, according to the public interest, a decision will be taken.”***

M-KH-Other-01-D

The interviewed government official explained that the Forces for Freedom and Change were those who decided about the Transition Government, the Prime Minister and the civilians in the Supreme Council. Therefore, they will be the ones deciding upon 67% of the Legislative Council members. The remaining 33% will be decided upon by “other forces”, as the Transition Agreement says vaguely. At the same time, he pointed out that issues of power sharing and federalism were not yet finalised. Channels through which the government gets to know about the opinion of the people, which it claims to take into consideration, are named vaguely as “through organisations or groups that then meet officials”. Demonstrations and protests would also be considered as a form of people expressing their opinion and would, therefore, be taken into account.

This process of appointing rather than electing people to a Transition Government “of technocrats”—without a formal process of participation of citizens or the wider civil society—is criticised by some interview respondents. Their perception is that the government appoints their friends without transparency of the process nor the reasons or qualifications for the appointments of specific persons. Interviewees mention that there seems to be no structured transparent process of mapping qualified persons—including those from the margins—or even of putting up criteria of qualifications. Thus, some interviewees point to the lack of a mechanism of accountability. Some respondents also observe that the “deep state” and regional authorities are by far not yet exchanged or replaced by the new structures.

The question remains how the actors of the Revolution—the activists and the Sudanese people in general—can now really be involved in decision-making. One interviewee observed the dynamics when the focus went from needs and issues to representation:

***“I suppose what happened was a political apportionment because the political parties were rooting for the people’s needs at first. But when the representation started, nobody thought about the young people’s opinions, of the resistance committees and youth movement supporters and women’s groups, who were true supporters of the Revolution. They should have at least listened to what they have to say, but that didn’t happen. What happened instead is that parties started promoting and nominating whom they deemed worthy into the Sovereignty Council, and even after they took their chairs, they didn’t bother informing the people in charge of the aforementioned bodies of what happened.”***

F-DW-Mornei-01-A-B

## Acquiring Information about the Transition Process

Six marginalised women from Mornei and Kadugli had heard neither about the Revolution nor about there being a new government. Nine interviewees stated that they had heard or knew that there was a new government, but didn’t know any further details. As an explanation, two mentioned that they were too busy with taking care of their daily needs. Three said they simply did not have the means—like televisions or radios—to get informed.

The most commonly mentioned way of how people learnt about the new government was hearing others talking about it. Some interviewees were even invited to information meetings—in one case by representatives of the new government, in two cases by resistance committees and in one case by a rebel group. One woman reports being asked questions about her demands, but then never heard anything back.

Eight interviewees expressed their wish that the new government should approach people and listen to their needs and demands. Only a few politicians, for example the Ministers of Health and of Education, were seen to travel around and ask people for their needs, demands and opinions. Four interviewees

stated specifically that it was difficult to obtain information, for example on aspects like different positions in the new government, which persons are holding these positions, how the decision-making process is structured or what kind of changes are on the way. They expressed the wish for a better information policy of the Transition Government.

One interviewee voiced scepticism, suggesting that the new government might even comprise members of the old regime in disguise. Others question whether the new government might respond to people's needs at all.

## Concrete Interactions with the New Government

A small number of interviewees indicate that they experienced some sort of interaction with representatives of the new government. While some state that no contact was initiated, others report of "the Government" coming to ask people for their opinions. One woman explains having participated in a workshop in Khartoum's Friendship Hall. A female activist explains how difficult it has been to influence nominations for the State Governors—even for a female activist from a privileged ethnic group in Khartoum:

***"I participated in many nominations. We tried to express our opinions about these nominations, we reached out to Hamdouk, but unfortunately they did not take our opinions in consideration. We [...] saw all the nominations of the Governors of the States, and they were contrary to all the agreement details. We are still protesting against this, and we submit an objection note [...]. My voice has reached the Executive Government, but they said they are not responsible for the choice, but that the Forces for Freedom and Change are responsible. But they are still using the policy of ignorance."***

F-KH-Other-06-A

Further groups, such as resistance committees, have put forward demands like the removal of certain governors or the National Congress Party. The latter was ordered to be dissolved at the end of November 2019. Some interviewees state that they asked representatives of the new government for help on specific issues—which was not granted or they were just being asked to be patient.

Thus, the few interviewed people who had a chance of directly interacting with the new government had similar experiences as before, at least in the initial phases of the Transition Government: that their voices and opinions were not translating into decisions and that their needs-related requests were not met. Similarly, it is pointed out that NGOs have been observed to only come along and ask questions and then leave without doing anything.

## Representation in Transition

The perception of marginalised women and other people facing numerous forms of discrimination and marginalisation as to being represented in the new government varies a lot. 19 interviewees feel that they are not being represented whatsoever (mostly women in Kadugli, Port Sudan and Nyala), with some of them saying that women or their regions were under-represented anyway and that they wanted to speak for themselves:

***"We have no representatives. I would like for us to be our own representatives so that we could speak up for the things that we want all by ourselves."***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-11

18 interviewees, mainly of Kadugli, Mornei, Gineina and ElFasher, assume that there is someone representing them, but they either cannot say this for sure or do not know who this is. Several times, people indicate that their alleged representatives never introduced themselves and asked them for their opinions. Others yet express their conviction that representation will start in the future.

69 interviewees state that they do feel represented, with varying degrees of satisfaction about it. When asked who represented them, most named Prime Minister Hamdouk (36). Others named institutions such as simply the “New Government” or referred to further members of the Transition Government: Sovereignty Council Member Aisha Moussa, Sovereignty Council Member Mohammed Al Taishi, Minister of Justice Nasreldin Abdelbari, but also General Shamselden Al-Kabashi, RSF leader Hemeti or General Burhan.

Eight persons claimed they were not satisfied with their representation. Two of them, from the Nuba Mountains, were not happy with Al-Kabashi. Three interviewees said they were being represented by General Burhan (3) and Hemeti (1) and were—except for one—also not satisfied. 13 respondents explicitly claimed to be content, with a specific mention of Prime Minister Hamdouk as well as Sovereignty Council members Aisha Moussa, Mohammed Al-Taishi and Minister Nasreldin Abdelbari.

Nine participants said that they are being represented by the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), the revolutionaries or the youth and women. Three interviewees mentioned armed movements (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) or the Revolutionary Front representing them. Two interviewees, in turn, named governors or IDP camp delegates as their representatives in national government bodies.

As reasons why people did not feel well represented it was said that the members of the Sovereignty Council were not elected, did not include all parties or served their members’ personal interests only. Furthermore, it was criticised that the Council actually had little impact and that some of its members were either not qualified or not interested in truly representing the people:

***“Although there is someone representing us from our home town, I still don’t think it is good because if they really wanted to listen to our problems and what we have to say, they would have to come here just like you guys. Therefore, I don’t think much of them.”***

F-SK-Kadugli-01-A-B

Others mention that, despite them having been able to express opinions and put forward demands, the government’s reaction was to continuously ask for people to be patient. Consequently, some interviewees state their reluctance in shaping an opinion about the Transition Government and want to observe its behaviour more closely before deciding whether or not to trust it. One further point of criticism voiced, as mentioned beforehand, is that too many people of the previous government are still involved in the Transition Government and that the military has a say in the appointment of positions.

Interestingly, a number of interviewees stress that they felt involved and represented in decision-making during the Revolution, but since the formation of the Transition Government, they have not felt they were heard anymore. So they noted a change from revolutionary times to transition times with regards to their access to decision-making and the capabilities or attitudes of officials towards representing marginalised people.

## Part 4: Influencing the Transition Process

Considering the limited possibilities the interviewees currently perceive as having to influence the Transition Government, there is an impressively high variety of options they consider suitable for accessing decision-making. Many of these centre on channelling their demands and opinions to the government through representatives, as described before. However, as we have learnt in the previous section, most interviewees currently feel not at all or only insufficiently represented.

Other possible ways of influence lie in presenting facts in the form of needs assessments or research projects. On this basis, ideas could be developed and demands formulated that could eventually be submitted to the government as proposals. Other suggestions focus more on self-organising, e.g. through the already existing structures of the Revolution Committees, or promote self-empowerment and self-help:

***“I have nothing to ask [the government] for. We can only do that [develop ourselves] through agriculture and education, we have nothing else but that.”***

F-DW-Mornei-02

Successful interventions thus appear limited, with the military and representatives of the old regime still holding influence, and yet possible, with the new government and a Revolution-based transition process under way. Against this background, this marginalised man argues for civil society to act as a watch-dog and correct the course of transition:

***“Instead of criticising the government’s decisions and demands, we ought to follow it correctly. Then, if they are somehow flawed, insufficient or unacceptable for the citizens, they could say so and then negotiate and come out with reasonable solutions for the matter.”***

M-SK-Sunut-02-A

The interviewed decision-maker emphasises that

***“We have to enact laws which provide equal rights for all organisations and civil community bodies. Before, there were laws which limit the role of some organisations, while others get greater chances. It was unequal. We want the civil organisations in Sudan to work in a good environment, without obstacles, and encourage them to do their role.”***

M-KH-Other-01-D

To do so, besides legal back-up, the government should support civil society organisations financially, like youth, women and research organisations. The decision-maker specifically mentions support for displaced women in rural areas. While he does not specify the actual role of civil society any further, the financing of local NGOs by the government could create the dilemma of dependency and limit their watchdog effectivity. At the same time, international funding may make them dependent in other ways. In the following, we analyse how the interviewees consider unity and cooperation as essential for overcoming discrimination. We further describe the attitudes and processes the respondents view as key for their self-organisation in order to bring about change, as well as the formats and activities they are currently applying or consider using in the future. We particularly look at the interviewees’ ideas related to educational activities. Finally, we round up this chapter by highlighting the interviewees’ perspective that, even in difficult circumstances, there are opportunities for the individual participation of multi-marginalised women. First, however, we display the sense of ownership and experience which the interviewees have gained during the Revolution and which are crucial for them to stay or become active agents of change.

## Sense of Ownership and Experience of the Revolution

Mobilising people to stay or become active agents of change largely depends on their perspective on how change is possible as well as their sense of ownership of change. During the Revolution in which large sections of the population participated, including women and people facing various forms of marginalisation and discrimination, the sense of ownership created a genuine potential for actively designing the future Sudan. During the transition phase, there is a risk that people lose this sense of ownership, due to various factors, thus losing the momentum to be truly participating in designing future structures and systems. It is not easy for all revolutionary activists to shift—at least partly—from a “resistance” mode to a “creation” mode in order to build a new functioning system. This is partly influenced by the need for ongoing resistance due to the ongoing violence against protesters and the mourning of martyrs.

When asked who contributed to the Revolution and the resulting changes that people observed during the last few months, the interviewees mention a wide range of actors—from the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) to youth movements, women, elderly people and kids, armed movements as well as politicians ...

***“[...] in addition to the Sudanese people.”***

F-DS-Nyala-01-A

In short, the whole population contributed to the change. The Revolution was one of the people. This is also reflected when analysing the statements of the marginalised women. 65 of them said they felt part of the ongoing change, with many of them accounting how they participated in demonstrations and actions:

**[Q: “Did you take part in the Revolution?”]**

***“I did. A man was battered a while back by the ‘Janjaweed’: They took away all his money and they shot him, and they broke his legs. For a long period of time, he was hospitalised here in Mornei, so the people refused to go out to the markets until the people who attacked the man were brought to justice. At the time schools were off, the people were persistent until they brought the criminals back to justice and things got back to normal.”***

F-DW-Mornei-02

***“We marched from the camp until we reached the military headquarter here in Nyala. We marched with our kids and elderly, all of us participated, and our voices were heard.”***

F-DS-Nyala-03

Significantly, the 65 interviewees who said they felt part of the change come from all the regions where our interviews took place. They include women in IDP camps and refugees, women in villages and cities, women who do care work at home or do marginalised jobs.

Many emphasise the empowering, educational and uniting effect the Revolution had for them:

***“In the past, we didn’t know anything about anything, but now after the Revolution we kind of gained a perspective on things and we are working together alongside the revolutionaries in order to develop the country.”***

F-DW-Mornei-02

***“All the Sudanese people, women, men, even children participated in the Revolution. Especially the active role of the women was something which all the world witnessed—the Kandaka, which means the strong woman. All the people joined. It is a turning point for the Sudanese people.”***

F-DW-Gineina-08-A

Important were also personal processes of change, such as becoming aware of corruption, sympathising with those participating in actions or even starting to publicly voice support for the Revolution:

***“Not only that, but I feel like I am the change itself. In the past, I felt so alienated from the society, because of discrimination and racism. This is not the case anymore.”***

M-SK-Sunut-02-A

The interviewees describe a strong experience of equality, unity and community during the Revolution, as if it were an image of the vision of the future Sudan. They feel that the Revolution brought forward new principles, unified goals and visions for Sudan, a sense of protection of each other regardless of different backgrounds and a representation of the opinions of marginalised people. This, they hope, will lead to people being less inclined to tolerate and more willing to rise up against injustice.

***“The people shared the same thinking. They cooperated together and protected each other, without paying attention for where you come from. They all acted as if we are all one. The Revolution invented new principles. I think it is very important do document these actions, so we keep them always in mind. During the protest in front of the Military Headquarter of the army, there were conferences and seminars, people who cooked food for the others, singing different cultural songs [, ...]. The people were always together, and we shall never forget this. [...] We lost many friends and many people who were killed. Also there was an attempt of the former regime to separate people and make people differ. They showed some arrested students on TV and said they are followers of rebel leader Abdulwahid [of SLA/M] and they want to ruin Sudan, but the people did not believe them and knew it was a lie.***

***We have to accept our diversity and manage it. There must be representatives from all different cultures and tribes, so everyone feels that this government belongs to us, to all the people. Also, the different cultures are to be presented in the media.”***

F-KH-Daressalam-11

Another interviewee describes:

***“I saw that the young generation is standing up for peace and justice and freedom, and I have been waiting for that for many years. I saw that the fears were gone, and there was unity and light. I saw women being taken seriously and leading the Revolution. I saw for the first time women in the Transitional Government and as a Foreign Minister. I saw Sudan being colourful with happiness, with hope and with powerful people who were ready to give their life to save the country. If you look five or ten years ago, it was a depressing country. But now, you can hear ‘Justice, peace, freedom is our choice’ in every corner. That has been swallowed for many years, and we chose the people in power. If these people don’t carry it well, we will take it and give it to the next ones. We have to keep our eyes open and observe and unite more and more. This is our Revolution. We should take care about it and carry it to the light and keep it up for the next generation.”***

F-GE-Berlin-01-A-B

13 interviewees, on the other hand, said they do not perceive themselves as having been part of the change. Some did not participate in demonstrations out of fear of being silenced or killed, as some active participants were—particularly in marginalised and conflict regions.

***“In Kadugli, as you might already know, the National Congress Party has the upper hand. So most of the youth activities and meetings were in secret, so there weren’t many public events for people’s fear of what might happen if they were ever caught. Most of the participants were either activists or college graduates.”***

F-KH-Other-03-A-B

One referred to God as being the only institution that can truly bring about change, and another one said that she didn’t have the time or energy:

***“We hear about the Revolution, but we had neither time nor energy to participate.”***

**[Q: Why do you think that these people went out on the streets?]**

***“They went out seeking justice and freedom and their lost rights.”***

F-KH-Daressalam-07

Others did not participate because they were not even convinced that they could bring about change—if they could, why would people not have done so beforehand? Others explain that they participated in all actions, but feel disappointed that women as well as marginalised ethnicities and regions were not included in the representation of the Transition Government:

***“No, I don’t feel as part of the change, although we have participated in the movement. We were there at the Headquarter Sit-In, we went out protesting, we raised posters and all. Nevertheless, I don’t feel like part of the change. Maybe because when the representation commenced, nobody bothered to include the marginalised regions nor thought of the problems that they are facing, especially regarding women’s issues. In my opinion, it all seemed artificial. That’s why I don’t feel like an actual part of the change.”***

F-DW-Mornei-01-A-B

One interviewee voiced concern about the risk of the Revolution being stolen. In the opinion of another, it is not finished yet, or it did already get stolen so that a new Revolution was needed. Others see the threat that the former system and the military are fighting the Revolution. Again others perceive the already starting “NGOisation” as a big concern—the tendency to create monetarised NGO structures which may act according to donor requirements rather than people’s needs. People express their hope that martyrs of the Revolution did not die for nothing. However, a number of interviewees are convinced that the unity and resilience of the people is strong enough to protect the Revolution and not let it be stolen:

***“I don’t think so [that there is a danger of NGOisation after the Revolution]. They [the people on the streets] are strong, they are aware, they have been protecting the Revolution for one year, and if there is something like this, again there will be protection—by the people, not the Transitional Government or the military. There are many organisations and neighbouring countries who are trying to steal that, but the people are really aware and awake. They are facing everything and are very clear and powerful and united. If something happens in one place, you will find thousands of people standing up to resist against it. I am not worried about this. In any kind of revolution some try to steal it, but in Sudan since the Revolution, I didn’t see such a thing, as people are clear what they want.”***

F-GE-Berlin-01-A-B



## Unity, Cooperation and Overcoming Discrimination as Key Factors to Bring about Change

Major factors for bringing about change, deemed crucial by a majority of 72 respondents, are unity and cooperation. Unity was mentioned referring to the national level and the need to overcome differences, strengthen equality and protect the Revolution. It was also seen as necessary among marginalised women in order to be heard and promote the changes needed. Unity can be built on the experience of the Revolution. It might include discussions about what people want to say and then nominate people to confer that message to the decision-makers.

***“As women, we have to unite our voices so that they can become much stronger and louder. All the women of Sudan, and especially marginalised women and the women who have been displaced, violated and abused, should unify their demands so as to reach the decision-makers as one.”***

F-DW-Gineina-01-A-B

Unity in organising should be successively achieved across different regions and genders as well as age groups. Ultimately, many interviewees utter the wish for unity as a nation, beyond all ethnic and other divides.

Cooperation and working together, in turn, would not only enhance unity, but also engage in a process of understanding and solving problems together:

***“I was struggling and fighting even before the Revolution. I took up arms against the previous government. In the end, I think it is all about collaboration and about us working together.”***

F-KH-Other-04-A-B

Cooperation on the basis of equality, in turn, could help to overcome discrimination and

***“... to tolerate, forgive and forget.”***

F-KH-Other-04-A-B

Thus, cooperation might also be helpful for a process of reconciliation between different parts of society.

Albeit considering unity and cooperation as important, some interviewees voice the concern that people might never agree due to the diversity of opinions. Others stress the qualities that are important for achieving unity and cooperation. These were seen in talking transparently, displaying and discussing issues openly, speaking up and being loyal to each other.

# Ideas and Key Factors for (Self-)Organising to Bring about Change and Make the Voices of Marginalised Women Heard

## Attitudes

When asked how change can be brought about, interviewees point to a variety of attitudes and preconditions as being fundamental. Freedom of speech is one such vital factor. In addition, change needs to be inclusive, with not only the government, but also the people playing a role in it.

***“We should all help the new government in the development process because they can’t achieve everything alone. And women need to be empowered for real change to happen.”***

F-DS-Nyala-01-A

Thus, women and people from marginalised areas, according to the interviewees, should be involved, as their empowerment constitutes a precondition for real change. Bringing about change should not happen just through NGOs or political parties, as they would not be interested in hearing people’s voices. In this context, several refer to their experiences with the previous government that did not change anything, even when it listened to people’s demands. This connects to the experience of interviewees who, as women, feel they have to bring about change on their own. However, there do not seem to be many self-organised groups as yet, as they are lacking resources for organising.

There are different opinions with regards to whether change comes from the grassroots or from the decision-makers. Many interviewees who assume the latter still consider it important to put pressure on decision-makers through protests and unions in order to influence the process.

The data show different opinions about the role of men in this context. Some interviewees state that socio-political change was mainly dominated by men, and therefore women need to be involved in their circles—either by invitation from male allies or by involving themselves on their own initiative—in order to put forward women’s demands. Another respondent states very clearly that solutions would need to be found without involving men

***“... because this will ruin everything.”***

F-SK-Kadugli-03.

***“The men should include us women in the meetings. We have so many things that we would like to demand from the government, things for our kids and families. (...) We can’t do that, unless they invite us. Men don’t like it when women question their way of doing things, and especially their decisions.”***

F-SK-Kadugli-04

Independent of change being brought forward with or without men and top-down or bottom-up, some interviewees had the experience that even the resistance committees underestimated the role of women and do not include them yet to a satisfying extent. Therefore, as described before, some women activists started reaching out to them and made a point of claiming their space.

## Process

As for the processes through which marginalised women could self-organise and make their voices heard, the interviewees had several overarching ideas. Again, unity is seen as a major factor. When unified and organised, women and people facing discrimination and marginalisation as well as activists would be able to reach decision-makers more effectively.

Meeting and talking is mentioned as essential by a majority. This could take place at local informal or formal gatherings, workshops, conferences or cultural symposiums. They would provide a space for people's problems and needs to be articulated, followed by brainstorming for solutions as well as planning and strategising their implementation. Raising awareness of the people—about their rights, about change being possible, the relevance of their voices and how they could make themselves heard—is also considered as crucial. All in all, these aspects would contribute to the empowerment of women and other marginalised groups who would then become active in different ways, as for example legal actions for the protection of women and girls. The activities could be organised and implemented more effectively when tasks are divided between all involved stakeholders.

When working together, the interviewees mentioned that it was important to be open in speaking their minds and be honest and truthful. This way, activism could serve the common good rather than personal interests. This would also include leaving past conflicts behind. One interviewee describes the organising and empowerment process for marginalised women as follows:

***“It is a chain of things to be done to reach that level, but the beginning is the awareness: The marginalised women shall be aware of their important role and then build social bodies and organisations that take their voice further. For the beginning, we have to set a minimum level of demands so that we can achieve a few goals.”***

F-KH-Other-01-A-B

## Formats and activities

The formats that the interviewees suggest as suitable for bringing about change include, as a first step, awareness-raising activities. They could also comprise of research, strategic thinking and using innovative and creative approaches as well as the organisation of direct nonviolent actions like protests or media work.

***“As marginalised women, we need to be working together much harder, and we need to do that in unity. We should be doing researches and they must reach the people in power and the decision-makers. We should also use social media to get our voices to be heard worldwide.”***

F-KH-Hajj Yousif-01-A-B

Women and other marginalised people could also collect and put forward demands as well as engage in negotiations for their implementation. This could happen by meeting members of government bodies (national and regional) and directly talking to them. Some interviewees point to the current situation as a window of opportunities for women in this respect:

***“We couldn't do that in the past without getting killed or arrested, so we need to make use of it and demand all the things that we have been asking for over and over for the past 30 years. As women who have been through a lot in the past, this is our time now.”***

F-SK-Deleng-01

Confirming the importance of involving marginalised women, the interviewed decision-maker suggests concentrating on legal protection and balancing out marginalisation in a focused and prioritised development process. This could improve the standard of living for women, especially in conflict regions, albeit on the basis of peace being achieved first. Furthermore, he suggests conferences and direct dialogue with regards to making sure marginalised women get their rights.

However, he also stresses:

***“Firstly, the marginalised women have to organise themselves. For example your group [Bana], and the thousands of employed women, are platforms which the women can use to organise themselves and to specify exactly what they want and how to achieve this. Secondly, in order to fulfil its duties during the transitional period, the Government must allocate resources for these institutions, so that they can be strong, perform their missions and contribute to the establishment of legislative and executive institutions. The Government must adhere to the 40% share of women in decision making. Thus, it could be guaranteed that they consider the women rights and issues in their decisions. (...) Often, there are individuals who speak on behalf of women, but this cannot replace the marginalised women. After they are organised and supported, the marginalised women can raise their voice to the decision-makers. (...) No one can represent the woman, but the woman herself.”***

M-KH-Other-01-D

Further formats of participation that were mentioned referred to media channels such as social media, radio, journals or the internet, in general. Helping poor people through income-generating projects and organisations, so that they could make a living, was considered another way of bringing about change.

## Ideas and Key Factors to Bring about Change, Related to Education

Education is identified by 31 interviewees as a key field of change, since it fundamentally shapes how people perceive their current situation and their opportunities of engaging in change processes. It can thus widen the spiral of empowerment. Education is not only understood in the context of formal schooling, but also includes non-formal ways, i.e. any process in which comprehension of a certain situation and options to act are being shaped. Thus, education is perceived as both the responsibility of the government and of the population. Accordingly, parents talking to their children is considered an important educational process.

Understood in this way, education is a field where women and people facing different forms of marginalisation can take initiatives themselves without dependence on state or non-state institutions. The interviewees mention they would particularly like to involve themselves in raising awareness in marginalised areas and among people with little or no formal education, with a focus on women. They could thereby rely on their own areas of expertise, such as one interviewee who graduated from the faculty of medical laboratories suggested she could educate others on health and medical issues. Alternatively, they could focus on specific topics of relevance, such as seminars particularly on women’s rights.

***“I wish for all the people to be aware of their rights and duties, because to not know can be of great use for enemies to take advantage of you and to take away your freedom. I also hope for justice and peace because we all make mistakes. We need to raise people’s conscience and awareness because we can’t afford to make the same mistakes twice.”***

F-DW-Mornei-03

One interviewee suggests a popular education effort with regards to socio-political changes, carried out by the Revolutionary Committees:

***“To spread awareness among the people, through workshops and discussions. The activists should do this in all neighbourhoods.”***

F-KH-Daressalam-09

Topics the interviewees consider relevant to raise awareness about also include those centred around spreading information and those connected to important values and attitudes. It is considered vital, for instance, to spread information about politics and the current situation in the country in general, including the new government, its agendas and policies. In addition, people should become aware of local languages, cultures and religions in Sudan. Giving this information is considered relevant because awareness of the current situation is a prerequisite for becoming active in processes of change. As became clear above, there are relevant numbers of people who do not have access to this kind of information in the first place.

Furthermore, the interviewees plead for raising consciousness about racism and tribalism, its detrimental effects on the society and on peace, as well as about democracy, democratisation processes and the rights and duties of citizens. Connected to this are further messages that interviewees would like to get across, e.g. that the margins in Sudan are as important as the centre, that diversity should be considered as valuable, that the people should promote a culture of peace and that it is important to renounce verbal and physical violence. Teachers should be more respected for their important role in society, for instance with referral to the killing of teacher Ahmad el-Khair during the Revolution. Awareness might also be raised in a more philosophical and ethical discussion about the meaning of freedom in terms of intellectual, not personal freedom.

Not the least, interviewees further emphasised the importance of raising awareness about the meaning and opportunities of change, the importance of the role of each individual and the fact that change needs time. Therefore, patience and perseverance are important. In addition, interviewees suggest capacity building measures so that people can improve their skills, e.g. with regards to agriculture, for bringing about change. All in all, education, awareness raising and capacity building of women are considered all the more relevant as women are the ones who spread knowledge, attitudes and capacities to the whole society.

## Individual Participation Processes and Possibilities

Since formal processes for influencing decision-making and change as well as genuine representation are currently not available to a satisfying extent, the interviewees developed a range of ideas for taking change into their own hands. If the government does not take care of the necessary developments, people have to—and are able to—do this on their own.

***“As a single woman, I will just keep speaking for myself. I truly believe that I am all alone, that no one can help me. If there is salvation, I will have to bring it to myself by myself.”***

F-SK-Kadugli-02

The different options that came to the interviewees' minds or that they already implement range from impacts in their personal sphere—like taking care of their daughters and enabling their education (ideally before them getting married)—to taking part in awareness raising work themselves. This could refer to the culture of peace, anti-racism, human rights and legal issues, health related issues etc. Moreover, especially since freedom of expression is more guaranteed than previously, people can speak up and present their own needs, demands, visions, experiences, ideas and points of view to the society through social media or the internet and websites in general as well as through arts and science. Alternatively, they could do so by volunteering work, taking part in interviews, getting involved in activist groups like Bana or in political parties. Furthermore, they think that change is shaped by organising and participating in workshops or raising voices on different platforms, but at the same time also by starting to go through one's personal sphere and changing one's own attitudes and behaviours.

***“We should all try to have some more meetings and gatherings to talk about our shared problems and discuss and maybe find some solutions to some of them. I think that we could come up with some solutions to problems like transportation and the scarcity of the bread.”***

F-E-Port Sudan-03

***“Personally speaking, I'm perfectly capable of supporting and motivating my home town village. We can organise and work with youth and take ideas from both individuals and groups. We can also inspect and study people's prospects and expectations of the transitional period, so that we can develop much further and achieve more.”***

F-KH-Other-02-A-B

Some of the interviewed women, however, said that they feared being rejected if they put forward their ideas and that they needed education or basic provisions to create the changes they seek.



*Photo: Creating a seat at an upcycling workshop of Bana with women of Mornei IDP Camp, West Darfur.*

## Chapter 7:

# From Analysis to Action

## Synthesis—Summary and Strategic Conclusions

---

It is our perspective as “Bana Group for Peace and Development” that if the Sudanese Revolution of 2019 wants to reach its goals successfully, its major demands of “Freedom—Peace—Justice” need to be fulfilled for those most marginalised in terms of ethnicity/racism, gender and class. Empowerment of the marginalised themselves is key in this process—building on their own capacities and human rights, rather than victimising them. This study, therefore, provides the opportunity for us to better understand what the life realities of women facing intersecting forms of marginalisation and their related needs and demands really are. In addition, through the analysis of the previous chapter, we can have a structured comprehension of the current experience of multi-marginalised women with regards to the ongoing changes in the transition process as well as their visions and ideas for inclusive future governance structures and possibilities to influence the transition process—and, at the end of the day, their life realities.

The purpose of this exploratory participatory action research, however, is not only to gain the abovementioned knowledge and insight. As our mission is to spread the culture of peace and support multi-marginalised women all over Sudan to have their needs met, the study is supposed to serve as a basis for groups like us as Bana to refine the goals of our work as well as the strategies and actions through which we want to reach them. As the analysis is based on the sample of persons we interviewed, we cannot generalise the results for the whole population or even the whole marginalised population of Sudan in a statistical sense. Still, we do assume that the results reflect aspects and dynamics that are indeed present and relevant in the whole country and especially the regions where we conducted the interviews.

After analysing the data we gathered (see Chapter 6), we therefore engaged in a process of reflection and interpretation of the results of our analysis. In this chapter, we go through the research question and its sub-questions. For each of them, we first summarise the main results of the data analysis and then present our interpretation and conclusions as well as the implications for strategies and activism that we see. We then also add some overall reflections.



## Sub-Question 1: What Are the Needs and Demands of Women in Sudan, Especially those Facing more than one Form of Discrimination or Marginalisation?

In the analysis of our data, we find that the multi-marginalised Sudanese women who were interviewed face different intersecting sets of discrimination and marginalisation. The ones most frequently named correspond to the main dimensions of the “Matrix of Domination” referred to in Chapter 2. They hence are mainly related to gender, ethnicity/racism, and class/economic status, in addition to war and displacement.

**In the following section, on each of these fault-lines, we**

- acknowledge some key developments that happened since the Revolution and the interviews and hence could not yet be reflected in the analysis
- relate it to the systems analysis that we depicted in Chapter 2
- share our observations and interpretations with regards to the experiences of marginalisation and discrimination of multi-marginalised Sudanese women as well as their needs and demands based on the analysis
- share our strategic conclusions on what needs to be done and prioritised—and by whom
- share our suggestions for first steps in this regard, particularly what marginalised women could do.

# Gender-Related Discrimination and Marginalisation, Needs and Demands

## Observations and Interpretations

### Noting that since the Revolution,

- the Public Order Law has been abolished, so that for example women and their children can now travel without their husband's approval
- FGM has been legally banned
- a national plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security has been approved by the Ministry of Social Welfare
- women have been more than before involved in the negotiations of the Peace Agreement in Juba of 2019/2020 and are generally more visible
- despite the social, economic and political barriers in this post-revolution transition period, marginalised women have much greater chances than previously that their suggestions will be heard and that they can participate in decision-making on all levels and procedures
- there lies a high potential in networking with feminist support groups or networks, in the openness on the side of the Transition Government, in the rise of the women's quota in the Legislative Council (Parliament) from 25% to 40% and the focus of international organisations on the participation of women
- and further noting that this issue is addressing Bana's systems map's Key Driving Factors of "Gender Inequality" as well as partly also "Unjust Distribution of Power and Resources", "Ethnic/Racist Discrimination", "Bad Legal System/Bad Content of Laws" as well as "Bad Socialisation" that is reinforcing cultural violence.

### We observe that

- gender-based violence and discrimination against multi-marginalised women in Sudan is severe and happens at all levels of society in the public and private sphere, with women at the same time doing a lot of the care work for free and in dependency on men
- gender-based violence and discrimination is deeply entrenched in society and community habits. Therefore, we assume that changing the status of women in private and public settings will need changes of cultural practices and would need to be based on women empowering themselves, representation in decision-making as well as legal protection and awareness-raising among all parts of society, including men
- women in conflict zones or in situations of inter-ethnic conflict (including conflict over land between farmers and pastoralists,) are particularly affected by violent conflict, including with regards to livelihood related issues—due to their role in care work and subsistence farming, and also as they are often the bread winners in the families where men have been killed, but also due to them facing a higher risk of sexualised violence

- marginalised women, however, do not focus their demands on the severe issues they are facing due to their genders, but rather on issues for the benefit of their society and communities, namely peace/security and humanitarian issues (like healthcare and education). We assume that this may be due to their vulnerability in the context of armed conflicts as well as their responsibility for undervalued care work in their families.

### **We assume that**

- implementing changes with regards to the Public Order Regime, FGM and a 40% participation of women in political representation will be particularly difficult to be reached for marginalised women, especially in the (former) war zones
- access for marginalised women and girls to safety measures and political participation, therefore, will need special provisions and efforts, e.g. gender-sensitive policing, women's shelters, translation to and from local languages or specific capacity-building
- participation of marginalised women is all the more difficult due to lack of access to education and resources.

### **Strategic Conclusions: Realising Gender-Equality**

Based on the above, we draw the following strategic conclusions:

- Access to power and jobs: To make the 40% representation more likely to become practice in governmental as well as civil society entities all over the country, with access of marginalised women to represent themselves, translation for local languages should be made available wherever possible. In addition, capacity-building about political processes with an empowerment approach should be provided. Furthermore, women need to have equal access to education and the related jobs. Accessible and needs-related education offers (both formal and informal) should be increased.
- Establishment of a Women's Council: We propose to establish a Women's Council which translates information and demands into the decision-making processes. It should be organised starting from the neighbourhood level on to the administrative level, then to the State and finally the national level. This should ensure the participation of women in decision-making throughout the whole process, and it should be working in accordance with the Ministry of Social Welfare.
- Recognition of care work: Care work in the homes and families needs to be more recognised and better distributed. This could, for example, include measures to ensure independent health and pension insurance or support for women who do this kind of care work.
- End to gender-based discrimination and violence: The current legal steps to abolish the Public Order Law and FGM need to become practice all over the country, as does an end to underage and forced marriage. Rape survivors should be protected by law and get support, and resulting children should be protected from discrimination and get legal papers. If a woman wants to, abortion should be legal and safely available in cases of rape. All further necessary provisions should be made, so that the CEDAW-Agreement can be signed.
- Sensitivity and protection: Some further practical measures could include specific gender-related training and gender desks at local police stations as well as anonymous protected shelters for women who face or are threatened by severe domestic violence.

- Legal protection: Also, we would welcome the Social Welfare Minister to put up a protective law that particularly helps to support, empower and include multi-marginalised women and which includes a specific focus on protection with regards to ethnic and family conventions and habits. This law will need to include mechanisms of enforcement.
- Implementing UN Security Resolution 1325: The UN Security Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security should be set as a top priority and implemented more thoroughly, with specific involvement of multi-marginalised women.
- Sensitisation of all sections of society: This could be done via awareness raising measures and media messaging. Also, gender sensitivity should be included as compulsory into the national school curricula. Men should be extensively and systematically approached. The feminist movements in the past neglected to raise the awareness of one half of the society due to them “being men”. This resulted in intransigence on the men’s side, which adversely affected the gender conflicts, biases and privileges, and the feminist movements were brutally attacked more than ever before. Both men and women should be advocated for equally so that an equal society could emerge.

### **Suggested first steps marginalised women can take**

- We could bring these issues forward by concerted awareness raising and nonviolent action campaigns of marginalised women in different parts of the country, in alliance with existing networks and with allies from the centre and among men. While doing this, we could build on related slogans of the Revolution.
- In addition, self-help initiatives can help to protect women in danger and also support job conversions for FGM practitioners and sex workers.

# Ethnicity-Related and Racist Discrimination and Marginalisation, Needs and Demands

## Observations and Interpretations

### Noting that since the Revolution,

- representation of different regions and ethnic groups is more widely discussed and also visibly improving in terms of involvement, awareness and participation in government
- there is a law that allows local languages as teaching languages at schools (even if not yet applied)
- this issue is addressing Bana's systems map's Key Driving Factors of "Ethnic/Racist Discrimination" as well as partly also "Unjust Distribution of Power and Resources", "Bad Socialisation", thus reinforcing cultural violence.

### We observe that

- racism based on colour and ethnicity is deeply entrenched in Sudanese society, which results in daily frustrations in subtly and blatantly racist interactions, severe implications on access to services, jobs, positions of power and sometimes also direct violence and even war
- this fault-line includes different levels: ethnicity, particularly, but not only, along the "Afro-Arab divide" among the different ethnic groups, along colour of skin (which can differ even within a family), along the region or place a person lives in—with the capital Khartoum as the centre and the (former) war zones and particularly IDP camps as the margins—and along whether people live in a city or village or observe a nomadic lifestyle.

### We assume that

- this racism is learnt and passed on from generation to generation and internalised both on the side of so-called "Arab" as well as so-called "African" groups, resulting in a deep level of mistrust
- this dynamic has been starting through centuries of slavery systems and colonisation and was strengthened by the previous regime's approach to depict Sudan as an "Arab" Muslim country, with everyone "non-Arab" and non-Muslim as outsiders.

### We conclude that

- ethnic and cultural diversity in Sudanese society is not seen as a wealth, but as a system of privilege and marginalisation.

## Strategic Conclusions: Building a Society Based on Freedom, Peace and Justice

- Unlearning racism: To counter everyday life experiences of racism, there should be a popular education and awareness raising effort, informally based on multi-ethnic trainers or popular educator teams and/or social media clips. This effort would aim at supporting processes to “unlearn racism” and related forms of discrimination and perceiving the diversity of Sudanese society as an asset. This may also be connected with efforts of transitional justice and nonviolent conflict resolution.
- Sensitive school materials and activities: School materials should depict the Sudanese diversity as a wealth and include different ethnic and gender perspectives as well as inter-religious understanding and tolerance. Contents should be relevant to different marginalised settings (including for children growing up in the countryside and in IDP camps) and reflect different perspectives on the conflict narratives in Sudan. Stereotypes should be avoided and an intersectional sensitivity mainstreamed. Where possible, school and cultural exchanges could also help young people to make friends across ethnic and conflict lines.
- End to discrimination and related harassment and attacks: As a first step, there should be stronger laws and legal prosecution of ethnic discrimination, particularly in the conflict areas. Complaint desks should be available at official institutions with regards to this, and police and legal personnel should be particularly trained and sensitised.
- Access to educational institutions, jobs and positions independently of ethnicity and skin colour: Favouritism should be ended. Instead, transparent, qualification-based procedures should be introduced and legally required.
- ID Cards should not show the ethnic group any longer, as all citizens should just focus on being Sudanese.
- Guarantee of freedom: Freedom of diversity, freedom of culture, freedom of religion should all be guaranteed. The implementation of using local languages in regional schools and at the national level should be promoted and protected, and people from all colours and backgrounds as well as cultures should be represented on TV and in other media.
- “Margins first”: Any efforts with regards to humanitarian aid and development will need to go firstly to the margins—and within the margins to the multi-marginalised persons (IDPs, villages, women etc.). The purpose is not to make them feel weaker as “victims”, but to serve their right to have their needs met. This way, the margins can catch up with others (consider the “Do No Harm” approach). (Multi-)marginalised people should be on the driver’s seat of those efforts to empower them.

## Suggested first steps marginalised women can take

- By speaking up in the national media and in mixed ethnic settings, e.g. of trainings etc., we as multi-marginalised women can contribute to popular anti-racism education.
- Again, nation-wide campaigns with a margin’s perspective can foster individual issues.

# Class-Related Discrimination and Marginalisation, Needs and Demands

## Observations and Interpretations

### Noting that since the Revolution,

- the Transition Government has made efforts to ensure that international support for the country is granted and managed to get Sudan taken off the US list of countries that support terrorism
- the Transitional Government has started to partly disown previous government officials, increased the salary of teachers and has started different infrastructure projects
- however, inflation is still sky-rocketing and the availability of bread, petrol, medicine and other necessities challenged even more, increased by the COVID 19 pandemic and the floods of mid-2020, with actors and allies of the former government elites playing a negative part, too
- the current generation of school students being at a disadvantage due to schools having been closed for almost one-and-a-half years by now, firstly during the Revolution and then the COVID 19 pandemic. Radio lessons are being organised to counter this, however budgets are short for the necessary re-arranging of school subjects and contents
- this issue is addressing the Bana's systems map's Key Driving Factors of "Unjust Distribution of Power and Resources" as well as to some extent "Ethnic/Racist Discrimination".

### We observe that

- the interviewees place a very high priority on education—almost as high as the fulfilment of basic humanitarian needs and livelihood itself—which leads us to the conclusion that marginalised women see a very high value in education and the chances it brings to improve one's own and the family's and community's lives
- on the other hand, that the lower access of women, so-called "African" ethnic groups and people from the countryside to education reinforces class-related marginalisation and poverty
- there is a close tie between ethnicity and class, likely resulting in a higher likelihood of poverty for people from so-called "African" ethnic groups
- while interviewees differ in their suggested path to economic stability (be it protectionism or free-market economy with international support), there is wide consensus that the approach to development and economic stability should focus on fulfilling the basic needs of all Sudanese people
- Sudanese multi-marginalised women have placed healthcare as a top priority even before the Corona pandemic, and that we as Bana have placed the potential threat of spreading diseases already as a major problem in our systems map of 2018.

## We assume that

- poverty looks different in the city and in the countryside, with making those living directly from the land more vulnerable to climate change and land-related conflict which can both lead to an increase in poverty
- the fact that Sudanese multi-marginalised women have placed healthcare as a top priority, even before the Corona pandemic hit, shows that healthcare was already less than basic beforehand, especially for marginalised women
- accordingly, the current pandemic brings the healthcare system to a collapse, hitting the people— especially at the margins - extremely drastically
- with regards to the economic situation in Sudan and the lack of healthcare facilities, people with disabilities will face an additional risk of severe hardship and likely poverty, especially if they belong to marginalised ethnic groups and regions.

## Strategic Conclusions: Ending Discrimination and Marginalisation in Education and on the Job Market, Stabilisation of the Economy and Fostering Climate Justice

- Accessible, affordable and inclusive education for all: Education should be free or at least affordable for marginalised people, with a particular focus on girls. Relevant adult education should be available and supported for marginalised women, also in local languages or dialects. All universities should accept people from all ethnic groups. Contents should be inclusive, intersectionally mainstreamed and include peace education.
- End of discrimination on the job-market: Discrimination on all levels of the job market and in all fields, based on ethnicity, gender and political conviction/affiliation, should be ended. Marginalised people and especially women should be strengthened in their position to provide livelihood for their families, e.g. through supporting sustainable agriculture, entrepreneurship, capacity building and through providing loans and emergency backup schemes.
- “Margins first” (see also under “ethnicity”): The provision of humanitarian needs and infrastructure should be improved, starting from the margins, with a particular focus on water as well as the availability and affordability of healthcare (including international support and medicine availability), but also transport, electricity and waste disposal. These efforts should focus on ecological and social sustainability and self-sufficiency both of the country and the people to provide for their own livelihood.
- Stabilisation of the economy in order to end price rises: Economic reform needs to focus on all people’s needs, not just some people’s greed, and extraction of natural resources. In this context, the Transition Government should build upon needs-based economy models and practices that are already known in Sudan (like the “Nafir” approach) or what Latin American indigenous social movements have put forward, like “Buen Vivir” or “Sumak kawsay” (a good life for all)<sup>30</sup>. Vital efforts must include re-directing security spending to civilian causes, redistribution of resources away from the hands of the elites under the previous regime and a stop to selling off Sudan’s wealth of resources and land to international actors instead of the local people benefitting. Furthermore, international debt relief and international financial support will be key to Sudan standing on its own feet. Special attention should be given to the agricultural sector, which feeds most people in Sudan and is very vulnerable e.g. to climate change.

30 More information for example at: Gudyas, Eduardo and Oliver Balch (2013). *Buen vivir—the social philosophy inspiring movements in South America*. The Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/buen-vivir-philosophy-south-america-eduardo-gudynas>, last accessed: 1.12.2020



- Combatting climate change: Taking into account the issue of climate change and the connected danger of a decrease of livelihoods, especially for farmers and pastoralists, and even the risk of further climate-related wars in Sudan, there should be local, national as well as international reforestation efforts (e.g. in the context of the Great Green Wall Initiative of the African Union<sup>31</sup>). Climate change adaptation programmes should be run with regards to needs and raising the awareness especially of local farmers and pastoralists, including a conflict transformation perspective. When building up infrastructure, regenerative energies like solar energy, as well as sustainable agrarian schemes, like organic agriculture or application of permaculture principles together with traditional methods, should be a focus. Environmental and climate justice should be part of the Transitional Government's policies and environmental laws, a dependency on agro-industry should be avoided. Any international business as well as governmental or non-governmental actors who involve themselves in Sudan should do so on standards of zero emissions and other environmentally sustainable practices. Furthermore, highly industrialised countries should not only strictly observe policies of climate justice, but also pay reparations for the damages climate change is causing in so-called "least developed countries" like Sudan. Such payments should be made directly to the victims in those countries.
- Special assistance for challenged people: Inclusive support of marginalised people with disabilities should be improved.

### **Suggested first steps marginalised women can take**

- Self-help initiatives and collectives help entrepreneurship of women to flourish. Nafir`'s (practical work for the benefit of all) can be a starting point for this. Let us use sustainable technologies and approaches!
- Campaigns of marginalised women in these fields could include international actors as addressees.

---

31 <https://www.greatgreenwall.org/about-great-green-wall>, last accessed: 30.11.2020

# Discrimination and Marginalisation, Needs and Demands Related to War and Displacement

## Observations and Interpretations

### Noting that since the Revolution,

- peace talks in Juba demonstrated a serious effort towards more inclusion of marginalised women than during previous peace talks
- all fighting being stopped and all wars at least frozen, and rebel groups coming to a celebration of this in Khartoum in mid-November 2020, signifying the war to be frozen
- women and men have been responding to continuing security incidents in Nyertiti and other places in Darfur, with sit-ins and protests, some of them even being killed in this context
- this issue is addressing Bana's systems map's Key Driving Factor of "War/Violent Conflict".

### We observe that

- marginalised women see peace and security as central for an improvement of their situation and of the situation of Sudan as a whole.

### We assume that

- in conflict areas, all other marginalisation dynamics described above would be exacerbated—including sexualised violence due to a lack of legal prosecution and as a weapon of war
- soldiers and rebels would need other means of income, if they are to lay down their guns—therefore approaches of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) as well as effective gun control are key
- the long-lasting wars have created big rifts in Sudanese society as well as trauma-dynamics within individuals and communities
- all strategies countering climate change and fostering conflict sensitive adaptation are also measures to prevent violent conflict and war.

## Strategic Conclusions: Foster Peace, Security, Trust and Healing

- Improving security in the conflict areas and areas where land conflicts are prevalent is of highest priority. Conflict sensitive adaptation to climate change as well as all measures to minimise climate change help to prevent violent conflict and a relapse to war.
- A successfully implemented Peace Agreement should lead to improved security of marginalised people, including a voluntary return of IDPs and refugees. Peace-making processes should involve the different local communities including women (referring also to UN Security Council Resolution 1325)
- On top of this, there should be broad disarmament and removal of landmines.
- Military and security spending should be drastically reduced, and funds instead be used for sustainable development, healthcare and education, including DDR (demobilising, disarmament, reintegration) efforts and a conversion of jobs from military/security to civilian jobs.
- Safety should be increased, especially for women. Any form of gender-based violence needs to be strongly deterred by law and punished accordingly. Sensible and sensitive policing could help in this respect.
- War-related trauma and mistrust need to be addressed through transitional justice, trust-building and collective and individual healing approaches.
- We welcome the involvement of the UN mission to help keep peace and security and to monitor the government's actions.
- Peace education should be part of formal and informal education (see also the Strategic Conclusions with regards to class)

## Suggested first steps marginalised women can take

- We as marginalised women (and women on all sides of conflict) can raise our voice to say that we are tired of war and demand peace—including methods like “Hakamat songs for peace”.
- In groups and workshops, trauma-sensitive approaches and elements of self-care (for example using the arts or appropriate physical exercises) can support (re-)building the resilience of people who had faced traumatic experiences.

# Intersecting Aspects, mostly with regards to the Political System

## Observations and Interpretations

### Noting that since the Revolution,

- the new cabinet is mainly civilian
- representation of women and different regions is being included into the new system
- the Ministry of Justice has made efforts to prosecute Omar Al-Bashir as well as those who have conducted the massacre of 3rd June 2019
- freedom is improving, and government structures are getting more organised
- this issue is addressing Bana's systems map's Key Driving Factors of "Unjust Distribution of Power and Resources" as well as to some extent "Ethnic/Racist Discrimination".

### We observe that

- while the interviewees have not placed much importance on the lack of freedom and participation as a marginalisation experience, they have still made it a point that participation and freedom of speech are basic preconditions for social change to the better
- transitional justice is not placed very highly on the agenda, whereas unity and the will to seeing a change to the better is being frequently mentioned.

### We assume that

- it may still be important to follow up with transitional justice to avoid (predominantly male) spoilers
- while there are a few changes in terms of civilians holding power at the national level, it may be much harder to achieve changes at state and local levels as well as inside the institutions. Members of the old regime will need to be addressed specifically to avoid them to become spoilers.
- the neighbourhood and resistance committees are a promising bottom-up structure of empowerment and social change. However, we notice that multi-marginalised women are underrepresented in them too, and they hardly exist in the countryside.
- representation will be more difficult to achieve if people do not speak Arabic, have to do care work for big families and/or have less education. Thus, they need special provisions to participate, as those mentioned above under "gender".

## Strategic Conclusions: Introducing Intersectional Representation and Mainstreaming, (Transitional) Justice and Protecting the Revolution

- The new system should use an intersectional approach to representation: Reflecting the fault-lines of gender, ethnicity/racism, class as well as possibly being affected by war and disability. Special provisions should be made to guarantee access for representatives from these groups.
- Establishment of justice and rule of law: There should be fair trials and rule of law, applied to all ethnic groups. There should be a scheme for transitional justice, and both war crimes and torturers as well as the killings during the Revolution should be prosecuted.
- Protect the Revolution: Representatives of the old regime need to be removed from office, also in the regions. Riches they have acquired unjustly will need to be returned to the people. Campaigns in this regard could, for most topics, address not only the Transitional Government, but also international actors.
- Self-organisation: Marginalised women need to organise and involve themselves in bottom-up structures of social change, e.g. by building their own committees and empowerment groups and/or by actively joining existing neighbourhood committees, parties and groups.

### Suggested first steps marginalised women can do

- We as marginalised women can organise exchange meetings, self-help and peer coaching groups as well as empowerment committees to raise our voice and participate actively in shaping society.

## Intersecting Conclusions

All in all, we understand that the multi-marginalisation of marginalised women on the lines of gender, ethnicity and class, especially in the contexts of war, is extremely severe and leaves those affected with feelings of isolation and powerlessness.

To address these connected intersecting issues, overlapping measures will be needed, as for example:

- Building on the fantastic awareness-rising processes at many levels during the Revolution, there should be efforts to further increase and facilitate intersectional anti-discrimination sensitivity at all levels and in all entities of society. Concrete strategies should be developed at all these instances to foster the opportunities and reduce the discrimination of multi-marginalised people. They are required e.g. with regards to decision-making power, budgeting, protection from violence, use of language and cultural references, access to education, health, jobs, etc. This could greatly improve social justice.

Some further detailed examples or approaches:

- Awareness-raising approaches that transform a culture of violence into a culture of peace—be it on the level of violent conflict, ethnic discrimination or gender-based violence.
- Marginalised women need to empower and organise themselves for their voices to be heard and to improve their situation. Accordingly, they should network and build groups from the grassroots up to the national level. The official representation systems need to be structured in an accessible and intersectionally sensitive way, and the official governance actors as well as the marginalised women's groups should be linked through communication and feedback mechanisms.
- Sustainable development has to start with focusing on basic needs at the margins and has to be sensitive to the multi-marginalised, using an intersectional approach.
- A shift from military security to human security could lead to “a just peace”: Human security is based on “freedom from want” (freedom from hunger, thirst, avoidable sickness etc., in a way linking up with needs-based economic and development approaches as the ones mentioned above) and “freedom from fear” (everyone having their human rights met). Military spending could be redirected accordingly, e.g. to healthcare, water access and education availability and affordability, with a clear focus on marginalised regions and women.
- Intersectional approaches should be used to develop anti-discrimination policies as part of implementing and protecting human rights. These policies should be reflected in the political programmes and structures of all ministries/fields and with stakeholders like community leaders, police, schools etc.

### Suggested first steps marginalised women can do

- While empowering ourselves and speaking “truth to power” at different levels, at the same time we can “walk the talk” ourselves: At our meetings and organising processes, we can also reflect about intersections of discrimination among ourselves and in society and develop solidarity strategies how to counter them.

## **Sub-Question 2: How Do the Governance Structures Resulting from the Transition Process Need to Look Like, so that they Are Inclusive and Ensure that Marginalised Women’s Needs and Demands Are Continuously Reflected and Met?**

### **Summary of Results of Analysis**

Given the intersecting experiences of marginalisation and discrimination of women in Sudan, what would the interviewees like to see instead? The political vision of an inclusive society which the participants in our study strive for is one of “Freedom—Peace—Justice”, as many encountered already in a kind of visionary experience during the Revolution.

According to the interviewees, an inclusive system would mean that all segments of society (genders, regions, ethnic groups, economic classes) have access to and are represented in decision-making structures. Such a system of governance would need to be based on participatory decision-making in some form of a democratic system, with civilian and without military representatives at all levels. The resistance committees, as a bottom-up structure, are being mentioned by many as trust-worthy and helpful in this respect and possibly could be built upon. Some also favour a strong role of the traditional leadership system.


At the same time, many interviewees emphasise that marginalised women should speak for themselves and represent themselves. This implies that they should have access to decision-making positions, be it in a representative system or a council based system. At the same time, marginalised women need to organise themselves in civil society initiatives, like unions and other group. There need to be entry points and forums for those in the decision-making process to discuss their needs and demands with regional and national decision-making bodies and reach concrete solutions at all levels. Also, decision-makers should frequently go to marginalised areas and listen to the demands of different sections of society (including women and different ethnic groups).

### **Observations and Interpretations**

- While interviewees wish for them to be visited and listened to, they do not express the need for holding those in power accountable for what they do with regards to their needs and demands.
- The interviewees show themselves aware that while a process of “empowerment by inclusion into official structures”—e.g. through representation at all levels of governance—is important, processes of “self-empowerment” are at least equally important.

## Strategic Conclusions: Mechanisms Ensuring Accountability and Participation

- There would need to be a functioning system of feedback between the margins and the centre: Those in power need to listen to those at the margins in order to understand their needs and act upon them. At the same time, the power-holders need to be held accountable by the people in order to see whether or not they did act upon the needs of the people. For this, local councils should also bear more weight, and accessibility of decision-making processes should be improved for multi-marginalised women, implementing the women’s quota of a minimum of 40% on all levels.
- In the spirit of self-empowerment rather than being empowered by others, while representation is an important aspect, marginalised women should focus on self-organising—locally but also for example in a Sudan-wide bottom up civilian Women’s Council or Committee. This Women’s Council would be a parallel civil-society structure alongside the official structures, from the grassroots of society, its neighbourhoods and villages, up to the national level, based on a rota system of representation. Bana proposes such a structure and would like to participate in it, too.



- Multi-marginalised women will be speaking for themselves rather than being represented by others (e.g. other women or men from the same region/ethnicity or civil society activists with privileged backgrounds).
- Civil society or international actors should act as allies, create spaces and “pass on the microphone”, rather than speaking on behalf multi-marginalised people.
- Providing translations from and to local languages—and if possible also into sign language—should become a standard procedure for accessibility, wherever needed.

### First steps marginalised women can take

- Develop a vision of your society and community, as you hope it would look like in ten years from now. Look at it in great detail: What has changed? What is there (rather than what is not there anymore)? What has been preserved? How has it been achieved? Paint a picture of this and share it with other marginalised women around you. Perhaps you can even find a joint picture or vision!
- Think of first steps leading to this joint vision. Who would need to take decisions differently to reach it? How can you access these people?



## Sub-Question 3: To what Extent Does the Transition Process up to now Open up Possibilities for Marginalised Women's Needs and Demands Being Reflected and Met by the Resulting Structures?

### Summary of Results of the Analysis

Some of the issues of importance to marginalised women have already started to be addressed, like legal issues with regards to gender-based discrimination and violence, the peace talks in Juba or the discussions about ethnic and regional representation at the national level, e.g. with regards to future elections. Nevertheless, the interviewees experience a lack of communication between the new government and the margins.

However, the most visible and tangible change for the interviewed marginalised people is the end of combat as well as the opening of formerly closed areas and roads and, in most cases, an increase of security. Furthermore, there has been a reduction of racist harassment and treatment in the public field. Also, many mention the newly won freedom—particularly freedom of speech as a precondition for other needed changes to be addressed and implemented. Some humanitarian efforts are being recognised, too. Omar Al-Bashir being tried at court is also mentioned as an important visible effect. However, the increase of economic pressures because of price rises limits what could be done.

Many describe how people have woken up in the course of the Revolution and consider this as a big chance for increased participation in political processes and affecting positive change. First efforts for a better representation of women and ethnic groups are visible, though not yet deemed enough by the interviewees. People also are concerned that during the debates about representation, power struggles may become more prominent than the actual goals of the Revolution and the topics that affect their lives. Many interviewed women, moreover, are concerned about the appointment processes of the Transition Government. Due to a non-transparent process, they have the impression that people close to the centre were sharing positions among themselves, and people facing multi-marginalisation were left out again. In their perspective, this implies the danger of the new system replicating the old one in terms of discrimination with regards to access.

At the same time, interviewees are concerned that representatives of the old regime are still holding a lot of power, especially in the regions and in the economy. Thus, they are concerned about the so-called “deep state” in which certain actors who are not part of the political leadership exert power, as for instance through important administrative positions in the ministries or by controlling the security services.

Still, the great majority of the interviewees, from all of the regions, feel they are part of the changes that have been started with the Revolution—in which many have participated themselves. The majority also feels represented to some degree by the new government or individual persons within it. Many understand that an unjust system that has been built up for 30 years or longer cannot be undone very quickly.

## Observations and Interpretations

- The spirit of the Revolution is still strong and planted a strong vision into the minds of people of what is possible and what they can do.
- There is still patience among the interviewees for the Transition Government to achieve changes that are tangible for them.
- The “soft landing” approach, which includes parts of the military serving in the new government, still needs to apply the rule of law with regards to those who have done wrong during the past regime.
- As marginalised people also experienced at least to some extent marginalisation within the revolutionary movement, the Sudanese civil society in the centre areas needs to listen and create spaces for those from the margins and become their allies rather than patronising them by claiming to know what is good for them.

## Strategic Conclusions: Using the Potential of Multi-Marginalised Women to Be Heard

- For the transition to lead to a really more inclusive system where needs and demands of multi-marginalised women are met, preconditions are the observation of political human rights, like freedom to speak one’s mind and the possibility of political participation, as well as an end to war.
- In comparison to the past, there are great chances at this point for multi-marginalised women to be heard. Thus, speaking up and organising, networking nationally and internationally with a feminist perspective, will be useful. Mainstream and privileged people, groups and decision-makers should continuously create space for these efforts, including translations from and to local languages.
- The lack of communication between the new government and the margins needs to be rapidly improved (see above), with feedback loops and participation spaces established already during the transition.

## First steps marginalised women can do

- Let us organise ourselves, formulate our visions and needs into demands and speak up! For example, we can pose questions and explain our needs and demands to local representatives.

## Sub-Question 4: How Can Women—Especially those Facing Several Forms of Discrimination and Marginalisation—Influence this Transition Process so that it Results in such Structures?

### Summary of Results of the Analysis

As the interviewees expressed both their hopes and their concerns with regards to the transition process, the question remains how they can influence that process so that the resulting structures will be inclusive and account for the needs and demands of people facing multiple forms of discrimination.

There are formal structures, like for instance political parties, regional and local government representations or unions. Others are semi-formal, for example native administrations or local associations, as well as informal self-organised structures, such as the neighbourhood and revolutionary committees that are already in place or in the process of being built. These structures bear the potential of women and people facing various forms of marginalisation and discrimination making their voices heard directly or through representation.

Yet, the interviewed marginalised women also want to raise their voice by themselves and have the capacity of providing their livelihood and affecting changes in their community. For this, they say, they need space and access to decision-making power, education opportunities, protection from discrimination and violence and, in some cases, basic facilities.

In this regard, the interviewees describe empowerment processes with the following major elements:

- a change in attitudes, like practising freedom of speech, challenging internalised discrimination structures, etc. In this context, formats of formal and informal education and awareness-raising are crucial, like “know your rights” workshops, organised by resistance committees, among others
- a transition from awareness-raising and capacity building to organising, as for example in groups and unions
- appropriate activities and formats, like meetings, teach-ins, practical work for the benefit of all (“Nafir”), (grassroots) conferences, research, media work or protest actions. Various forms of representation were also mentioned as important here
- an empowerment process being centred around relevant content (around their experiences of marginalisation and their demands). This will make a meaningful difference to the lives of marginalised women.

However, any new governance structures are facing the risk of being jeopardized for a number of reasons, one of the biggest concerns being the involvement and continued power of the military and RSF (Rapid Support Forces). The new structures will need time, thorough and transparent communication as well as consistently following the rule of law and implementing it for all, including marginalised groups, in order to gain the trust of the people.

All in all, the interviewed women all share a lot of strength, wit and ideas of what they can or already do contribute to changes in society—be it analysis, concepts, skills, motivation and will-power—as we can see in the following quotes:

***“We just need them to provide the basics, and we will do the rest.”***

F-DW-Mornei-12

***“It is our duty to contribute with our ideas: Every single activist is obliged to share his or her ideas in order to enlighten the local communities, for they have no one to guide and educate them. Raising awareness and spreading a peace culture is our duty to remind them of their long forgotten rights, so that they can also help and contribute for the better good.”***

F-DW-Mornei-01-A-B

At the end of the day, marginalised people need to overcome marginalisation and discrimination so that Sudan becomes, as one interviewed woman from an IDP camp in Nyala, South Darfur, put it,

***“a home for all the people to live and work together in peace”***

F-DS-Nyala-02.

## Observations and Interpretations

- Marginalised women have a deep understanding of empowerment processes and what they can do about them.
- All the more, it will be key to have marginalised women raise their voices at this point in time to make sure that future structures of governance will continuously reflect and meet the needs and demands of people facing multiple forms of discrimination and marginalisation.

## Strategic Conclusions: Strengthen Empowerment Processes

- External actors can support empowerment processes upon request, for example by creating spaces for exchange, awareness-raising, information transfer and training, while the ownership needs to remain with the Sudanese multi-marginalised people at any time.

## First steps marginalised women can do

- Gather the knowledge you need and organise in a more permanent way, e.g. organise longer-lasting campaigns (possibly with other allies) on the demands above.

# Potential Implications of the COVID 19 Pandemic

The current pandemic has changed the playing field of the Sudanese transition process considerably. It is still hard to estimate the consequences and impacts of this. However, a few implications can already be seen:

COVID 19 painfully makes it visible that, while we are all potential carriers of the virus, it is much more likely that we will be detrimentally affected if we are in a position of intersectional multi-marginalisation:

- Given the already severe economic crisis of inflation and scarcity of necessary commodities, as described above, its acceleration through the pandemic as well as counteracting measures like lockdowns hit poorer people (often of marginalised ethnic groups, as explained above) economically harder, up to the point of starvation.
- Women, who are usually caretakers at home, are facing a specific set of effects, if they are supposed to cope with less money and food while having to take care of children. They are also specifically affected by the crash of the Sudanese healthcare system (e.g. when giving birth).
- Those living in marginalised areas are more likely to have less access to medicine and health facilities and less access to other supplies, sometimes even to knowledge of the pandemic. However, people who live in subsistence agriculture may have better chances.
- On a global scale, Sudan is having a disadvantaged position with regards to medical protection gear and equipment, making its health personnel more vulnerable. This, in turn, leads to the closing of hospitals and people dying, also of usually curable diseases like diarrhoea or malaria. International isolation as well as re-nationalisation during the crisis add up to medicine shortages. The global distribution of the upcoming vaccine displays the scandalous way in which the global society is repeating colonial patterns: Western industrialised countries are seen as ruthlessly grabbing large quantities of the vaccine doses, instead of promoting a global distribution based on actual vulnerability and risk.

The situation, hence, makes the implications of unjust structures of marginalisation and deficiencies of human security, globally as well as within Sudan, more blatant—and the need to act, i.e. to find and build better structures and solutions, more urgent. This is particularly important in the light of the ongoing and increasing climate crisis, which Sudan is already suffering from, as well. In many ways, at this point the world and Sudan are—still—having a chance to take appropriate decisions and make efforts to put things, somewhat, right.



*Photo: Evening circle of a Bana workshop, ending the day in sharing, community and cooperation.*

## Chapter 8:

# The Revolution Continues with All of us

## Conclusion and Recommendations

---

To sum up once again—we as “Bana Group for Peace and Development” set out in December 2019 for our participatory action research with the aim to find out:

**How can women—especially those confronted with intersecting discrimination and marginalisation—influence the Sudanese transition process in a way that the resulting structures are inclusive and assure that the needs and demands of women facing different forms of marginalisation are continuously reflected and met?**

The idea of the research started from an analysis that the key driving factors of conflict in Sudan are war and violent disputes, ethnic and racist discrimination, the unjust distribution of power and resources, the lack of rule of law, many bad governments in succession, gender inequality, bad socialisation and a bad legal system involving bad laws. Following the spirit of the major demands of the Sudanese 2019 Revolution, i.e. “Freedom—Peace—Justice”, we were also aware of the risk that the system to be established after the Revolution might reproduce old discriminatory practises of marginalisation, at least partially. Bearing this in mind, we understood that the abovementioned demands need to be fulfilled for those most marginalised in terms of ethnicity, gender and class and that empowerment of the marginalised themselves is key in this process.

In order to answer the research question, we set out for a participatory action research in which we interviewed 129 persons from seven Sudanese states, 117 of which are women facing multi-marginalisation. As an exploratory-inductive study, we used qualitative content analysis to answer the following key questions, i.e. the sub-questions to our research question:

- What are the needs and demands of women in Sudan, especially those facing different forms of discrimination?
- How do the governance structures resulting from the transition process need to look like so that they are inclusive and ensure that women’s needs and demands are continuously reflected and met?
- To what extent does the transition process up to now open up possibilities for marginalised women’s needs and demands being reflected and met by the resulting structures? How could this be yet improved?
- How can women—especially those facing different forms of discrimination—influence this transition process so that it results in such inclusive structures?

# Concluding Summary

## Needs and Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women in Sudan

Through our extensive analysis, we find that about 60.5% of the interviewees face intersecting experiences of ethnic or racist discrimination. About 31% recount experiences of gender-based discrimination and violence, whilst almost 21% state to have experienced forms of discrimination related to class and economic status. Thus, the results confirm the validity of the main fault-lines depicted in the “Matrix of Domination”, one of the key concepts we use in this study. Furthermore, 18% of the interviewees have experienced marginalisation connected to war and displacement. 11% recounted instances of discrimination related to education, 9% to religion and 4% related to the violation of political human rights. At the same time, we find that the different experiences of discrimination and marginalisation cannot be seen independently of each other, but rather that they strongly interact. Thus, we use an intersectional lens to interpret the results of the analysis.

The intersectionality becomes further visible when considering the needs and demands voiced by the multi-marginalised women we interviewed. Needs and demands concerning discrimination related to class and economic status, like healthcare, water, employment, livelihood etc., are put forward by a majority of 80% of the interviewees. 67% identify needs and demands in the face of war-related discrimination and marginalisation, e.g. for increased safety, peace and security as well as transitional justice. 54% see improvements in the quality, accessibility and affordability of education for all as a key need and demand. 26% name ending ethnic and racist discrimination, as for instance in direct interactions or on job market, as important.

A further 26% of the interviewees ask for increased political power and participation, freedom and human rights. Only around 12% voice needs and demands directly related to ending gender-based discrimination and violence. We assume that this is, on the one hand, due to the intersectionality of gender-based discrimination with other forms. On the other hand, we postulate that marginalised women do not focus their demands on the undoubtedly severe issues they are facing due to their gender. Rather, they concentrate on issues for the benefit of their family, society and community, mainly due to their vulnerability in the context of armed conflicts as well as their responsibility for undervalued care work in their families.

## Potential Future Governance Structures

Given the background of intersecting experiences of marginalisation and discrimination of women in Sudan, what kind of a country would the interviewees like to see instead? The political vision of an inclusive society that the participants in this study strive for is one of “Freedom—Peace—Justice”. According to the interviewees, an inclusive system would mean that all segments of society (genders, regions, ethnic groups) have access to and are represented in decision-making structures. Such a system of governance would need to be based on participatory decision-making of some form of democracy, with civilian and without military representatives at all levels. At the same time, many interviewees emphasise that marginalised women should speak up for themselves and represent themselves. Therefore, marginalised women would like to organise and empower themselves.



## The Transition Process and the Needs and Demands of Multi-Marginalised Women

The role of the Transition Government and structures is to pave the way for new governance structures to be put into place after the transition from military dictatorship to civilian-led democracy. People put much hope into the changes they want to see in the future Sudan, and whether or not the Transition Government will be able to generate a number of those changes will be decisive for its success. We find that some of the issues of importance to marginalised women have already started to be addressed, like legal issues with regards to gender-based discrimination and violence, the peace talks in Juba or discussions about ethnic representation at the national level, e.g. with regards to the future elections. Yet, many identified that needs and demands are not yet met or addressed. Nevertheless, the great majority of the interviewees, from all of the regions, feel they are part of the changes that have been started with the Revolution—in which many have participated themselves. The majority also feels represented to some degree by the new government or individual persons within it. Many understand that an unjust system that has been built up for 30 years or longer cannot be undone very quickly.

### Influencing the Transition Process

As the interviewees expressed both their hopes and concerns with regards to the transition process, the question remains how they can influence it so that the resulting structures will be inclusive and account for the needs and demands of people facing multiple forms of discrimination.

Some structures bearing the potential for women and other multi-marginalised people to make their voices heard are already in place or in the process of being built up. However, the interviewed multi-marginalised women want to raise their voice by themselves, beyond representation, and have the capacity of providing for their livelihood and affecting changes in their community. We find that multi-marginalised women developed a realm of ideas for influencing the transition process. Although focused on the Sudanese transition process, these ideas reflect ways, values, activities and strategies which multi-marginalised women can generally use to empower themselves and be true agents of change. The interviewees thereby depicted an empowerment process resembling the empowerment spiral as introduced in Chapter 2.

## Strategic Conclusions

From the statements above and based on our own observations, assumptions and conclusions from the analysis of the collected data, we draw as the main strategic conclusions that we have to

- implement gender equality
- build a society based on justice and freedom
- end discrimination and marginalisation in education and on the job market, foster the stabilisation of the economy as well as climate justice
- promote peace, security, trust and healing
- introduce intersectional representation and sensitivity mainstreaming as well as (transitional) justice
- protect the Revolution
- install mechanisms that ensure accountability
- use the current potential of multi-marginalised women to be heard
- strengthen empowerment processes for us, the multi-marginalised women in Sudan.

As Bana, we are obliged to set the strategies and ways to implement the above, in order to make the voices of multi-marginalised women heard and have their needs met with regards to “*Freedom—Peace—Justice*”. This includes efforts towards a just peace and the spreading of a culture of peace, as well as getting rid of poverty and creating spaces that enable communities to move forward. Among other things, this should happen through self-empowerment of the multi-marginalised as well as lobbying the decision-makers to change laws and policies. Therefore, we put forward not only recommendations to marginalised women in Sudan for their empowerment, but also recommendations and demands to the Sudanese civil society and the Transition Government as well as the international community.

## Recommendations

Based on our analysis, synthesis, reflections and strategising processes as part of this study, we put forward recommendations and demands to a variety of actors. After outlining our major demands, we specify recommendations and demands to each of the different actors in detail.

## Recommendations in Detail

# As Bana Group for Peace and Development, we demand ...

- 1 ... that true “Freedom—Peace—Justice” must include the empowerment and participation of all sectors of society, including the most marginalised in terms of racism, gender and class.
- 2 ... that the end to all forms of marginalisation and discrimination and their intersection must be the priority of Sudanese and international efforts for a future political and economic system in Sudan and is therefore reflected and mainstreamed at all levels and in all contexts of society.
- 3 ... that empowerment and self-organising of multi-marginalised women must be considered central for the transition and the future system of Sudan and thus have to be given space by all means.
- 4 ... that all segments of society (genders, regions, ethnic groups, social classes etc.) have fair access to and are represented in decision-making structures.
- 5 ... that all national and international efforts in support of Sudan be centred around the self-determination and needs of the Sudanese people—with a focus on the multi-marginalised, rather than the political and economic interests of other countries.

## Specifically, we ask the following of the Sudanese Transitional Government:

- 1 We want peace and stability, with an end to greed, corruption and political self-interest, based on a participatory constitutional process including all people, meaning that the country and all its citizens and their basic needs should come first and be a top priority.
- 2 There should be further changes in rules and laws according to the demands of the Revolution, particularly including deterrent laws placed and reinforced for everyone who commits violence and discrimination against women or on the basis of ethnicity.
- 3 International agreements regarding women’s rights, like CEDAW, should be signed and ratified and put into practice both at the legislative and executive level.
- 4 By directly involving marginalised women, the Transition Government should think of and work on improving opportunities for livelihood of women as well as suggest ways and implement projects to empower them economically.
- 5 The chances and accesses of women—especially from the margins—to training and education should be increased.
- 6 We strongly recommend creating consultative mechanisms with the local communities and continuing to strengthen the role of local councils as well as multi-marginalised women at all levels of decision-making.

## To International Actors, we put forward the following main messages:

- 1** We welcome and call for the support of the international community, however in an impartial manner to all parties and without interfering with internal policies of the country. There should be a focus on basic needs, especially of those facing multiple marginalisation.
- 2** We call for the international community to provide technical and logistic support for the Transition Government to achieve peace, including international expertise.
- 3** We also call for the international community to lobby the government to sign the CEDAW agreement and support the implementation of all necessary measures.
- 4** Furthermore, we call for support to IDPs and refugees who want to voluntarily return home and to ensure their safe reintegration into society, so that each and every one of them can find their role and place within the society.
- 5** We greatly welcome any support with continued awareness raising efforts, conducted by Sudanese for Sudanese, about issues related to discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity and class. Also, we welcome the conducting of global feminist conferences to support the democratic transformation and women's participation.
- 6** Support is needed in responding to the ongoing economic crisis, which is connected with the health & pandemic as well as the climate-/extractivism-related crises. Measures should include financial aid, counter-inflation strategies and humanitarian aid for those most affected. This implies improved education and health provisions, but also capacity-building and support with regards to vocational training, household economy, sustainable and conflict-sensitive adaptations of agricultural systems and, generally, measures towards sustainable development and self-sufficiency/livelihood.

## Recommendations in Detail

# By Marginalised Women to Marginalised Women in Sudan—for their Empowerment

As marginalised Sudanese women, we recommend the following to all marginalised women in Sudan:

- Create spaces for awareness-raising, discussion and exchange: maybe firstly among yourselves, with other marginalised women in your region, with women and men. Share your situations and share ideas how you deal with them. Set the agenda of what you want to talk about and the topics you want to address yourselves, e.g. knowing more about your rights, health issues, entrepreneurship, how you could organise child-care, reforestation or protection. Invite resource persons whenever useful. Include a discussion on “What I / what we can do” to such meetings, and if possible make them regular.
- Develop a vision of your society and community, as you hope it would look like in ten years from now. Look at it in great detail: What has changed? What is there (rather than what is not there anymore)? What has been preserved? How has it been achieved? Paint a picture of this and share it with other marginalised women around you. Perhaps you can even find a joint picture!
- Strategise: Set up goals and develop approaches that might contribute to reaching them. Phrase demands and make them heard, including through different media channels. Work together on them, in the “Nafir” spirit. Create synergies and alliances around specific issues, e.g. push for Sudan to sign the CEDAW Agreement, push for organic sustainable agriculture together with local and international actors from that field or raise your voice to say that you’re tired of war and demand peace (for instance using methods like Hakamat<sup>32</sup> songs at symbolic places or places of decision-making).
- Organise self-help and empowerment groups on an activist basis: Meet regularly and network locally, nationally and in some cases internationally. Develop or join a Women’s Council/Committee starting from the neighbourhood level with a delegation to the administrative, state and national levels. Cooperate and link this Council/Committee up with the Ministry of Social Welfare to make sure women’s needs and demands are heard and met at all levels.
- Create safe spaces for activists who do not (yet) have the self-confidence to speak up for their needs. Create self-help initiatives, which can help protect women in danger, and also support job conversions for FGM practitioners and sex workers. Include trauma-sensitive approaches and elements of self-care into your safe spaces to (re-)build the resilience of people who had faced traumatic experiences. Look at yourselves as powerful and important and analyse the powers that you have.
- Develop formats for inter-ethnic awareness-raising and exchange in order to “unlearn racism” and implement them widely and continuously. Learn about each other’s cultures (especially the non-mainstream cultures!). Discuss experiences of discrimination, think of what can be done for further prevention, what can be done in actual situations, what can be done about reconciliation and healing. Practice communication based on listening and understanding, not to harm others. You could also include games and cooperation exercises in such mixed groups. Test this format and share it widely, also via the resistance committees, and provide facilitation for it. Implement this in mixed ethnic settings.
- Create self-help initiatives and collectives to help entrepreneurship of women to flourish. “Nafirs” can be a starting point for this. Use environmentally sustainable technologies and approaches!
- Consider issues related to climate change and prepare yourselves in terms of reforestation, water management and sustainable agriculture (and where necessary adaptation)—and also address your local governments with these issues.

---

32 Hakamat are female singers who traditionally sing men into war—some have however also used their songs to entice peace

# To the Transitional Government

... we recommend the following:

### **Related to Peace and Security:**

- We want peace and stability, independently of greed and political interests, meaning that the country and all its citizens and their basic needs should come first and be the top priority.
- International experts on peace-making should be granted full access to all areas of the armed forces, whether it be critical areas of conflicts or transitional zones, so that they can get to the crucial points of the situation.
- Redirect military security spending to human security spending.<sup>33</sup> This includes the conversion of job opportunities to create new prospects for former employees of the military/armed security sector. Strengthen healthcare, water access and education availability and affordability, with a clear focus on marginalised regions and women.
- Enable, support and secure voluntary return of IDPs, refugees and those displaced through land grabbing or “hawakeer”<sup>34</sup> rights.
- There should be broad disarmament/DDR and removal of landmines.

### **Related to Gender-Based Discrimination and Violence:**

- There should be deterring laws placed and reinforced for everyone who commits violence and discrimination against women.
- International agreements regarding women’s rights, like CEDAW, should be signed and ratified and implemented both at the legislative and executive level. Legal personnel and police, especially in marginalised regions, need to be trained to follow through, protect and ensure women’s rights.
- The chances and accesses of women—especially from the margins—to training and education should be increased.
- In cases of rape, abortion should be legal and safely available.

### **With regards to Economy, Humanitarian Needs, and Class:**

- Implement economic reforms as a priority. Stopping price rises is central. Focus all such measures on meeting all basic needs of the overall population (referring to the concept of “Buen vivir”)<sup>35</sup> in order to prevent a further divide of rich and poor. Establish a just economic system, including environmental justice & laws and sustainable development.
- Involving marginalised women, the Transition Government should think of and work on improving opportunities for the livelihood of women as well as suggesting ways and implementing projects to empower them economically. At the same time, strengthen the recognition of care work in the families and homes, including independent health and pension insurance for women doing this work without direct pay.
- In this context, it is also important to ensure that international development support truly benefits multi-marginalised people who are most in need and that resources can be used by the local poor rather than the international rich, hence limiting extraction practices.
- An end to corruption will help benefit multi-marginalised people, hence measures in this respect at all levels are key.

---

33 This is described further in Chapter 7 of the study

34 Hawakeer are lands traditionally used by a specific ethnic group for a specific purpose

35 This is described further in Chapter 7 of the study

### **With regards to Discrimination on the Basis of Ethnicity and Skin Colour:**

- Take ethnic group as a category out of ID cards and official papers.
- Support efforts of “unlearning racism”, e.g. through media messages, change of school curricula and recognition and promotion of local languages and cultures.
- Clarify land rights and establish conflict resolution schemes without ethnic discrimination. Build upon the already established and trusted traditional systems

### **With regards to Different Forms and Issues of Discrimination:**

- Use intersectional mainstreaming approaches to develop anti-discrimination policies and practices as part of implementing human rights. These policies should be reflected in the political programmes and structures of all ministries/fields and with stakeholders like community leaders, police (complaint desks for intersectional discrimination), schools (incl. school materials) etc.
- Establish and strengthen the rule of law. Laws to protect against ethnically based discrimination need to be strengthened and followed through. This includes job and university recruitment based on qualifications and transparency in job requirements.

### **With regards to Democratisation and the Participation and Empowerment of the Multi-Marginalised:**

- Stay closely connected to your constituency in the margins: In order to keep the support of the people, strengthen efforts to listen to their needs and demands. Make the needs and demands of marginalised people a priority of your strategies. Create transparency by explaining the processes and decision-making of the transition in such a way that they reach the margins.
- Recognising all efforts that are already being made to increase the participation of marginalised women, we call to continue these efforts and build more trust in women’s ability to participate in the change process. This includes more participation in the various activities and programmes as well as in policy- and decision-making during the transitional period, both at national and state level. Applying UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security should be one of the top priorities.
- We strongly recommend creating consultative mechanisms with local communities and to strengthen the role of local councils. Create and support regional and national exchange and consultation fora to address pressing issues, involving civil society initiatives. Make sure to actively include and create accessibility for initiatives of women as well as ethnic and other minorities. Establish “bottom up” democracy instruments, e.g. building on the Revolution Committees or a Women’s Council structure, which could be closely linked up with the Ministry of Social Welfare, among others. An upcoming important process will be the development of the next Sudanese Constitution: This should be a massive and just participatory bottom up process in which all people with their needs and demands are heard.
- Create space for marginalised women to represent themselves. Involve the minimum quota of 40% women at all levels of governance. Provide for translations with regards to local languages, wherever necessary.
- Follow through with building a civilian governance structure, also in the regions.
- Increase efforts in relation to transitional justice, particularly with regards to the previous regime’s crimes and the killings during the Revolution. Also increase provisions for trauma-related treatment and transformation.

## Recommendations in Detail

# To the Sudanese Civil Society

especially actors from privileged ethnic groups and genders, we recommend the following:

- Listen.
- Be aware that you may have implicit biases and examine how you take part in systems of oppression.
- Do not speak on behalf of others, but open doors and amplify. Try to be an ally<sup>36</sup>.
- Make your activities and actions sensitive with regards to intersectional discrimination and marginalisation: Who is up to now deciding, benefiting, getting funded, being heard or represented, being unheard? What can you do to counter these dynamics? Best: Support activities and actions designed and implemented by multi-marginalised people.
- Strengthen structures that support ownership of the concerned population—even if this might sometimes mean handing over control to them.



## Recommendations in Detail

# To the International Community

... we recommend the following:

### **Focus and “Code of Conduct”**

- We welcome and call for the support of the international community, however in an impartial manner to all parties and without interfering with internal policies of the country.
- Listen—e.g. by considering the demands mentioned in this study. Use approaches of intersectionality when designing and implementing your programmes. Learn to understand the conflict background and work in a conflict-sensitive and trauma-sensitive manner.
- Work needs-based, starting from the focus on the most marginalised. Apply the Do No Harm Approach and consider approaches like “Buen Vivir”. Ask yourself: Who asks for this? Who benefits? Which detrimental effects might my intervention have, such as destroying self-help structures or local markets and/or perpetuating marginalisation? In what way can such structures be supported instead?
- If what you can offer does not comply with these criteria, have the courage and refrain from intervening.
- Cooperate with local actors, with their ownership of the process. Sudanese people need to be on the “driver’s seat” of shaping their society. This, for example, also refers to the Conference on Economics which the Transition Government, based on the Constitutional Declaration, will convene with wide participation of different sectors and civil society.

### **With regards to Peace and Security**

- We call for the international community to provide technical and logistic support for the Transition Government to achieve peace. We also call for international experts in conflict transformation and peace-making to consult with different levels of governance and civil society. A UN mission is welcome to monitor the actions of the government and the military and also to help keep peace and security.
- Furthermore, we call for support for IDPs and refugees, who want to return voluntarily, helping to ensure their safe reintegration into society, so that each and every one of them can find their role and place within the society.
- Do not support any armed groups or actors on either side, neither directly nor indirectly. Support the reduction of military expenditure and the reduction of the military role in the government. Make this a condition for economic cooperation.
- Contribute to efforts like landmine removal and DDR
- Support bottom up and national level transitional justice processes.

### **With regards to Gender-Based Discrimination and Violence**

- We call for the international community to lobby the government to sign the CEDAW agreement and to support the implementation of all necessary measures.

### **With regards to Issues of Economy, Humanitarian Needs and Class**

- Focus on the needs of the multi-marginalised, foster self-sufficiency and sustainable livelihoods.
- The ongoing economic crisis in Sudan, provoked by the previous regime building on unjust global economic structures and mechanisms and exacerbated by the COVID 19 pandemic, urgently needs international support. Debt release is a top priority in this respect as well as further economic measures to counter inflation.
- Unconditional international solidarity and humanitarian support with regards to the COVID 19 pandemic and its health-related, economic and social effects is urgently needed—particularly for those facing multi-marginalisation. One priority is the provision of medical equipment, medicine and vaccine.
- The Sudanese health system has already been insufficient before the pandemic. Contribute to the build-up of healthcare availability for multi-marginalised people.
- Support for the educational system in these times of economic crisis is needed as well, although the contents should be developed for and by the diverse (including marginalised) Sudanese people on a basis of inclusion and respect for diversity.
- There is support needed for water provision, particularly in the marginalised areas.
- In the context of the climate crisis, we need capacity-building and support with regards to sustainable and conflict-sensitive adaptations of agricultural systems (pastoralism, farming, forestry—both on the level of subsistence and for economic activity). Use and promote climate-neutral technologies in all your efforts and projects (including the reduction of flights, especially for already privileged people) and implement sustainability frameworks like permaculture, with the goal of environmental and climate justice. If you are part of a country, government or economic entity which contributes massively to climate change, seek climate justice through strict policies of zero-emission and other measures. Seek a change towards a non-extractivism system as well as lobbying your government and economic entities to pay compensation to those at the margins who are most hurt by climate change.

### **With regards to Different Forms and Issues of Discrimination**

- We greatly welcome any support of continued awareness raising efforts, conducted wherever possible by Sudanese for Sudanese, about issues related to intersecting discrimination e.g. on the basis of gender, ethnicity and class. Also, we welcome the conducting of global feminist conferences to support the democratic transformation and women's participation.

**Lastly: If you do not want people to migrate to your countries, make sure that there is global social and climate justice and a development that reaches the marginalised—instead of cooperating with anti-democratic militia groups like the RSF.<sup>37</sup> In this context, the Khartoum process and any deals with regards to stopping migration and enforcing deportation of refugees in Europe should be ended. Efforts should rather be invested into real stability through freedom, peace and justice in Sudan. In this light, an independent review with regards to the support of the RSF, as part of a transitional justice process, and other cooperation with the previous regime would also be necessary. Any future international political and economic cooperation with Sudan should not be based on self-interest. Cooperation with governments that counter the Sudanese Revolution should be checked for their negative impact on Sudan and its transition towards a country that lives up to the goals of its Revolution, i.e. *“Freedom—Peace—Justice”*.**

---

<sup>37</sup> See also: 25.4.2020, Statement of Sudan Uprising and Germany: <https://medium.com/@sudanuprising/statement-on-the-german-governments-resumption-and-expansion-of-cooperation-in-sudan-34e557a1025e>



Photo: Graffiti by an unknown artist at the Sit-In in front of the Military Headquarter in Khartoum, May 2020, displaying the goals of the December Revolution: "Freedom—Peace—Justice". The graffiti was painted over after the massacre against revolutionaries on 3rd June 2019, yet the dictatorship did not last.

## Bibliography and Annexes

# Bibliography

---

**Abbara, Iman (2019). *Reclaiming Azza—A History of Female Resistance in Sudan*.** Sisi Magazine. Available at: <https://www.sisimag.com/blog/2019/6/7/eclaiming-azza-a-history-of-female-resistance-in-sudan>. Accessed: 19.7.2020.

**CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2016). *Designing Strategic Initiatives to Impact Conflict Systems: Systems Approaches to Peacebuilding. A Resource Manual*.** Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Available at: <https://www.cdacollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Designing-Strategic-Initiatives-to-Impact-Conflict-Systems-Systems-Approaches-to-Peacebuilding-Final.pdf> . Accessed: 19.7.2020.

**Collins, Patricia Hill (2000). *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*.** New York: Routledge. Available at: <https://uniteyouthdublin.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/black-feminist-thought-by-patricia-hill-collins.pdf>. Accessed: 30.11.2020.

**Crenshaw, Kimberle (1991). *Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color*.** Stanford Law Review, 43(6), 1241-1299.

**Elsawi, Zaynab (2011). *Women Building Peace: The Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace in Sudan*.** In Batliwala, Srilata (Ed.) 2011. Changing Their World. The Association for Women`s Rights in Development (AWID).

**Galtung, Johan (1969). *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*. *Journal of Peace Research*. 6(3): 167–191.** Gudyas, Eduardo and Oliver Balch (2013). Buen vivir—the social philosophy inspiring movements in South America. The Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/buen-vivir-philosophy-south-america-eduardo-gudynas> , last accessed: 1.12.2020

**Gulston, Vania (2019). *The Revolution in the Streets of Sudan: An Interview with Hajooj Kuka*.** Law At The Margins, available at: <https://lawatthemargins.com/the-revolution-in-the-streets-of-sudan-an-interview-with-hajooj-kuka/>. Accessed: 19.7.2020.

**Hasters, Alice (2019). *Was weiße Menschen nicht über Rassismus wissen wollen aber wissen sollten*.** Berlin: hanserblau.

**Kramer, Julia Katharina (2003). *Can Facilitating Empowerment be a Tool for Conflict Transformation in Asymmetric Conflict? Towards an Integrative Framework of Empowerment*.** Unpublished MA Thesis. Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford.

**Mayring, Philipp (2014). *Qualitative Content Analysis: Theoretical Foundation, Basic Procedures and Software Solution*.** Klagenfurt. [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/39517/ssoar-2014-mayring-Qualitative\\_content\\_analysis\\_theoretical\\_foundation.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2014-mayring-Qualitative\\_content\\_analysis\\_theoretical\\_foundation.pdf](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/39517/ssoar-2014-mayring-Qualitative_content_analysis_theoretical_foundation.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2014-mayring-Qualitative_content_analysis_theoretical_foundation.pdf). Accessed: 26.02.2021.

**Merriman, Hardy (2019). *Lessons of Uprisings Around the World: The Present Moment and Possible Future*.** International Centre for Nonviolent Conflict, [https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog\\_post/lessons-of-uprisings-around-the-world/](https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/lessons-of-uprisings-around-the-world/). Accessed 19.7.2020.

**Omer, Sari (2012): *Proposed Family Law. Towards Gender Justice in Sudan*.** SORD (Sudanese Organisation for Research and Development).

**Sow, Noah. 2018. *Deutschland Schwarz Weiß: Der alltägliche Rassismus*.** Norderstedt: Books of Demand.

**Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (2009). *Beyond Trousers. The Public Order Regime and the Human Rights of Women and Girls in Sudan*.** A Discussion Paper Submission to the 46th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Banjul, the Gambia. Available at: <http://www.pclrs.com/downloads/Miscellaneous/Public%20Order%20Submission%20Paper%20MASTER%20FINAL.pdf>. Accessed: 30.11.2020.

**Tønnessen, Liv (2019). *Women at Work in Sudan: Marital Privilege or Constitutional Right*.** Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 26(2), 223–244. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxz011>. Accessed: 19.7.2020.

**Weber, Annette (2019). *For a Peaceful Transition in Sudan—Current Developments and Plausible Scenarios*.** Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Available at: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C39/>. Accessed: 19.7.2020

**Welzer, Harald (2012). *Climate Wars. Why People Will be Killed in the 21. Century*.** Cambridge: Polity Press.

## Annex 1:

# Questionnaires

## Annex 1a: General Template Version

---

### Interview Questionnaires—Template

#### Before the interview

- Make sure that phone has enough storage and is charged, and do not forget the data sheet!
- Remember the overall research question:
- “How can women—especially those facing several kinds of marginalisation or discrimination—bring their needs and demands into the transition process, so that the resulting structures are inclusive, accessible and their needs are being met?”
- Ask for both formal and informal or traditional political structures, also nationally and locally.
- You do not need to ask all questions, but you can add more to find out more with regards to the overall research question. And do adapt to the kind of language suitable for the person you interview!

#### Introduction

- Background to the study: outreach all over Sudan by an activist women`s network.  
Focus on needs and demands of women and how the transition process could take them into account.
- Confidentiality and anonymity (if wanted)
- Recording
- Data Sheet
- Expectation management and (realistic!) follow up

#### Questions

##### Inclusiveness and Discrimination

- What kinds of discrimination and marginalisation do you face in Sudan? (for example, based on gender, education, ethnicity, religion, abilities, education...)
- What was the role of the previous government or political situation influencing this discrimination?

## **Needs**

- What are your needs that are not being met?
- What would be your ideas how to change this / make this happen?
- Who are the key people to change that? Who are the key people for change in your community?

## **Political vision**

- What is your vision of a new Sudan? And how would your life and your area look like then?
- How would the new system need to look like, so that all people can be heard and their needs met?
- What were the good things you saw in the Revolution? What could be done to keep and strengthen them in the future?
- What were the bad things, and how could we minimise them in the future?

## **Transition process**

- How did the transition go since the Revolution up to now? Did you feel any changes—if yes: which?
- Do you feel part of it?
- What is going well?
- What not?
- How could it go on the right track?
- What could you—or we—do about it?

## **Influencing political structures**

- Who (what kind of people or groups) was active in politics and the community before the Revolution? Who is now?
- What possibilities did you see for you/marginalised groups before the Revolution to influence politics?
- What possibilities would you like to see in the future? Through which ways / mechanisms / structures?
- Who represents you in the Transition Government? Or: Who talks on behalf of you? Are the people who represent you the right people to speak on your behalf?
- Do you have access to the people who represent you? For example, can you talk or discuss with them?

## **Optional / Alternatives**

- Do you participate right now in decision-making in the community or in politics? If yes, how? Do you feel your voice is heard?
- Did you raise your demands to the previous government? Did they fulfill them? If not, why? Do you think that these demands have been or will be taken up by the Transition Government?

## **Influencing the transition process**

- What are new opportunities right now how to influence the transition process and raise your demands? Do you make use of them? What kinds of mechanisms do you use for it?
- What could be (additional/new) ways in which marginalised people can be involved?

# Annex 1b: Version in Simple Language

## Interview Questionnaires—Simple Language

### Before the interview:

- Make sure that phone has enough storage and is charged, and do not forget the data sheet!

### Remember the overall research question:

- “How can women—especially those facing several kinds of marginalisation or discrimination—bring their needs and demands into the transition process, so that the resulting structures are inclusive, accessible, and their needs are being met?”
- Ask for both formal and informal or traditional political structures, also nationally and locally.
- You do not need to ask all questions, but you can add more to find out more with regards to the overall research question.
- Do adapt to the kind of language suitable for the person you interview! In square brackets, some suggestions for formulations. The bold questions are priorities. The questions in italics may be left out.

### Introduction

- Background to the study: outreach all over Sudan by an activist woman`s network. Focus on needs and demands of women and how the transition process could take them into account.
- Confidentiality and anonymity (if wanted)
- Recording
- Data Sheet
- Expectation management and (realistic!) follow up

## Questions

### Inclusiveness and Discrimination

- What kinds of discrimination and marginalisation [violence] do you face in Sudan?  
(for example, based on gender, education, ethnicity, religion, abilities, education ...)
- Did the previous government have a role in this discrimination?

### Needs

- **What are your needs that are not being met?**
- **What would be your ideas how to change this / make this happen?**
- Who are the key people to change that? Who takes decisions in your community?



## Political vision

- **What is your vision [idea, dream] of a new Sudan? And how would your life and your area look like then?**
- How could this be made possible? What would need to happen? (How would the new system need to look like, so that all people can be heard and their needs met?)
- **What were the good things you saw in the Revolution? What could be done to keep and strengthen them in the future?**
- What were the bad things in the revolution? How could we minimise them in the future?

## Transition process

- **How did the transition go since the Revolution up to now? Did you feel any changes? If yes: which?**
- **Do you feel part of the change (of the Revolution and since)?**
- **What is going well?**
- **What not?**
- How could it go on the right track?
- What could you—or we—do about it?

## Influencing political structures

- *Who (what kind of people or groups) was active in politics and the community before the Revolution? Who is now?*
- *What possibilities did you see for you/marginalised groups before the Revolution to influence politics?*
- What possibilities and chances of involving yourself in the change of your community and life would you like to see in the future? What would you need for that?
- **Who represents you in the Transition Government? Or: Who talks on behalf of you? Are the people who represent you the right people to speak on your behalf? [Do you agree with that?]**
- Do you ever meet or talk to the people who represent you?

## Optional / Alternatives

- Do you participate right now in decision-making in the community or in politics? If yes, how? Do you feel your voice is heard?
- Did you raise your demands to the previous government? Did they fulfill them? If not, why? Do you think that the Transition Government is doing or will be doing something about these demands now?

## Influencing the transition process

- So you see new opportunities now, with the Transition Government, to get your voice heard? Did you already use them?
- **What could be (additional/new) ways in which marginalised people can be involved? [How do you think you could involve yourself in the change?]**

# Annex 1c: Questionnaire for Decision-Makers

## Interview Questions

Decision-makers

For the study on

**“How can women—especially those facing several kinds of marginalisation or discrimination—bring their needs and demands into the transition process, so that the resulting structures are inclusive, accessible, and their needs are being met?”**

Conducted by “Bana Group for Peace and Development”, in cooperation with “KURVE Wustrow—Centre for Networking and Training in Nonviolent Action”, 2020.

### *Prioritised questions: in colour*

## Structure and Decision-Making of Transition Government

- How does the Transition Government take decisions?
- Who has the possibility to influence those decisions?
- How do the decision-making processes between the military and civilian members of the Transitional Government look like? What are the discussions looking like? Who takes which roles? Who (often) takes the lead, who follows?
- Do the discussions about decisions in the Transition Government include the perspective of marginalised people, particularly marginalised women?
- Which other bodies are important decision-makers in the transition period? How did they come into the decision-making power?
- How do the Transition Government and the Ministers' Cabinet cooperate?
- What are the plans and steps to get the change process also into the ranks of the administration and into the regions?
- What are the strategies of the Transition Government to involve potential spoilers? How much energy and compromise does this actually take?

## Access of Marginalised Women (e.g. from the Countryside, Conflict areas ...) into Decision-Processes

- How does the Transition Government get feedbacks or inputs from marginalised women?
- How do you envision a democratic government to do that?

- How can marginalised women be (better) included in the peace process?
- What could marginalised women do so that their voices are better heard, that they are more visible?
- How does the Transition Government communicate to civil society about what is happening with regards to the transition process? Do you think this information reaches marginalised women? If yes, how? If not, how could it be done?

## The Emerging New System

- Which forums or methods are there right now for **civil society to give inputs** into the transition process and shaping of the new system? Who participates mainly? Are marginalised women part of this?
- What are your **visions** for a new system in Sudan? [do you have a specific model in mind?]
- Which **processes** are right now ongoing or planned until the election/end of **transition period**? (peace process, transitional justice, economic reform, legal reforms...?)
- How do you think a new system can make sure that **economic development** will not only benefit a few elites, but will really benefit marginalised people and particularly women? Who is responsible and has the ability to make that happen?
- There are improvements planned in the health and education sectors, which is very important especially to marginalised women. Do you see them (and/or other marginalised groups) being prioritised in the efforts?
- Do you see any efforts right now or upcoming to improve the security situation of marginalised women (e.g. in IDP-Camps in Darfur etc.), or measures to secure women if families return from IDP-Camps to their villages?

## Legal Issues

- The Public Order Law has been abolished in Khartoum State. Will it be abolished in other states too? What is the process for this?
- What is the legal framework on protecting women and girls from violence (including sexualised violence and FGM)? How does the transitional government plan to improve the translation into practice?
- Do you think that Sudan will become a signatory of CEDAW in the nearer future and how would that be translated into practice, particularly with regards to marginalised women?
- In Gineina, we heard that one of the problems of rape children is that it is very difficult to get legal papers, and hence they are excluded from education etc... How could this be addressed best?

Thank you ever so much!

# Annex 2: Demographic Data Sheet

## Interview Data Sheet

— to be filled in by / for every person that is interviewed or in a focus group discussion!

Date & time: \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Location of interview: \_\_\_\_\_

Individual interview

Focus Group Discussion

Age: _____	Gender: _____
Education: _____	Marital status: _____
Place of living: _____	Occupation: _____
Ethnicity: _____	

Marginalised Woman

Activist

Other (e.g. Decision-maker)

Wants to be quoted, as \_\_\_\_\_



## Annex 4: Interviewees' Demographic Data<sup>38</sup>

Interviewees: Demographic Data	
As far as known from data sheets	

<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES (of whom 5 in a focus group)</b>	<b>129</b>
--	------------

GENDER			
Women:			117
	of whom divorced:	11, plus one whose husband abandoned her	
	of whom (known) early marriage:	2	
	of whom widow:	4	
	of whom single:	22	
Men:			12
	of whom single:	6	
	of whom married:	4	

ETHNICITY			
So-called „African“ ethnic groups			85
	Nuba (incl 3 men)	17	
	Zagahwa	14	
	Fur (incl. 2 men)	11	

<sup>38</sup> As pointed out in the description of the sample in Chapter 5, the demographic data sheets on which the information in this table is based, are not available for all interviewees. Some of the demographic data sheets handed in do not contain all information asked for. Therefore, the sample contains missing data. This explains why, in this table, the numbers do not always add up to the total number of interviewees.

	Massalit	10	
	Bargo	6	
	Logory	4	
	Barnu	3	
	Barta	3	
	Jalat	3	
	Dajo	2	
	Haware	2	
	Taishi (incl. 1 man)	2	
	Tagali Abasia (incl. 1 man)	2	
	Artag	1	
	Golfat	1	
	Hawazma	1	
	Kabashia	1	
	Teisi Abdul-Salam	1	
	Tanier	1	
So-called „Arab“ ethnic groups			15
	Messairya (incl. 3 men)	11	
	Rizeigat	2	
	Banya Amir	1	
	Jaalya	1	
Other/“exceptions“:			7

	Felata migrated from West Africa generations ago (of which 1 male)	3	
	Ethiopian (born of refugees in Sudan)	2	
	Dinka (mainly considered South Sudanese)	1	
	Nubian (Dongolawi, North Sudan)	1	

<b>CLASS</b>			
<b>Place of Living</b>			
Living in Khartoum (of whom 32 in marginalised areas like Dares-salam, Hajj Yousif, Umbadda, Mayo IDP Camp), incl. 7 men:		37	
Living in IDP Camps (Mornei (West Darfur), Kirinding & Abazar-Camp (Gineina), Alsalam & Atash Camps (Nyala), Mayo (Khartoum):		49	
Living in village (Sunut County West Kordofan, and North Darfur):		9	
Living in city but not Khartoum and IDP-Camps (El-Fasher, Kadugli, Deleng, Port Sudan), of which 2 men:		34	
Living outside of Sudan with political asylum		1	



Living in conflict zone (Darfur 57, Nuba mountains 19 incl 2 men)			76
--	--	--	----

<b>Job</b>			
Housewife/family care work		21	
Unemployed (incl. 1 man)		13	
Activist (of which 3 men)		10	
Tea seller		9	
Teacher		8	
Daily worker		6	
Student (incl. 1 man)		4	
Housekeeper, house maid		3	
Farmer		3	
Agricultural engineer (incl. 1 man)		3	
Secretary		2	
Social worker		2	
Factory worker		2	
Self-employed (incl. 1 man)		2	
Nutritionist		1	
Cleaner		1	
Trader		1	
Trainer		1	

Washing clothes		1	
Sheikha		1	
Building guard		1	
Doing national military service		1	
Midwife		1	
Doctor (male)		1	
Project manager (male)		1	
Carpenter (male)		1	
Member of Sovereignty Council (male)		1	

<b>Education</b>			
Does not speak Arabic at all		1	
No formal education		14	
Quran School		3	
Formal education up to basic school		20	
Formal education up to secondary school/high school (incl. 3 men)		20	
Up to college (incl. 1 man)		18	
University degree holder (graduate or postgraduate, incl. 6 men)		16	

## FURTHER CATEGORIES

Differently abled (known)		1	
---------------------------	--	---	--

<b>Age (women)</b>			
Age below 20		14	
Age between 21 and 30		31	
Age between 31 and 45		26	
Age between 46 and 62		3	
<b>Age (men)</b>			
Age between 20 and 30		5	
Age between 31 and 45		3	
Age between 46 and 50		2	

## INTERVIEW LOCATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

State	Locations	Abbreviation	No of interviewees
Darfur North	ElFasher	DN	7
	Village		1
Darfur South	Nyala	DS	17
Darfur West	Gineina	DW	15
	Mornei		17
East Sudan	Port Sudan	E	8
Khartoum	Hajj Yousif	KH	15 (incl. 2 men)
	Daressalaam		14 (incl. 4 men)

	Other		7 (incl. 1 man)
South Kordofan	Kadugli	SK	10 (incl. 2 men)
	Deleng		9
West Kordofan	Sunut villages	WK	8 (incl. 3 men)
Germany	Berlin	GE	1

<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>129 Interviewees (5 in focus group)</b>
--------------	--	--	--

## Annex 5: List of Interviewees

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES							
	<b>Acronym (Gender—State—Location—Interview No. - A=Activist, D=Decision-Maker, B=Bana Member)</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Occupation</b>
1	F-DN-ElFasher-01	40	High School	Barnu	female	married	teacher
2	F-DN-ElFasher-02	37	illiterate	Barnu	female	married	housewife
3	F-DN-ElFasher-03	35	College	Fur	female	married	unemployed
4	F-DN-ElFasher-04	32	High School	Zagahwa	female	married	housewife
5	F-DN-ElFasher-05	30	College	Zagahwa	female	married	social worker
6	F-DN-ElFasher-06	43	College	Kabashia	female	married	teacher
7	F-DN-ElFasher-07	40	Basic School	Zagahwa	female	married	housewife
8	F-DN-Village-01-A	27	University Master, Agricultural Engineer	Zagahwa	female	no answer	activist
9	F-DS-Nyala-01-A	25	College	no answer	female	single	activist
10	F-DS-Nyala-02	62	illiterate	Zagahwa	female	married	housewife
11	F-DS-Nyala-03	45	Quran School „Khalwa“	Zagahwa	female	married	housewife
12	F-DS-Nyala-04	43	unknown	Zagahwa	female	married	not working
13	F-DS-Nyala-05	several	5 women in 1 focus group, illiterate and educated	Zagahwa and Fur	female	married and single	housewives
14	F-DS-Nyala-05	several	5 women in 1 focus group, illiterate and educated	Zagahwa and Fur	female	married and single	housewives
15	F-DS-Nyala-05	several	5 women in 1 focus group, illiterate and educated	Zagahwa and Fur	female	married and single	housewives

16	F-DS-Nyala-05	several	5 women in 1 focus group, illiterate and educated	Zagahwa and Fur	female	married and single	housewives
17	F-DS-Nyala-05	several	5 women in 1 focus group, illiterate and educated	Zagahwa and Fur	female	married and single	housewives
18	F-DS-Nyala-06	unknown	unknown	Zagahwa	female	divorced	unknown
19	F-DS-Nyala-07	19	High School	Tanier	female	married	housewife
20	F-DS-Nyala-08	16	High School	Zagahwa	female	underage marriage	housewife
21	F-DS-Nyala-09	19	College	Fur	female	single	nutritionist
22	F-DS-Nyala-10	49	Basic Education	Zagahwa	female	married	housewife
23	F-DS-Nyala-11	35	none	Artag	female	divorced	not working
24	F-DS-Nyala-12	22	College	Zagahwa	female	single	doing national service (military)
25	F-DS-Nyala-13-A	19	University	Falata	female	single	social activist
26	F-DW-Gineina-01-A-B <sup>39</sup>	26	College	Barnu	female	single	activist
27	F-DW-Gineina-02	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
28	F-DW-Gineina-03	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	married	unknown
29	F-DW-Gineina-04	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
30	F-DW-Gineina-05	27	unknown	unknown	female	married	unknown
31	F-DW-Gineina-06	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
32	F-DW-Gineina-07	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
33	F-DW-Gineina-08-A	unknown	unknown	(Nuba mountains)	female	unknown	political activist
34	F-DW-Gineina-09	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	widow	(taking care of children and mother)
35	F-DW-Gineina-10	unknown	unknown	Massalit	female	unknown	unknown
36	F-DW-Gineina-11	unknown	Does not speak Arabic	Does not speak Arabic	female	unknown	unknown
37	F-DW-Gineina-12	unknown	unknown	Massalit	female	unknown	unknown
38	F-DW-Gineina-13	unknown	unknown	Massalit	female	unknown	unknown
39	F-DW-Gineina-14	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
40	F-DW-Gineina-15	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	Sheika
41	F-DW-Mornei-01-A-B	39	BA Degree	Fur	female	divorced	teacher

<sup>39</sup> This interviewee lives both in Gineina and Khartoum. It is common in Sudan for people to alternate their location and especially to move between the capital and their home town or area. Where known, this is marked in foot-notes.

42	F-DW-Mornei-02	25	none	Dajo	female	married	farmer/housewife
43	F-DW-Mornei-03	21	University	Fur	female	single	teacher
44	F-DW-Mornei-04	16	Basic School	Massalit	female	single	unemployed
45	F-DW-Mornei-05	30	uneducated	Massalit	female	divorced	unemployed
46	F-DW-Mornei-06	38	High School	Haware	female	married	housewife
47	F-DW-Mornei-07	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
48	F-DW-Mornei-08	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
49	F-DW-Mornei-09	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
50	F-DW-Mornei-10	22	-	Massalit	female	married	daily worker
51	F-DW-Mornei-11	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
52	F-DW-Mornei-12	26	College	Haware	female	married	unemployed
53	F-DW-Mornei-13	18	Basic School	Massalit	female	divorced	unemployed
54	F-DW-Mornei-14	36	Basic School / 3rd grade	Massalit	female	married	daily worker
55	F-DW-Mornei-15	20	High School	Massalit	female	married	cleaner
56	F-DW-Mornei-16	27	Basic School	Gemmir	female	married	daily worker
57	F-DW-Mornei-17	18	Basic School	Massalit	female	married	trade
58	F-E-Port Sudan-01	18	Basic School	Bania Amer	female	married	tea lady
59	F-E-Port Sudan-02	19	College Student	Nuba (Christian)	female	not married	student
60	F-E-Port Sudan-03	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
61	F-E-Port Sudan-04	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
62	F-E-Port Sudan-05	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
63	F-E-Port Sudan-06	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
64	F-E-Port Sudan-07	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
65	F-E-Port Sudan-08	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
66	F-GE-Berlin-01-A-B	33	Computer Engineer	Riseigat/Hamar (Arab)	female	unmarried	trainer
67	F-KH-Daressalam-02-A	29	University Medical Laboratory	Nuba	female	single	teacher
68	F-KH-Daressalam-03	50	Basic School	Nuba	female	divorced	tea lady
69	F-KH-Daressalam-04	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	widow	housekeeper
70	F-KH-Daressalam-05	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	widow	tea lady
71	F-KH-Daressalam-06	unknown	unknown	? (Ethiopian)	female	unknown	washing clothes

72	F-KH-Da-ressalam-07	38	Basic School	Nuba	female	married	tea lady
73	F-KH-Da-ressalam-08	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	tea lady
74	F-KH-Da-ressalam-09	34	Basic School	Nuba	female	married	house maid
75	F-KH-Da-ressalam-10	30	Basic School	Jaalya	female	divorced	house maid
76	F-KH-Da-ressalam-11	unknown	unknown	(South Darfur)	female	unknown	unknown
77	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-01-A-B	31	University	Nuba	female	single	teacher
78	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-02	27	College	Dajo	female	single	teacher
79	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-03	18	College	Bargo	female	single	student
80	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-04	24	College	Bargo	female	divorced	Secretary
81	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-05	30	High School	Bargo	female	single	factory worker
82	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-06	22	College	Rizeigat	female	single	teacher
83	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-07	21	College	Barta	female	single	student
84	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-08	35	High School	Nuba	female	husband abandoned her	building guard
85	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-09	30	High School	Nuba	female	single	factory worker
86	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-10	25	Basic School	Barta	female	married	housewife
87	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-11	22	High School	Nuba	female	married	housewife
88	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-12	24	College	Bargo	female	married	secretary
89	F-KH-Hajj Yousif-13	26	College	Barta	female	single	social worker
90	F-KH-Other-01-A-B	32	B.A. and High Diploma	Danagla	female	not married	agricultural engineer
91	F-KH-Other-02-A-B <sup>40</sup>	42	High School	Messairya	female	married	activist
92	F-KH-Other-03-A-B <sup>41</sup>	26	College	Barna	female	single	activist
93	F-KH-Other-04-A-B <sup>42</sup>	39	University	Fur	female	single	unemployed
94	F-KH-Other-05	19	attended school until she had to help earn money	(Ethopian, Christian)	female	unknown	tea lady
95	F-KH-Other-06-A	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
96	F-SK-Deleng-01	25	illiterate	Bargo	female	married	daily worker

40 This interviewee lives both in Khartoum and in the Sunut region, West Kordofan.

41 This interviewee lives both in Khartoum and in Kadugli, South Kordofan.

42 This interviewee lives both in Khartoum and in Zalingi, Central Darfur.



97	F-SK-Deleng-02	21	High School	Jalad	female	single	not working
98	F-SK-Deleng-03	30	Basic School	Jalad	female	married	housewife
99	F-SK-Deleng-04	28	illiterate	Jalad	female	divorced	housewife
100	F-SK-Deleng-05	30	illiterate	Dinka	female	married	not working
101	F-SK-Deleng-06	30	High School	Felata	female	married	not working
102	F-SK-Deleng-07	25	illiterate	Hawazma	female	underage marriage	daily worker
103	F-SK-Deleng-08	35	illiterate	Golfat	female	married	tea lady
104	F-SK-Deleng-09	35	illiterate	Bargo	female	widow	housewife
105	F-SK-Kadugli-01-A-B	30	University: Agriculture	Nuba	female	single	engineer at the Ministry of Agriculture and Resources, Kadugli
106	F-SK-Kadugli-02	35	Basic School	Teisi Abdul-Salam	female	divorced	tea lady
107	F-SK-Kadugli-03	25	High School	Saraf El-Logory	female	married	housewife
108	F-SK-Kadugli-04	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
109	F-SK-Kadugli-05	35	Quran School „Khalwa“	Logory	female	widow	midwife
110	F-SK-Kadugli-06	37	High School	Logory	female	widow	farmer
111	F-SK-Kadugli-07	35	Quran School „Khalwa“	Logory	female	unknown	unknown
112	F-SK-Kadugli-08	unknown	unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
113	F-WK-Sunut-01	24	Basic School 7th grade	Messairya	female	married	farmer
114	F-WK-Sunut-02	25	illiterate	Messairya	female	divorced	tea lady
115	F-WK-Sunut-03	18	Basic School 7th grade	Messairya	female	underage marriage	not working
116	F-WK-Sunut-04	19	High School	Messairya	female	married	self-employed
117	F-WK-Sunut-05	unknown	Unknown	unknown	female	unknown	unknown
118	M-KH-Daressalam-01-A	unknown	Unknown	unknown	male	unknown	unknown
119	M-KH-Daressalam-02-A	26	University	Nuba	male	single	social activist
120	M-KH-Daressalam-03-A	26	University	Felata	male	single	project manager
121	M-KH-Daressalam-04-A	unknown	Unknown	Nuba	male	unknown	unknown
122	M-KH-Hajj Yousif-01	23	High School	Fur	male	single	carpenter
123	M-KH-Hajj Yousif-02	23	High School	Fur	male	single	student

124	M-KH-Other-01-D	47	Post Graduate	Taishi	male	married	Member of Sovereignty Council
125	M-SK-Kadugli-01	35	College Degree	Nuba	male	single	employed
126	M-SK-Kadugli-02	33	Master	Tagali Abasia	male	married	agricultural engineer
127	M-WK-Sunut-01-A	40	University	Messairya	male	married	doctor
128	M-WK-Sunut-02-A	50	High School	Messairya	male	married	self-employed
129	M-WK-Sunut-03-A	24	University	Messairya	male	single	unemployed





Circle of hands (Bana).  
Photo: Bana Group

**Bana Group for Peace And Development** is a group of Women Human Rights Defenders from all over Sudan, who have been working together beyond ethnic and regional divides since 2017. They supported each other and collectively took part in the Revolution of 2019. In December 2019, they met in Sudan's marginalised West Darfur region to kick off this study and further work for the empowerment of multi-marginalised women, in cooperation with the German NGO KURVE Wustrow—Centre for Training and Networking in Nonviolent Action, supported by the "Civil Peace Service" programme.

**Bana** is a network that works on a consensus basis, beyond political affiliations and with an activist rather than an NGO approach. Current other foci are emergency solidarity work in the context of the COVID 19 pandemic, and linking sustainable agricultural approaches like permaculture to the Sudanese contexts.



**Contact:**

**Bana Group for Peace and Development:**  
bana.kh@protonmail.com // bana.darfur@protonmail.com  
mai.shatta@protonmail.com

**KURVE Wustrow** was founded in 1980 with the aim of turning concerns about violent conflict into conscious nonviolent action. They conduct trainings, workshops and events in the field of civil, nonviolent conflict transformation in Germany and abroad. They send International Peace Workers as part of the "Civil Peace Service" to selected crisis regions. For this purpose, KURVE Wustrow is closely cooperating with partner organisations in Eastern Europe, in the Middle East and in South Asia and Africa.



**Contact:**

**KURVE Wustrow:** info@kurvewustrow.org  
Phone: +49 (0) 58 43 98 71 0 // www.kurvewustrow.org



Supported by the

